

THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF TURKEY, 1481-1512

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The Foreign Relations of
T U R K E Y
1481 - 1512

By
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PREFACE

MACHIAVELLI is reported to have thought that "a second ruler like Bayezid would have rendered the Ottoman power innocuous to Europe," and Sir Edward Creasy summarized these years of Ottoman history as the "feeble and inglorious reign" of Bayezid II. It has been the custom of historians to dispose of Bayezid as one of the "slothful sultans" of the Ottoman line, although Professor Schevill some years ago questioned this viewpoint and indicated that perhaps Bayezid II recognized the need of consolidating the empire his father had shaped.

Seven sultans of the Ottoman dynasty ruled the Turks preceding the accession of Bayezid II. All of these seven had been men of outstanding ability, each apparently abler and more successful than his predecessor, and the seventh with his dramatic conquest of Constantinople and his forceful and dashing personality was so outstanding that any to come after could hardly be other than anticlimactic. The sixteenth century, however, seemed more exciting and more colorful than the fifteenth. Gold from the new world poured into the old, affecting the Ottoman empire as much as any. The Mamluk power in Egypt without the revenue from the transit trade fell easier to the Turks, who then proceeded to subject most of the Balkans and the Near East to their rule. Little notice, therefore, was given to what happened between the first flush of the Ottoman empire under Mehmed the Conqueror and the full flowering under Selim the Grim and Suleiman the Magnificent.

Consequently the present study was undertaken to fill in the gaps for that period of Ottoman history coinciding with the discovery of America, the rounding of Africa, and the birth of the modern national European states; the study was also undertaken with the thought that the history of a period or a people can often be best understood by seeking out second-rate figures.

The author wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to the American Council of Learned Societies for two grants-in-aid, one in 1935 and the other in 1938, for the study of the Turkish language, which study made possible the use of certain Turkish sources for this period.

Dr. Paul Wittek of the University of London, England, has been exceedingly generous in giving his time and rendering invaluable assistance not only in the study of the Turkish language as used by the fifteenth and sixteenth century Ottoman chroniclers but also in the study of the origins and the development of the Ottoman state.

To Professor Emeritus Albert Howe Lybyer of the University of Illinois the author is especially grateful. The study was first suggested by Professor Lybyer in 1933, and under his wise and friendly direction it was first written as a doctoral dissertation, submitted in 1935. Since then,

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a great deal of material has been investigated and added, and the monograph as presented here is the product of this later research and of several revisions of the original manuscript.

The author is thankful for the continued encouragement and tolerance given by the several members of his family throughout the preparation of this book.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

THE BATTLE OF MANZIKERT in 1071 was a calamitous affair for Romanos IV, Diogenes, Emperor of Constantinople, but for Alp Arslan and his Turkish company it was a victory so decisive that nearly all of Asia Minor was opened to them immediately. Though the control over this region by these Seljuk Turks was new, their knowledge of this part of the world had been considerable for many years.¹ Along the frontier facing Byzantium had developed quasi-independent states, the objectives of which were to protect the urban centers of Islam, to harass the Byzantine empire continuously, and to extend the Moslem faith and the lands of the Abbassid caliphs. Many, though not all, of the leaders and soldiers of these frontier states were Turks who, after 1071, found it easy to expand their possessions in Asia Minor. Some, indeed, moved on to the advanced frontier and formed new marches against the enemy.²

Meanwhile the Seljuk princes who had led in the invasion of Asia Minor and their descendants slowly came to the realization that this was a permanent acquisition and a desirable productive region rather than just a valuable steppingstone to something greater in the older Moslem world. At the moment when this new attitude was recognized the Seljuk princes began to establish an empire with Konya as its center.³ They incorporated most of the autonomous little states of Asia Minor into a Seljuk empire and were instituting a stable civilization when the Mongol invasion of the thirteenth century destroyed most of the existing unity.

During the flourishing years of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the government, religious circles, and cultured society of the Seljuk empire came to be filled with ambitious individuals from the older Moslem centers. It was they who organized the state and its government, who planned and built the splendid Seljuk mosques and schools, who wrote the poetry and chronicles of the empire, and who, in short, civilized the area.⁴ But every move which increased the power and size of the state and centralized its government was strongly contested by all the frontier groups which, heretofore, had been largely independent. As the spirit of these border states was never destroyed completely, new frontier states and principalities emerged quite naturally, following the disorganization

¹ Turkish soldiers were employed in Baghdad in the ninth century, and during the tenth and eleventh centuries Turkish tribesmen in considerable numbers fought and settled in the neighborhood of Malatya and Diarbekir (P. Wittek, "Deux chapitres de l'histoire des Turcs de Roum," in *Byzantion*, XI, 293). Before the battle of Manzikert, Turks had raided as far west as Konya (P. Wittek, *The rise of the Ottoman empire*, p. 19).

² The Danishmend emirate around Amasya was perhaps the outstanding example.

³ Cf. Cahen, "La campagne de Manzikert d'après les sources musulmanes," in *Byzantion*, IX, 613-642; Wittek, "Deux chapitres," pp. 296-297.

⁴ Wittek, *The rise of the Ottoman empire*, pp. 16-32. Undoubtedly many of these cultured administrators were trained in the schools of Baghdad (B. Miller, *The palace school of Muhammad the conqueror*, pp. 12-20; 193, n. 12).

brought to Asia Minor by the Mongols and by those fleeing from this Asiatic horde.⁵ One of the many new states appearing at this time was led by a certain Osman, who became the eponymous hero of the Ottoman Turks.

Since the date of this study lies in a period when the Ottoman empire was not fully matured and was still inchoate in character, it is profitable to view the qualities of the institutions in the early state in order to understand better the struggles and the policies which dominated the later age under consideration here.

The warlike frontiersman living on the confines of the weakened Abbassid empire and the disrupted Seljuk empire was called by the Moslems a ghazi, and hence his state is referred to as a ghazi state. Literally *ghazi* means a raider but, as used commonly by the Arabs and the Turks, it came to signify anyone who fought against the enemies of Islam.⁶ Actually the ghazis of Asia Minor lived almost entirely from forays into the Byzantine empire and accepted in their ranks not only Turks and Arabs but Greeks, Armenians, and renegades from many different countries. Their civilization, if it may be so termed, was in a constant state of flux and the only permanent characteristic was that of raids and change. Skill and bravery in battle were the highest attributes. Theology, especially orthodoxy, learning, conservatism, domesticity, and distinguished ancestry were held in little esteem. It was loyalty to the group and to the individual ghazi within the group which united them. War, raiding, and movement were the natural life of a ghazi, and when he became surrounded by a stabilized and civilized society he knew not how to live and promptly rebelled.

Osman, the first of the Osmanli, or Ottoman, dynasty, was a ghazi and a leader of ghazis.⁷ He gathered about him warriors who under his leadership proved to be a constant threat to peaceful conditions along the confines of the Byzantine empire. Under his next successors, Orkhan and Murad I, the ghazi activities continued and much of the Balkan peninsula was overrun and held by them. From the names of leading ghazis, such as Evrenos and Mikhaloglu, it is evident that several, if not many, of the ghazis were of Christian origin.⁸ In the fourteenth century, therefore, in this dawning Ottoman empire, it should be emphasized that the ghazi

⁵ In western Anatolia the leading new emirates besides the Ottoman were Menteshe, Aydin, Sarukhan, Karasi, Tekke, Jandar, Hamid, Kermian, Ghazi Chelebi, and Karaman.

⁶ The poet Ahmed at the end of the fourteenth century declared, "A Ghazi is the instrument of the religion of Allah, a servant of God who purifies the earth from the filth of polytheism . . . the Ghazi is the sword of God, he is the protector and the refuge of the believers. If he becomes a martyr in the ways of God, do not believe that he has died—he lives in beatitude with Allah, he has eternal life" (Witteck, *The rise of the Ottoman empire*, p. 14).

⁷ Orkhan, son of Osman, is called "Sultan, son of the sultan of the ghazis, ghazi, son of a ghazi, marquis of the horizons, hero of the world" (Witteck, "Deux chapitres," p. 305).

⁸ Mikhaloglu would be "the Michaelsons." For Evrenos, see J. H. Mordtmann, "Evrenos," in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, II, 34-35.

force was the power which created and led the state and that this force was ghazi, not Turkish, in character.

These ghazis, in the period when the Ottoman state was spreading out over the Balkans, can be separated into two categories.⁹ One, undoubtedly truer to the original idea, was composed of the raiders who were almost continuously engaged in raiding and who were not dependent on the personal leadership of the Ottoman emir. The other division contained all of the ghazis who were directly under the emir, thus becoming *his* dependable soldiers. This force was augmented by captives of war, each of whom would fight for his captor, whether he be the emir or some important ghazi. These were the new soldiers called janissaries. Thus, the Ottoman forces had an almost inexhaustible supply of man power, for each new conquest added fighting men to the ranks and a new area from which to draw. This personal ghazi, or janissary, army was perhaps the most important development in the fourteenth century for it permitted the Ottomans to carry on official raids and real organized war. Toward the end of the century under Bayezid I, first of his line to take the title sultan, conquests of the older Moslem states and the adoption by him of many ways common to Balkan aristocracy alienated many of the ghazis, who after Timur's victory at Ankara in 1402 and the following general disruption, seized the opportunity to redirect the energies of the state to former ghazi practices.¹⁰

In the wake of these astonishing successes of Osman, Orkhan, and Murad I, many men — Arabs, Syrians, Persians, Iraqis, and Seljuk Turks — flocked to the new centers to establish a Moslem civilization. Teachers, jurists, theologians, and dervishes wanted to share in the acquired wealth and hoped there would be places for them in the conquered lands.¹¹ Bursa (Brusa), the first important residence of the Ottomans, rapidly developed into a moslem center with many mosques and schools.¹² It was this learned group, the *'ulema*,¹³ which greatly helped to administer and to retain what the ghazis had won. The *'ulema* represented a more settled and civilized society than the ghazis and because of this difference it should be easy to understand the scorn, contempt, and jealousy each had for the other.

Within the Ottoman state, besides the ghazis and *'ulema*, there were two other important groups, the sipahis and the *akhis*. There were two types of the former. In one class, a sipahi was a feudal lord who possessed

⁹ Wittek, *The rise of the Ottoman empire*, p. 45.

¹⁰ Wittek, "De la défaite d'Ankara à la prise de Constantinople (un demi-siècle d'histoire ottomane)," in *Revue des études Islamiques* (1938), pp. 15-28.

¹¹ Wittek, *The rise of the Ottoman empire*, pp. 42-43.

¹² Brusa came to be called *dar al-'ulema*, the city of theologians.

¹³ The word *'ulema* means learned men and doctors of the canon law of Islam.

a fief from the sultan and who could be called upon for service if needed;¹⁴ in the other, a sipahi of the court was a soldier in the standing cavalry of the sultan. Most of the sipahis were or had been ghazis and most of the land assigned to them had been won by the sword and it could be passed on to sons. Later, of course, when many of the soldiers of the state technically were slaves, fiefs were supposed to return to the sultan, but actually many did not and these were left to sons.¹⁵ Thus a new aristocracy, or gentry, was developed.

An *akhi*, however, was not a fighting man but an artisan.¹⁶ It is not exactly known what connections the *akhis* had with the ghazis. Nevertheless, from descriptions of them it can be seen that there were several artisan fraternities, corporations, or guilds, which cooperated with the ghazis and always played an integral part in the productive life of the cities and towns of Asia Minor.¹⁷

After the defeat at the Battle of Ankara in 1402 the Ottoman state ceased to exist. All the Anatolian emirates which had been acquired by Bayezid I were restored by Timur to their previous rulers; yet the sons of Bayezid salvaged something: Isa held Bursa; Mehmed, Amasya; and Suleiman, all the European territory of his father.¹⁸ Nevertheless, within ten years, Mehmed had defeated his brothers and reunited the family possessions. Following this, Mehmed I, Murad II, and Mehmed II more gradually, but more securely, bound together under them nearly all the emirates and Turkish tribes of western Asia Minor. These three were considered great ghazi sultans. Mehmed I and Murad II were reared at Amasya, one of the oldest ghazi centers in Asia Minor,¹⁹ and in their lives they followed the *futuwwa*,²⁰ which was a set of chivalric rules that guided many ghazis. They supported and directed the raids and campaigns in Europe, and Mehmed II, by capturing Constantinople, came

¹⁴ The giving of fiefs to warriors was customary at the time of the Seljuks (Witteck, *The rise of the Ottoman empire*, p. 19). These sipahis usually came to war mounted.

¹⁵ Junis Bey and Alvise Gritti, "Pamphlet," in A. H. Lybyer, *The government of the Ottoman empire in the time of Suleiman the magnificent*, p. 271.

¹⁶ Wittek, *The rise of the Ottoman empire*, p. 42.

¹⁷ For the importance of the *akhis*, consult W. L. Langer and R. P. Blake, "The rise of the Ottoman Turks and its historical background," in *The American Historical Review*, XXXVII, 468-505; Wittek, *The rise of the Ottoman empire*, pp. 42, 44.

¹⁸ Wittek, "De la défaite d'Ankara," pp. 16-17.

¹⁹ Before the Seljuk state determined upon Konya for the capital, the Danishmendids had established Amasya as their chief city. Later, when the Seljuk empire disintegrated, a Danishmendid state was reconstructed at Amasya. One of the prime characteristics of the Danishmendid mode of life was the ghazi organization. The Danishmendids claimed the famous Ghazi Seyyid Battal as a member of their family (Witteck, *The rise of the Ottoman empire*, p. 20).

²⁰ The *futuwwa* was a set of canon rules to govern a virtuous life. Several corporations based their rules on the *futuwwa*, and at the end of the fifteenth century four corporations still remained — *ghazi*, *akhi*, *abdal*, and *baji* ('Āsiqāshāzāde, *Tārīkh-i* [F. Giese, ed.], pp. 201, 213). The chivalrous rules placed the "obligation of mutual fidelity" on both follower and leader. There was a kind of investiture ceremony, using a war club, sword, and drinking cup (Witteck, *The rise of the Ottoman empire*, pp. 38-40; C. van Arendonk, "Futuwa," in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, II, 123-124). Some of these ceremonies still existed in the late fifteenth century, for Jem, during the winter of 1481-1482, took part in such a ceremony on his trip to Mecca (Hasan ibn Mahmud Beyati, *Jām-i Jem dīn* [Ālī 'Amiri, ed.]).

to be looked upon as the greatest of all ghazis. They did not neglect, however, the problem of the Asiatic provinces. Whereas Bayezid I had conquered these areas and had come to live and act as the successor of the Byzantine and Balkan rulers, Mehmed I and Murad II married Turkish ladies and thoroughly identified themselves with the Turkish people.²¹ Thus, through marriage and a more tempered pressure, they regained control of western Anatolia. It was during the reign of Murad II that the Osmanli began to trace their ancestry back to the Turkish Oghuz tribe and to think of the history of the dynasty.²² Mehmed II, after the conquest of Constantinople, became the heir of the Byzantine emperors, and the chief task of establishing the Ottoman empire fell to him. He tried by the use of the *'ulema*, the sipahis, and the janissaries to weld the Balkan districts and the Anatolian provinces into an empire, but it was not an easy task.²³ When he died in 1481 the work had not been completed, though under his strong hand the fissures in the structure were hardly apparent.

At the time of Mehmed's death in 1481 the Ottoman empire lay astride the Straits between Europe and Asia, controlling the lands on all sides from the Taurus Mountains and the Euphrates to the Danube and the Dalmatian coast. Nearly all of Greece was hers, and the Black Sea, except for a bit of the north shore, was a Turkish lake. A foothold in southern Italy had been won at Otranto, and the Knights at Rhodes were apprehensive about their position. Government in the Crimea and around the Sea of Azov was guided by the Ottoman sultan.

The inhabitants of the Ottoman empire were less unified and less homogeneous than would be indicated by the structure of the state. Throughout European Turkey there were the same peoples and groups which had lived there before their conquest. In Asia Minor there were Greeks and Armenians, Persians, Arabs, Syrians, and Turks. Some were semi-nomadic; others were warriors, settled farmers and artisans, mystic dervishes, and proud urbane gentlemen. The Ottoman family by the use of force, patronage, and fiefs was developing a loyalty to itself, but it was far from being perfected enough to survive any great temptation. There were still many descendants and satellites of former princes, living within and outside the empire and longing for a return to former glories. Given an opportunity which promised a chance of success, they would eagerly support any movement to weaken the power of Ottoman rule.

²¹ Mehmed I married a daughter of the house of Sulqadr and Murad II, a daughter of the emir of Jandar (Witteck, "De la défaite d'Ankara," p. 27). ²² *Ibid.*, pp. 27-28.

²³ One of Mehmed's grand vizirs was Karamani Mehmed Pasha, who was trained by the *'ulema* (F. Babinger, "Karamani Mehmed Pasha," in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, II, 745-746). For Mehmed's great work in building a civil corps of administrators, see Miller, *The palace school*, pp. 20-44.

CHAPTER II

BAYEZID'S YOUTH AND ACCESSION TO THE THRONE, 1447-1481

AT LEAST for a century preceding Mehmed's death it had become the prerogative of the successful heir of an Ottoman sultan to execute his brothers and other male members of the family.¹ Naturally, this practice set the stakes of inheritance high and often led to civil struggles. The passing of the Conqueror brought no exception to this custom, and for the next two years the Ottoman empire was the scene of fighting between Bayezid and Jem, the two sons of Mehmed II.

Bayezid, the elder of these two, was born in 1447 at the palace at Demotika,² which is located in eastern Thrace, southwest of Edirne (Adrianople). His mother was called Gulbahar, or "Rose Blossom," and by birth she was a Turk.³ It may have been that she came from an old Tokat family, for Bayezid erected there in 1485 a mosque and school in her memory.⁴

It was the general custom for an Ottoman prince to remain in the harem with his mother until between the age of seven to ten, when he would be sent to some province to rule under the tutelage of a corps of teachers and advisers.⁵ Bayezid was sent to Amasya, the old ghazi Danishmend center, where he governed for more than twenty-four years. This assignment was made, moreover, before his circumcision, for in the fall of 1457, Mehmed II invited to Edirne⁶ all the important men of the state to celebrate the occasion. After the four-day festival of formal court gatherings, banquets, pageantry, and almsgiving, Bayezid and his brother, Mustafa, with their preceptors returned to their residences at Amasya and Manisa (Magnesia) respectively.⁷

In time of war the sons were called upon to lead various sections of

¹ John VI Cantacuzena, who died in 1383, spoke of this custom. It became a lawful right at the time of Mehmed II (Witteke, "De la défaite d'Ankara," p. 23).

² Rector et Consilium Ragusini ad Illustrissimum Dominum Venetum, Ragusa, May 10, 1512, in M. Sanuto, *I diarii*, XIV, 222. (Hereafter this work will be referred to as Sanuto.) In later years Bayezid was very fond of Demotika, and in 1509, after the earthquake, he spent a considerable sum in repairing the palace and its walls (Nicolo Zustignan to Venetian Government, Edirne [Adrianople], August 4, 1510, in *ibid.*, XI, 293; T. Spandugino, *De la origine deli imperatori Ottomani, ordini de la corte, forma del guerreggiare loro, religione, rito, et costumi de la natione, in Documents inédits relatifs à l'histoire de la Grèce au moyen âge* [C. N. Sathas, ed.], IX, 177). Jem was born in 1459 (J. von Hammer, *Histoire de l'empire Ottoman depuis son origine jusqu'à nos jours*, III, 456).

³ L. Thuasne, *Djem-sultan, fils de Mohammed II, frère de Bayezid II, (1459-1495)*, p. 28n. (Hereafter this work will be referred to as Thuasne.) Mustafa Pasha, who was Bayezid's maternal uncle, was the son of Hamza Bey, or Hızır Bey (D. DaLezze, *Historia Turchesca, (1300-1514)* [Ursu, ed.], p. 180; Hammer, III, 340; IV, 8).

⁴ A. Gabriel, *Monuments Turcs d'Anatolie*, II, 91, 93.

⁵ Miller, *The palace school*, pp. 22-23.

⁶ Leunclavius mentions Istanbul (*Annales Sultanorum Othmanidarum*, p. 45).

⁷ F. Giese, "Die altosmanischen anonymen Chroniken in Text und Übersetzung," in *Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, XVII, no. 1, 148-149; L. Chalcocondylae, *De origine ac rebus gestis imperatorum Turcicorum*, p. 287; Hammer, III, 38-39.

the forces. In the campaigns of 1473 of Mehmed II against Uzun Hasan of Persia, both Bayezid and Mustafa took part. Bayezid with his tutor, Khass Murad Pasha, led some thirty thousand Rumelian troops on the right wing while Mustafa led a like number of Anatolian troops on the left.⁸ At the Battle of the Euphrates, Gedik Ahmed Pasha was sent to inspect Bayezid's troops. The pasha reproached Bayezid for their disorder and thereby opened a standing feud between the two; Bayezid was so angered that he declared Gedik Ahmed would sometime rue this day.⁹ The battle was indecisive although Bayezid did his part satisfactorily.¹⁰ Later, in 1480, when Mehmed II was busy in the Balkans and engaged in Bessarabia, Bayezid was ordered to take the fortress of Turul in Armenia.¹¹ But in all these engagements it was never demonstrated that Bayezid was a magnetic leader or a brilliant soldier.

Whether or not Mehmed II had a preference among his sons can not be definitely established. After 1474, when Mustafa died,¹² rumor had it that Jem was his father's favorite and would be the successor.¹³ Nevertheless, many of the high officials, the pages, and the leaders of the janissaries were friendly with and favored Bayezid.¹⁴ Mehmed II, moreover, had appointed at least two of Bayezid's sons,¹⁵ Abdullah and Ahmed, governors of Manisa and Mastro respectively.¹⁶ These sons in a struggle between Bayezid and Jem would naturally bring their forces in on the side of their father. But Bayezid was apprehensive and realized that there was a difference between the positions of the elder son and the successor.¹⁷

In character, the two heirs, Bayezid and Jem, bore little resemblance. Bayezid was thirty-four years old and more given to books and talk than to the profession of arms.¹⁸ At Amasya he filled his days with music, poetry, philosophy, theology, astronomy, and cosmography. Ottoman historians, consequently, have named him *Sofi* or *Veli*—a religious devotee or saint, respectively. He was interested in good craftsmanship and collected finely cut diamonds and hand-wrought objects in metal. In

⁸ DaLezze, pp. 45, 55; C. Zeno, "Travels in Persia," in *A narrative of Italian travels in Persia in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries* (C. Grey, trans. and ed.), The Hakluyt Society Works, XLIX, 21-23; Hammer, III, 161; G. M. Angiolello, "A short narrative of the life and acts of the King Ussun Cassano," in *A narrative of Italian travels in Persia in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries*, The Hakluyt Society Works, XLIX, 78-80.

⁹ This feud was ended by Gedik Ahmed's execution when Bayezid was sultan (Giese, p. 155; DaLezze, p. 185; Lutfi Pasha, *Tavârih al-'otmân*, [Kilisli Mu'allim Rif'at, ed.], p. 192).

¹⁰ DaLezze, p. 61; Giese, pp. 151-152; Zeno, pp. 24-26; Angiolello, pp. 88-90; Hammer, III, 162-165.

¹¹ Hammer, III, 252. ¹² DaLezze, p. 66.

¹³ Spandugino, p. 170; M. Sanuto, *La spedizione di Carlo VIII in Italia*, p. 190.

¹⁴ N. Jorga, *Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches*, II, 234; Spandugino, p. 170; S. N. Fisher, "Civil strife in the Ottoman empire, 1481-1503," in *The Journal of Modern History*, XIII, 455-457.

¹⁵ Bayezid had eight sons: Abdullah, Shehin, Alem, Ahmed, Mehmed, Mahmud, Korkud, and Selim (Hammer, IV, chart at the end). ¹⁶ Hammer, III, 345; DaLezze, p. 70.

¹⁷ As a prince in Amasya, Bayezid vowed to build a mosque and a school there if he became sultan (Amasyali 'abdi Zade Husain Husam-ad-din, *Amasya târîh-i*, I, 128-129; Gabriel, II, 38).

¹⁸ "Yet if it is a question of words, they expound like Beyazid" (Sâri Mehmed Pasha, *Nasâ'ih ül-vâğera ve 'l-ümme*, [W. L. Wright, Jr., ed.] Princeton Oriental Texts, II, p. 109. In Dr. Wright's translation [published in the same volume as the original], *Ottoman statecraft: the book of counsel for vezirs and governors*, p. 140).

his younger days he enjoyed physical exercise and became a fine horseman and an excellent marksman with the bow.¹⁹ His tastes were simple and, following religious practices, he ate moderately and abstained from wine. Above all, he was peaceful in temperament.²⁰

Jem, twelve years his junior, besides being a poet of fame, was much more energetic, warlike, severe, and openhanded than his brother. It was asserted by some of his contemporaries and has been maintained by later writers that these characteristics led Mehmed II and some of the high officials to prefer Jem to Bayezid.²¹ Undoubtedly these qualities were more in accordance with those of his father than were those of Bayezid, and for this reason it is not difficult to think that Mehmed II might have hoped that his younger son would succeed to the throne.

In the spring of 1481 Mehmed II gathered his army in Anatolia and crossed the Bosphorus to Uskudar late in April to lead the campaign in person. Against whom the force was to be directed remains unsettled. It might have been against either Rhodes or Egypt. Perhaps it was to subdue tribes on the confines of Anatolia. Some have contended that he went to humble and crush his son, Bayezid, who, he feared, was becoming too confident and bellicose.²² But Mehmed II perished before the campaign began.

Early in May the army was quartered for the night near Maltepe and there Mehmed II died unexpectedly. Neşri, who writes as if he had been on the expedition, states dramatically that he was awakened in the middle of the night to find the wind was whistling where the sultan's tent had been pitched.²³ Camp was broken immediately and the army hurriedly pressed back to Uskudar (Scutari), there to find all transportation to Istanbul seized. Slowly it was learned that the sultan was dead and that the grand vizir and the pashas had secretly carried the body across to Istanbul.

In order to enable Jem to reach the capital and be proclaimed sultan before Bayezid arrived on the scene, Karamani Mehmed Pasha²⁴ and Manisali Chelebi, grand vizir and chief judge respectively,²⁵ had hoped

¹⁹ Strange as it may seem to those familiar with the nineteenth- and twentieth-century Ottoman empire, the earlier Ottoman Turk placed great importance in physical fitness, strength, and endurance. On the regimen of this, see Miller, *The palace school*, pp. 117-123, 155-159.

²⁰ DaLezze, p. 166; Hammer, IV, 1-3; Thuasne, pp. 28-30.

²¹ Thuasne, p. 31; Spandugino, p. 170; DaLezze, p. 172. Thuasne's biography of Jem is both scholarly and easy to read and unquestionably gives the reader a correct portrayal of the diverse facets of Ottoman civilization.

²² Spandugino, p. 170; DaLezze, pp. 114-115. This situation, if true, is similar to many episodes later in Ottoman history. In particular, it brings to mind Suleiman's difficulties with his sons. Some have written that Mehmed II preferred Jem because Bayezid had so many more sons than Jem. At this time, Bayezid had seven sons and Jem one or two.

²³ "Auszüge aus Neşri's Geschichte des osmanischen Hauses" (trans. and ed. by Th. Nöldeke), in *Zeitschrift der Deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, XV (1861), pp. 371-372.

²⁴ F. Babinger, "Karamani Mehmed Pasha," in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, II, 745-746. Karamani is often referred to as Nishanji Pasha, for he was also secretary of state. He was born in Karamania, the son of 'Arif Chelebi and a descendant of the famous Jalal-al-din al-Rumi. He came to Istanbul and was educated in a *medrese*. Through the attachment of Mahmud Pasha, he became *nishanji* and then in 1478, grand vizir. He took an important part in organizing the laws of the empire. He married daughters of rich men, was director of the mint, and was hated by many in Istanbul (*ibid.*; DaLezze, p. 118). ²⁵ Neşri, p. 372; Hammer, III, 341.

to notify Jem of the event first by carrying Mehmed's body back to Istanbul and by concealing his death.²⁶ They closed the city to the janissaries and sent out the *afemoglans*, or janissary apprentices, on a task of repairing a water course.²⁷ These two individuals were the leaders of the Moslem Institution, one trained by the *'ulema*, and the other, at that moment, the head of the *'ulema*.²⁸ They were partisans of Jem and undoubtedly wanted to use him to maintain their own positions and to further the interests of the *'ulema*, the Moslem civil administration, and the group of theologians and lawyers who wished to re-establish an oriental monarchy.

But Karamani Mehmed Pasha's plans were foiled. His slaves whom he sent posthaste to Jem were caught and held by the beylerbey (governor) of Anatolia. One was impaled for denying his mission.²⁹ Word came to the janissaries of the true course of events and, finding some rude transports, they crossed to Istanbul, bellowing like wild animals. Led by their aga (chief), they seized and beheaded the grand vizir and paraded through the streets shouting, "Long live Bayezid!"³⁰ Some time intervened, while the soldiers pillaged Jews and Christians, before Ishak Pasha, the vizir left in charge in Istanbul, was able to subdue the mob and end the chaos. The pacification was largely the result of an agreement to pay each soldier a sum of money.³¹ At this time, too, the pashas in charge raised to the throne, as a regent, Prince Korkud, one of Bayezid's sons, who was a sort of hostage in the palace.³²

These pashas were natural enemies of Karamani Mehmed Pasha. The aga of the janissaries, the beylerbeys of Rumelia and Anatolia, and another of the European pashas were related to Bayezid by marriage and they meant to benefit from this connection.³³ They, as well as Ishak and Daud Pashas, vizirs in the city, were graduates of the Palace School.³⁴

²⁶ 'Asiqpāšāzāde, p. 183; Neşri, p. 371; Spandugino, p. 170; DaLezze, pp. 116-117; Hammer, III, 339-340. ²⁷ Neşri, p. 373. ²⁸ Lybyer, pp. 215, 217-218, 220.

²⁹ Neşri, p. 371; 'Asiqpāšāzāde, p. 183; Spandugino, p. 170; DaLezze, pp. 116-117.

³⁰ Neşri, pp. 373-374; Spandugino, p. 171; DaLezze, pp. 117-118.

³¹ Neşri, pp. 373-374; DaLezze, p. 118; A. Gritti, *Relazione di Andrea Gritti oratore straordinario a Bayezid II, letto in Senato il 2 dicembre 1503*, in *Le relazioni degli ambasciatori Veneti al Senato durante il secolo decimosesto* (E. Albreri, ed.), series 3, III, 19; Spandugino, p. 171; Giese, p. 154.

³² Neşri, p. 374; Spandugino, p. 171; DaLezze, pp. 118-119; Gritti, p. 19; G. A. Menavino, "Della vita et legge Turchesca," in *Dell'istoria universale dell'origine et imperio de Turchi* (Sansovino, ed.), p. 337. In the palace at the same time there was Oguzkhan, Jem's young son, but the pashas raised Korkud, showing a definite preference for Bayezid (Hammer, III, 339).

³³ Kasim, aga of the janissaries (DaLezze, p. 164); Rustem, janissary pasha (DaLezze, p. 179); Hersekoglu Ahmed, beylerbey of Rumelia (Spandugino, p. 170; P. Giovio, "Informatione di Paulo Giovio vescovo di Nocera, a Carlo Quinto Imperadore Augusto," in *Dell'istoria universale dell'origine et imperio de Turchi* [Sansovino, ed.], p. 218; and Sinan, beylerbey of Anatolia (Hammer, III, 339) were all related to Bayezid by marriage.

³⁴ For the significance of the school, the training of leaders, and their "esprit de corps," see Miller, *The palace school*, pp. 5-9, 23-44, 70-93. Another leading pasha of the time was Gedik Ahmed, of whom it is definitely stated that he rose from the ranks of the janissaries, not from the palace school (Cl. Huart, "Ahmed Pasha," in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, I, 201). Hersekoglu Ahmed Pasha, son of the last Duke of Herzegovina was educated in the palace school (Haili Edhem, "Hersekoglu Ahmed Paşanın terjume" hält," in *Tarih Othmān-i enjumen-i mejmū'a-si*, V, 280).

They were able to throw the weight of the janissaries, the *solaks* (special left-handed guardsmen of the sultan), and the *itchoylans* (palace pages) into the scales on the side of Bayezid.³⁵ Thus, with the leaders of the army and so many of the influential members of the court favoring Bayezid, it is not difficult to understand the furor and the failure of the plot of Karamani Mehmed Pasha. Some tribute here should also be given to Bayezid's political sagacity in arranging such profitable marriages, and perhaps in intriguing to obtain the advancement of these relatives.

As soon as Bayezid learned of his father's death he set out for Istanbul with all speed, for he knew that Amasya was twice as far from Istanbul as was Konya, Jem's residence.³⁶ Bayezid in his hurry, however, did not cast all caution to the winds, for he halted at Ismid (Nicomedia), notified the court of his arrival, and sent a trusted slave to Istanbul to see with his own eyes the body of Mehmed II. The son of Uzun Hasan of Persia had recently been caught in a similar trap.³⁷ When the slave returned with full assurance, Bayezid proceeded to Uskudar, where he was formally greeted by the pashas and many of the soldiers who crowded the Bosphorus with galleys and barges of every description. On each side of the imperial barge were janissaries who loudly demanded the confirmation of Korkud's promises and insisted upon the removal of Mustafa Pasha from Bayezid's suite.³⁸ Sending Mustafa back to Asia, Bayezid quieted the soldiers by agreeing to give 1,000 *aqchas* to each sipahi and 300 to each janissary as well as to raise their daily pay by five and three *aqchas* respectively.³⁹ Landing in Istanbul, Bayezid donned black robes and set out for the palace, but a cordon of soldiers blocked his way. They, too, demanded the money and a promise that he would appoint as vizirs only men from the officers of the janissaries, the sipahis of the court, and the pages of the court. To this Bayezid assented, but to a request for clemency for the pillaging and the violence by the troops he made no answer. Bayezid spurred his horse and rode on through the crowd to the palace.⁴⁰

³⁵ Neşri, p. 372. *Solaks* were veteran janissaries forming a bodyguard for the sultan (Lybyer, pp. 129-130). The *itchoylans* were the student pages of the palace school (Miller, *The palace school*, pp. 81-82; Lybyer, pp. 73-78).

³⁶ Between Mehmed's death and Bayezid's arrival in Istanbul seventeen days elapsed (*Âsiqâsâzâde*, pp. 182, 183; Neşri, p. 373). Bayezid and his suite made the trip in eight days (Hammer, III, 448).

³⁷ DaLezze, pp. 164-168. Bayezid, a short time before, had executed one of Mehmed's messengers who had been disrespectful and too persistent (*ibid.*).

³⁸ Mustafa, Bayezid's maternal uncle, was an Anatolian Turk and was not liked by the court. Later he became a *kariasker*, or judge of the army (Hammer, III, 340-341).

³⁹ DaLezze, pp. 119, 168; Neşri, p. 374. Fifty *aqchas* were equal to one Venetian gold ducat.

⁴⁰ "... primo si dimanda che quello haveva fatto Corcut Gelebi, suo figliuolo, de accrescere le provisioni fosse insieme col dono de' 1000 aspri per la sua conformatione. Rispose Balasit: 'sia fatto'. Secondo, che non fosse eletto, ne potesse esser Vizir cioè de' 4 consiglieri niuna persona, se non era stato figliuolo di christiano, et così contento. Terzo, che fosse pardonato a tutti quelli, che havevano danneggiato et robbato Christiani et Giudei, et altri. A' questa partita lui non rispose, ma pinse il cavallo avanti. . . ." (DaLezze, pp. 168-169).

The day following, Bayezid carried on his own shoulder with the vizirs and emirs the body of Mehmed II to the mausoleum in the courtyard of the mosque which he had built.⁴¹ Court was held the next day, May 22, 1481, and Korkud handed over to Bayezid all rights of the empire.⁴² Homage was paid to the new sultan and bread was broken. Ishak, Daud, and Hersekoglu Ahmed Pashas were appointed vizirs, messages were sent to governors and officials to inform them of the change, and all kadis (judges) were ordered to publish the accession of Sultan Bayezid II.⁴³ Although Bayezid now was in control of the city of Istanbul and the imperial treasure and had been recognized by the court as sultan, his position was not impregnable and he knew it.⁴⁴ This was his chief concern for the next dozen years and more until his brother, Jem, died. The question, however, to be considered here is why Bayezid had gained this first and very important victory in attaining the prize of empire.

Perhaps the prime reason for this success was his age. Bayezid had had more years in which to cultivate the ambitious and energetic men at the court. He was related to some by marriage and undoubtedly had known many of them intimately for years. It may be that he had been educated with some of them. These men, in turn, could sway the loyalties of other men, for there was a strong *esprit de corps* among the members of the court. Another factor of consequence was Bayezid's conservatism.⁴⁵ For nearly thirty years Mehmed II had been building an empire which was rapidly breaking with Ottoman traditions and following the pattern established by the Seljuk and Byzantine emperors. That Bayezid had lived for many years in Amasya, a ghazi stronghold, should not be minimized, as it seems improbable that he could escape altogether the influence of such an environment. The janissaries and the sipahis of the court were the official ghazis of the time, and although they had evolved to some degree away from the original pattern, they retained much of the loyalty and sentiment of the ghazi order.⁴⁶ They, too, objected to Mehmed II's use in the government of the *'ulema* and men educated in *medresehs* (mosque schools). Thus they turned to Bayezid. Mehmed II had been irritated by his son and there was rumor in 1481 that the Anatolian campaign was to be directed against him. If there were any

⁴¹ Hammer, III, 341.

⁴² DaLezze, p. 169. There seems to have been some question over the legality of this step. Many writers indicate that Korkud and others held the view that Korkud was the sultan and that Bayezid was only ruling for him. In later years this question was raised again (Spandugino, p. 171; Menavino, p. 531). ⁴³ DaLezze, p. 169.

⁴⁴ Some seventy years before, his great-grandfather, Mehmed I, had gathered forces in Anatolia and conquered his brother, Sulciman, who was in possession of the European provinces.

⁴⁵ One indication of this was Bayezid's act in selling in the bazaar all the pictures which Gentile Bellini had painted for Mehmed II. Also, Bayezid asserted that his father did not believe in the Prophet Mohammed or in any faith (DaLezze, p. 121; L. Thuasne, *Gentile Bellini at Sultan Mohammed II*, pp. 32, 68). ⁴⁶ S. N. Fisher, "Civil strife in the Ottoman empire, 1481-1503."

traitorous thoughts in Bayezid's mind which had been revealed by a treasonable act,⁴⁷ his bravery was surely stimulated by partisans at court or by the knowledge of their existence. Then when Mehmed II died Bayezid and his adherents lost no time in consolidating their positions and in warring against Jem, for all seemed to agree that Jem was like his father. One can not be sure but that the palace group was dominant and Bayezid only its candidate.

⁴⁷ See above, note 37.

CHAPTER III

CIVIL WAR, 1481-1482

WHEN the outside world heard that Mehmed II, the Conqueror of Constantinople, was dead there was great rejoicing. In Bologna the citizens carried holy relics through the streets praising God for this benevolent act.¹ Pope Sixtus IV believed that this occasion made the time propitious for a union of all Christians in a crusade against the Turks.² The great victory of Mehmed II in 1453 had frightened western Europe, and now it was believed that the greatest enemy of Christendom had passed and that no successor could retain his empire. Too, probably some of the Italian princes realized there would be a struggle between Bayezid and Jem, and Machiavellian Italy hoped to profit from this affair.³ Fortunately for the Ottoman empire, Europe was so divided that no action resulted from any of these ideas. Bayezid and Jem were permitted to settle the issue between them, at least for the moment, without intervention from Europe.

But the Italian princes need not have been correct in their reasoning about a civil war in the Ottoman state. Several times Bayezid offered life to Jem and a handsome pension if he would live peacefully in Jerusalem.⁴ Jem, however, was ambitious and vexed at what he considered a mis-carriage of his father's wishes.⁵ Moreover Jem claimed to be the legitimate heir, as he was born in the purple and Bayezid was not.⁶ Since the messengers of Karamani Mehmed Pasha never reached Konya, Jem began under a serious handicap, but this did not hinder him from making a valiant effort to overthrow Bayezid. Upon learning of Bayezid's accession, Jem gathered troops at Konya and set out for Bursa (Brusa).⁷ By the time Jem arrived there he may have had twenty thousand fighting men,⁸ a mixed force comprising feudal sipahis from Anatolia, *asabs* (irregular infantry), dervishes, and men from Karamania and from the tribes of Warsak and Turgud.⁹ At Bursa he found a sizable contingent of sipahis and *timarjis* (feudatories) who had assembled at the call of Mehmed II for his spring campaign. Jem was able to add these to his army, but the

¹ June 1, 1481 (G. Nadi, *Diario Bolognese*, p. 92).

² He offered his ships and arms at Ancona (Pope Sixtus IV to the Republic of Florence, Rome, June 4, 1481, in *Documenti sulle relazioni delle città toscane coll'oriente cristiano e coi Turchi fino all'anno MDXXXI* [G. Müller, ed.], p. 233).

³ Andreolo da Guasco, a Genoese, tried to get the merchants of his city to take advantage of the rivalry between Bayezid and Jem. Genoese were to furnish ships, and mercenary soldiers were to come from Poland. The Khan of the Crimea was approached and his response was friendly (W. Heyd, *Histoire du commerce du Levant au moyen-âge* [F. Raynaud, trans.], II, 406).

⁴ Thuasne, p. 20. ⁵ DaLezze, p. 172.

⁶ Caoursin, *Johannis Burchardi diarium*, I, 534-535, cited in Thuasne, p. 31.

⁷ Nešri, p. 375; 'Āṣiqpāšāzāde, p. 183; Spandugino, p. 171; DaLezze, p. 172.

⁸ DaLezze, p. 172.

⁹ 'Āṣiqpāšāzāde, p. 184; Nešri, p. 377; Hammer, III, 346. Many people in Anatolia preferred Jem, believing him to be a just man, and various of the *akhi* looked upon Jem favorably because he repaid his loans, even when in flight (DaLezze, p. 178).

main fortress of the city refused to capitulate, and Jem established his headquarters outside the city near the Mosque of Bayezid I. The janissary garrison in Bursa had a few skirmishes with Jem, until at a conference he was able to persuade the janissaries that he too, as a son of the late padishah, had a right to their allegiance.¹⁰ With their submission, the city of Bursa opened its gates to Jem and recognized him as sultan. Astrologers had spread the rumor also that Jem was to be the next ruler and this turned some to his support.¹¹ Here, Jem had money coined and the *khutbe* was read in his name.¹² Thus Jem became the acknowledged sovereign of part of the Ottoman state and made ready to defend his position.

Learning of all these moves, Bayezid, meanwhile, was making preparations of his own. A call was sent out to all the sanjakbeys of Europe to send forces,¹³ and an order was issued prohibiting the ships at Gallipoli from taking any more men to Valona or Otranto.¹⁴ Gedik Ahmed Pasha, the general at Valona in charge of the campaign to relieve Otranto, was recalled with his troops,¹⁵ and Bayezid crossed to Uskudar (Scutari) with the imperial troops to direct the battle in person. Likewise, he sent Ayas Pasha with about a thousand janissaries to Bursa to bolster the strength of the garrison, but they arrived too late to join the men in the fortress. Ayas Pasha and most of his men were captured and held until Jem's defeat a few weeks later.¹⁶

The inhabitants of Bursa did not cast their lot with either candidate at first, as they feared for their property and their city. They remembered the battles among the sons of Bayezid I, and knowing the havoc the janissaries recently had wrought in a few days in Istanbul, they hoped to spare Bursa that.¹⁷ After Jem arrived in full force outside the city, the pressure was too great to resist and Bursa recognized Jem as sultan. Another exigency appeared, however, when news came that Bayezid had crossed to Anatolia with the full force of the Rumelian army and that Gedik Ahmed had been recalled from Valona.¹⁸ At this juncture a deputation was sent to Bayezid from Bursa on Jem's behalf asking for a peaceful settlement. The envoys were Seljuk Khatun, a daughter of Sultan Mehmed I; Ahmed Chelebi, the son of Khudayi Shukru; and two mollahs,

¹⁰ Neşri, p. 376; 'Asiqaşazade, p. 183; DaLezze, pp. 172-173.

¹¹ Neşri, p. 376; 'Asiqaşazade, p. 183.

¹² Neşri, p. 376; 'Asiqaşazade, p. 183; Lutfi Paşa, p. 191. Two prerogatives of a sultan were coining money and having his name mentioned in the Friday prayer and sermon in the mosques.

¹³ 'Asiqaşazade, p. 184; Spandugino, p. 171.

¹⁴ DaLezze, pp. 170-171. Bayezid had possession of the imperial fleet at this time (J. W. Zinkeisen, *Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches in Europa*, III, 282).

¹⁵ Spandugino, p. 167; DaLezze, pp. 170-171.

¹⁶ Neşri, pp. 375-376; 'Asiqaşazade, p. 183; DaLezze, p. 173; Thuasne, p. 33.

¹⁷ Neşri, pp. 375-376; 'Asiqaşazade, p. 183; Thuasne, p. 33.

¹⁸ Neşri, p. 376; DaLezze, p. 171.

Ayas and Hamdi Chelebi.¹⁹ They proposed to Bayezid that the empire be divided with Bayezid taking the European part and Jem dominating the Asiatic half.²⁰ No doubt the leaders of Bursa had a hand in this, for these envoys, with the exception of Seljuk Khatun, were from the *'ulema*, and this city was the center of the *'ulema*, *dar-al-'ulema*. Too, Bursa might be the chief, or capital, city of this Anatolian empire. Bayezid, however, replied, "Kings have no relatives," and proceeded with his plans to attack Jem and force him to submit to the authority of the state.²¹

The two brothers prepared for battle. Bayezid was joined at Isnik (Nicaea) by his son Abdullah, the governor of Manisa, who had failed to succor Ayas Pasha at Bursa. Also Gedik Ahmed Pasha with sixteen thousand men from Valona arrived in time for battle and they were graciously received.²² In addition, Bayezid corrupted Jem's chamberlain, Yakub, with the promise of one hundred thousand *aqchas* and the position of beylerbey of Anatolia if he persuaded Jem not to retreat to Karamania but to fight.²³ In Jem's camp the majority, after the negotiations for compromise had failed, urged that the invitation to battle be refused; but Jem elected to fight.²⁴ He sent a body of janissaries under Gedik Nassuh Pasha to hold a pass near Isnik while the main force followed him to the plain near Yenishehir. Sinan Pasha, beylerbey of Anatolia, chased Gedik Nassuh from this position and all converged onto the plain of Yenishehir where it became apparent that the issue might be decided.²⁵ Here, before the battle on June 20, 1481, Bayezid exhorted his troops to be loyal. He renewed the promises of money that his son, Korkud, had made to the cavalry, infantry, and pages and assured the captains and pashas that he would lead them successfully in battle as many times as had his father, Mehmed II. The men swore to defend him with their lives, to maintain faith, and to wish none other for sultan.²⁶ By noon, Jem had been defeated and, as the chronicler Neşri says, "The Karaman crows scattered like young from the nest when they saw the eagles of Bayezid."²⁷ It was a general rout, and Jem, though slightly wounded, fled in such haste that he reached Eskişehir by morning and Konya a week later. After three days there, Jem gathered his family and set out for Egypt. On the way he was honored in Tarsus, Aleppo, Damascus, and Jerusalem, and in Cairo Sultan Kaitbay received him as a son.²⁸

¹⁹ Neşri, p. 376. Khudayi Shukru is referred to in some texts as Mevlana Shukrullah, but the meaning is nearly the same ('Asiqaşazade, p. 184; Hammer, III, 344).

²⁰ Hammer, III, 344.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² DaLezze, pp. 174-175; Hammer, III, 345.

²³ Hammer, III, 344.

²⁴ Some place the blame for this advice on Fenarioglu Hasan Chelebi (Neşri, pp. 376-377).

²⁵ Neşri, p. 377; DaLezze, pp. 173-176; Hammer, III, 344-345.

²⁶ DaLezze, p. 175.

²⁷ P. 377. Yakub took some of the troops over to Bayezid's side as he had agreed to do (Hammer, III, 346).

²⁸ Neşri, pp. 377-378; 'Asiqaşazade, p. 184; DaLezze, pp. 176-178; Gliese, p. 154. There were three hundred people in the group that Jem took with him (Hammer, III, 346-347).

Bayezid and his army followed Jem more leisurely and arrived in Konya four days after Jem's departure.²⁹ Remaining here, Bayezid sent Gedik Ahmed to pursue and capture Jem, but at Eregli the chase came to a halt since this marked the border between Turkey and Egypt.³⁰ Bayezid had written to Alaeddin, prince of Sulqadr, asking him to stop Jem, but the prince did nothing, replying that Jem would be captured if he came that way.³¹ In Konya Bayezid invested his son Abdullah with the governorship of Karamania and then returned to Istanbul, ordering Gedik Ahmed to follow him.³² When the janissaries reached Bursa they wished to sack the city and to put to the sword the dervishes who had aided Jem in order to revenge the death and injury of some of the janissaries. Bayezid, calling them "brave fellows," asked that Bursa be given to him, but before they agreed each janissary had to be bribed generously. Nevertheless some of the dervishes were executed, though Bursa had tried to shift the blame to villagers from a neighboring region.³³

Eight days after Bayezid had returned to Istanbul, Gedik Ahmed Pasha and his company arrived.³⁴ Bayezid sent for him, detained him, and had him imprisoned, evidently because of personal feeling and a report that he favored Jem. The next morning when the court heard of it there was an immediate and violent reaction. Gedik Ahmed had begun his soldiering as a common janissary and under Mehmed II had risen to the posts of beylerbey and vizir.³⁵ He had been a pasha for many years and had many victories to his credit. Bayezid's maternal uncle, Vizir Mustafa Pasha, and Rustem, aga of the janissaries and Bayezid's son-in-law, have been credited with the imprisonment of Gedik Ahmed, but they were unable to influence the court or hold the troops, who were unanimous in their support of Gedik Ahmed. He was the ablest general in the empire and was personally loved by all because he was just, generous, thoughtful in citing valiant deeds in official dispatches, and eager to recommend one according to his merits. That he frequently became intoxicated and then haughty and most inflexible was not objectionable in their eyes. The janissaries, sipahis, and *silindars* (sword bearers), with most of their officers and the court, came to the palace threatening all who proposed the arrest or who stood in their way. By force they entered the outer gate and had Bayezid at their mercy, as he feared they might turn to Jem. Besides asking for Ahmed's liberation and the dismissal of those who

²⁹ Along the route to Konya various Turcomans petitioned for freedom from taxation because they had attacked Jem in his flight. Bayezid gave them no promise and told them to present their request at court. Later, when they did come, he had them executed for meddling in Ottoman affairs (Hammer, III, 347-348).

³⁰ DaLezze, pp. 177-178; 'Asiqpāšāzāde, p. 184.

³¹ Thuasne, p. 38. ³² Nešri, p. 378; 'Asiqpāšāzāde, p. 184; Hammer, III, 348.

³³ Nešri, pp. 377-378; 'Asiqpāšāzāde, p. 184; Hammer, III, 348-349.

³⁴ DaLezze writes of this episode in the first person and with considerable feeling, indicating that he was in Ahmed's company at the time (pp. 178-181).

³⁵ For a sketch of Gedik Ahmed Pasha's life, see Cl. Huart, "Ahmed Pasha," in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, I, 201.

had proposed his detention, the leaders demanded that Bayezid fulfil his promises to appoint to high office only those of the Ruling Institution³⁶ and to pay the bonuses awarded before the battle at Yenishehir. The soldiers of the court asserted that Bayezid favored the *timarjis* and the peasants more than he did the soldiers who had loyally served his father and who had been well trained and disciplined at the court. They claimed that they had created and enlarged the Ottoman state and that now Bayezid would ruin it. After many speeches, Bayezid acceded to their wishes, not only liberating Ahmed but also honoring him with the position of vizir with special authority. Those who had opposed him disappeared from court.³⁷ This episode shows, of course, that Bayezid was not an absolute sovereign but was often at the mercy of the court and the army.³⁸

Besides fear, there was another reason for Bayezid to liberate Gedik Ahmed, and that was the need of an able general to quell a revolt in Karamania. Although sheikhs and dervishes in Karamania had assured Bayezid of their support,³⁹ Kasim Bey, last scion of the Karamanoglu family, had attacked the Ottoman forces led by Ali Pasha, who was Prince Abdullah's governor in Konya. Leaving a son in Istanbul as a hostage, Gedik Ahmed set out with several thousand janissaries, *azabs*, and his own troops to succor Ali Pasha and subdue Karamania. Kasim Bey withdrew to Selefke with the Ottomans following in two columns. Near Mut, Ali Pasha was attacked, but Kasim retreated to Tarsus when Gedik Ahmed relieved Ali. At this point Ahmed established his chief winter quarters at Larenda, where he acted as governor of Karamania.⁴⁰ Kasim Bey, however, was not defeated and spent the winter gathering an army and allies to renew the conflict in the spring. In November, 1481, he sent an envoy to D'Aubusson, Grand Master of Rhodes, to obtain munitions and five galleys. The latter made a friendly reply, but the Knights had suffered so greatly from the attack of Mesih Pasha in 1480 that they were in no position to offend the Ottoman government.⁴¹

Kasim Bey's natural ally was Jem, who by the spring of 1482 was eager to try his fortune again. Deserters from Gedik Ahmed's winter

³⁶ Undoubtedly this was a shaft at the Vizir Mustafa, who was a Turk by birth and not a member of the Ruling Institution. Also it should be noted that Ahmed was the son-in-law of Ishak Pasha, who at this time was grand vizir (Hammer, IV, 8).

³⁷ The vizir, Mustafa, was imprisoned in a castle on the Dardanelles, and Rustem, the aga of the janissaries, fled in a light galley to the Mediterranean (DaLezze, p. 180).

³⁸ DaLezze (pp. 180-181) gives an interesting report on Gedik Ahmed's audience with Bayezid. The pasha was very humble and, bending one knee to the floor, said that he was the faithful slave of the sultan, who could do with and dispose of his slaves at his pleasure. If he wished to keep him prisoner or kill him, he could do it. Ahmed was apologetic for the presumption of the janissaries and others who had dared to do all this against his own wishes. Then he turned toward those who were present, admonished them to obey the sultan, and reprimanded them for moving against the sultan whose faithful and obedient slave he wished to be. How much of this harangue was political expediency, of course, remains an open question. ³⁹ Hammer, III, 336.

⁴⁰ 'Asiqpāšāzāde, p. 185; Nešri, p. 378; Hammer, III, 349-350.

⁴¹ Thuasne, pp. 45-46. Bayezid, at about the same time, arranged a six-month truce with the Knights (*ibid.*, pp. 46-47).

quarters and other Ottoman malcontents had joined with Kasim Bey at Tarsus in entreating Jem to return and occupy his rightful possessions.⁴² Letters (some of which were undoubtedly forged) from Ottoman notables, chief of whom was Gedik Ahmed, were sent to Jem to inform him that Anatolia would be handed over to him upon his arrival.⁴³ Jem, too, had been busy on his own behalf. When he had reached Cairo, Kaitbay, the sultan of Egypt, refused to aid him so Jem spent the winter months on the pilgrimage to Mecca.⁴⁴ Without question he did this for its political effect, because he took some learned men with him to publicize the journey. He participated in a semi-religious, semi-knightly ceremony and had his ancestry traced back to the early Turkish Oghuz family.⁴⁵ Probably he was making a bid for the support of the religious and purely Turkish elements in the Ottoman state. Upon returning to Cairo early in 1482, Jem found that Kaitbay had not changed his mind about assistance. Perhaps discouraged, Jem again wrote to his brother, asking forgiveness and a division of the empire. This Bayezid refused but, again, he urged Jem to accept a pension of one million *aqchas* and retire in Jerusalem.⁴⁶ Jem decided against this and when the messages from Kasim Bey and the Ottoman traitors were received he resolved to try once more to win at least a part of the Ottoman state. At last Kaitbay had a change of heart and furnished Jem with several thousand soldiers, forty thousand ducats, and orders on the governors of Aleppo and Damascus for additional men and money.⁴⁷ Thus in the spring of 1482 Jem came to Aleppo, where he found several Ottoman deserters. Proceeding to Adana, he was met by Kasim Bey, who was promised Karamania if they were successful. Then they invaded the Ottoman territory aiming at Konya, where Jem under Mehmed II had been governor.⁴⁸

During the winter Bayezid had been aware of all these developments. Gedik Ahmed Pasha was blamed for the numerous desertions from his winter quarters and was ordered to return to Konya and bring Abdullah to Karahisar to await the arrival of Bayezid and the imperial army.⁴⁹ While this union was being effected Jem and Kasim arrived in full force before Konya, but Ali Pasha defended the city so stoutly that they were unable to take it. Foiled here, they decided to encircle the city and try their luck at Ankara, the seat of the principal Ottoman traitor. Ankara was occupied for a few days but troops from Amasya, loyal to Bayezid, soon arrived on the scene and routed Jem's forces.⁵⁰ Learning that Gedik

⁴² The most important of these deserters was Mehmed Bey, sanjak of Ankara and formerly aga of the janissaries ('Asiqpāshāzāde, p. 185; Neşri, p. 378; Hammer, III, 351).

⁴³ 'Asiqpāshāzāde, p. 185; Neşri, pp. 378-379.

⁴⁴ 'Asiqpāshāzāde, pp. 184-185; Neşri, p. 378; Luṭfi Pāshā, p. 191; Thuasne, pp. 47-48.

⁴⁵ Hasan ibn Mahmud Beyati, *Jām-i Jem* *ayin*. ⁴⁶ Thuasne, pp. 48-51.

⁴⁷ Halil Edhem, p. 204; DaLezze, p. 181; Thuasne, pp. 51-52.

⁴⁸ 'Asiqpāshāzāde, p. 185; Neşri, p. 379; DaLezze, p. 181; Hammer, III, 351-352.

⁴⁹ 'Asiqpāshāzāde, p. 185; Hammer, III, 351-352.

⁵⁰ 'Asiqpāshāzāde, p. 185; Neşri, pp. 379-380; Giese, p. 155; Hammer, III, 352-353.

Ahmed's forces had joined Bayezid's, Jem abandoned all hope. He fled to Eregli and from there sent two of his high officials to Bayezid to propose a settlement.⁵¹ Before the refusal came, Jem had begun to seek a refuge in Europe. The Venetians declined to receive him so he accepted the hospitality of the Knights of St. John on the island of Rhodes. Bayezid had caught his first ambassadors to Rhodes and sent Hersekoglu Ahmed Pasha with a body of cavalry to pursue and prevent Jem's escape, but this failed. On July 26, 1482, Jem boarded a ship for Rhodes at Anamur, never to return to his native land.⁵²

Bayezid passed the summer in Konya, from where he again subjected Karamania. In the autumn, after appointing his sons, Shehin and Korkud, governors of Konya and Sarukhan respectively, he went to Edirne (Adrianople) for the winter.⁵³ But from this moment until Jem's death in 1495 Bayezid never had absolute confidence in the security of his throne. He realized that Jem in conjunction with a powerful force from Egypt or with a coalition of the European states could be a very serious threat to the throne as well as to the existence of the Ottoman empire. Jem had become a matter of foreign policy and was no longer an internal problem. That Bayezid felt secure from revolution and civil war is shown by his settlement of the old score with Gedik Ahmed Pasha.

In November, 1482, after a great banquet at Edirne, the pasha was seized and executed. From Bayezid's point of view there were many counts against Gedik Ahmed.⁵⁴ He had sharply criticized Bayezid's military leadership in the campaign of 1473; he had protested vigorously against abandoning the expedition of Otranto; he was undoubtedly too great a favorite of the troops, as the demonstration of the previous year had witnessed; he had not countenanced the treaty signed with Venice and had practically resigned from the negotiations which led up to the treaty with the Knights of Rhodes because he thought paying for the imprisonment of Jem was prostituting the dignity of the Ottoman state; he and his father-in-law, Grand Vizir Ishak Pasha, had plotted successfully against Mustafa Pasha, Bayezid's favorite; and, perhaps most of all, he was very outspoken, especially when intoxicated, a frequent occurrence with Gedik Ahmed Pasha. Upon his execution some of the troops rebelled, but they were crushed. Shortly afterward Daud Pasha, beylerbey of Anatolia, replaced Ishak Pasha as grand vizir. Evidently Bayezid was slowly trying to move in the direction of personal and absolute control over the several branches of the government.

⁵¹ Bayezid offered him certain revenues to retire in Jerusalem, and Jem asked for the cession of some Anatolian provinces (Hammer, III, 353-354).

⁵² 'Asiqpāshāzāde, p. 185; Neşri, p. 380; Hammer, III, 352-354; Thuasne, pp. 56-63; DaLezze, pp. 181-182; Spandugino, p. 171; Giese, p. 155.

⁵³ 'Asiqpāshāzāde, pp. 185-186; Giese, p. 155.

⁵⁴ Giese, p. 155; Luṭfi Pāshā, p. 192; Hammer, IV, 7-9. D'Aubusson wrote to Pope Sixtus IV that Gedik Ahmed Pasha was favorable to Jem (Thuasne, p. 68).

CHAPTER IV

THE FEAR OF JEM'S RETURN, 1482-1495

THAT JEM'S FLIGHT from the Ottoman empire in 1481, and again in 1482, transformed the civil war into a question of diplomacy and international intrigue was indicated in the negotiations and the terms of the peace treaty with Rhodes. For many years the Knights of St. John had been a thorn in the side of Turkey, but Bayezid decided to make peace with them, even though it was known that they were in no position to resist a serious attack.¹ In November, 1481, an envoy was sent to Rhodes to negotiate a truce and to invite an ambassador to Istanbul, but the latter was delayed on the charge that Turkey had not released certain prisoners. Later Gedik Ahmed, from Konya, was assigned the task of making peace. In 1482, he asserted that the prisoners had been freed, and, for the extradition of Jem, Bayezid offered perpetual peace, money, and the most favored commercial treatment.² D'Aubusson, the grand master of the Knights, was stalling in the hope of winning many allies and using Jem as an entering wedge to curb the Ottoman state.³ By midsummer he knew this was hopeless; so to strengthen his hand he obtained a power of attorney from Jem and then sent him to France for safekeeping. Following this, two ambassadors, Guy de Mont Arnaud and Leonard du Prat, were sent to the Porte to negotiate a treaty,⁴ but were instructed not to agree to pay any tribute or to send an annual ambassador to the sultan. In Edirne (Adrianople) they were presented to Bayezid and then referred to Gedik Ahmed and Mesih Pashas. When de Mont Arnaud insisted that they negotiate as equals, Ahmed became furious and the conference would have been ruined if Mesih, who knew Bayezid was demanding peace, had not taken affairs into his own hands.⁵ The final treaty stated⁶ that between the two nations there was to be peace on land and sea and freedom of commerce for the duration of Bayezid's life; that each agreed to return fugitive slaves of the other unless they had changed their religion, in which case twenty-two ducats each would be paid; and that the castle of St. Peter at Budrum (Halicarnassus) was an inviolable asylum for fugitives. The Rhodians had a private audience with Bayezid, who inquired about Jem's health and state of mind and then dismissed them,

¹ Mehmed II had softened the Knights by a heavy attack in 1480 and probably was planning to finish the job when death came in 1481. The Knights refused aid to Jem in the winter of 1481-1482 on the plea of not having the necessary material (Thuasne, pp. 45-46).

² *Ibid.*, pp. 45-47; DaLezze, pp. 182-183; Hammer, III, 356.

³ D'Aubusson wrote to Pope Sixtus IV, the king of Naples, the king of Hungary, and the Venetian government for a crusade. All agreed now was a propitious time but none moved a man. A typical reply came from the king of Naples, who thought it a great opportunity but that unfortunately he was unable to aid the Knights for he was being attacked at that moment by Venice and the Pope (Thuasne, pp. 68-70, 101-102).

⁴ Permission had been received from the Pope (*ibid.*, pp. 75-76).

⁵ Gedik Ahmed at this point absented himself from all further discussions.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 83-84; DaLezze, p. 182; Hammer, III, 357.

sending along his own ambassador to D'Aubusson. This envoy signed with the grand master on December 7, 1482, a secret treaty in which, for the confinement of Jem, Bayezid was to pay to the Knights annually in August forty-five thousand Venetian ducats and also a like sum for the past year. This was approved by Bayezid on January 3, 1483.⁷ Thus was signed the well-known treaty between the Porte and Rhodes whereby Bayezid, in a sense, paid tribute to Rhodes and subsequently to the Pope for Jem's continued incarceration. No wonder some of the vizirs complained of the treaty, but it was a poignant illustration of the role Jem was to play in Ottoman foreign relations for the next twelve years.

The mild and peaceful tenor of this treaty was only a continuation of Bayezid's cautious policy during the actual fighting with Jem. From the moment of Bayezid's accession until Jem's second flight, Bayezid felt forced to have peace. The first expression of this principle was his decision regarding the campaign in progress in southern Italy. In August, 1480, Gedik Ahmed with ten thousand men had captured Otranto, probably in order to secure control of the Straits of Otranto and the Albanian coast.⁸ Ahmed then returned to gather another force and was near Valona when Mehmed II died. Bayezid forbade the ships at Gallipoli to transport the men to Otranto to relieve the Turkish troops under Hayreddin, which were besieged by Alfonso, duke of Calabria. Gedik Ahmed was recalled to fight against Jem, and the troops at Otranto were abandoned.⁹ They, in a hopeless situation without food or water, surrendered on September 10, 1481,¹⁰ and never again during Bayezid's reign did the Turks seriously threaten Italy. Bayezid feared that such an attack might prove the needed stimulus to unite Italy against him.

The Italian correspondence of 1481 concerning a crusade against the Ottomans never passed the stage of planning. The khan of the Crimea and the king of Poland signified their willingness to aid, while the Genoese agreed to carry the troops from Italy,¹¹ but the majority of Italians were disinterested; Florence even failed to send any congratulatory messages to Bayezid until the seventh year of his reign.¹² Of all the Italian states, however, Venice was probably the most interested in Turkey and the Levant; undoubtedly, her citizens were the best informed. Following

⁷ DaLezze, pp. 182-183; Thuasne, pp. 84-86, 104; Hammer, III, 357-358. Some authors put the figure at 40,000 instead of 45,000 ducats (DaLezze, p. 182; Spandugino, p. 171).

⁸ Edward Armstrong, "The Papacy and Naples in the fifteenth century," in *The Cambridge Medieval History*, VIII, 195.

⁹ Gedik Ahmed was most bitter over this policy; and perhaps if there had been more boats at Valona he would have relieved the besieged forces at Otranto, as evidently he had promised the officers that he would return (DaLezze, pp. 170-171).

¹⁰ When the Turks surrendered, the Duke of Calabria promised a free evacuation of the port, but he failed to keep his word. Many of the men were put in his galleys and some of the janissaries turned and fought for him later in his several Italian wars (DaLezze, pp. 170-172; Giese, pp. 154-155; Armstrong, VIII, 195; Spandugino, p. 167; Hammer, IV, 3-4).

¹¹ G. Grasso, "Documenti riguardanti la costituzione di una Lega contro il Turco nel 1481," in *Giornale ligure di archeologia storia e belle arti*, VI, 322.

¹² G. R. B. Richards (ed.), *Florentine merchants in the age of the Medici*, p. 50.

the death of Mehmed II, the ghazis of Serbia and Bosnia under Iskender Pasha began to raid Dalmatia. They attacked Zara and captured a village on the gulf of Cattaro, for they asserted that the former peace treaty with Venice terminated upon the death of the sultan.¹³ The Venetians, however, desired to maintain the peace, and to show their intentions, they sent out four armed galleys to capture and return to the Turks the island of Cefalonia, which a Neapolitan force had just taken.¹⁴ Then, the doge of Venice sent an ambassador to the Porte to present the island of Cefalonia with his compliments to Bayezid, and at the same time to complain of the disorders in Dalmatia and to renew the treaty of peace which Venice had with Mehmed II. Antonio Vituri, the ambassador, and his secretary, Alvise Manenti,¹⁵ had difficulty in negotiating a treaty, but succeeded in winning one very favorable to Venice, signed in Istanbul, January 16, 1482. By its terms,¹⁶ Venice was no longer required to pay the annual tribute of 10,000 ducats, custom duties in Turkey for Venetians were lowered from five to four per cent, Venetians were to be indemnified for losses suffered from Ottoman arms since the last peace, slaves were to be returned, and commerce and the Venetian *bailo* were to be protected. Venice, on her part, returned Cefalonia and settled 50,000 ducats in claims held by the Ottoman government against her. No wonder Gedik Ahmed Pasha protested that this was a weak treaty, but Bayezid had Jem in mind and wished to keep Venice in a satisfied mood.

In fact, Bayezid feared that the Venetians might assist Jem or acquire him from the Knights of St. John, so late in 1482 Iskender Pasha, who had been Bayezid's preceptor at Amasya, was sent to Venice to have the doge confirm the treaty made by Antonio Vituri.¹⁷ Iskender was also to negotiate with the Venetians concerning Jem. In case Jem fell into Venetian hands Bayezid offered the Morea to them as a reward or ransom for his brother.¹⁸ The doge was either uninterested in or skeptical of this offer, but early in 1483 he sent Domenico Bollani and Francesco Aurelio to Istanbul to make a showing of good intentions and to ratify the treaty of the previous year.¹⁹ In July of this year Venice refused to accept Jem from Duke Charles of Savoy and in December sent Giovanni Dario, a new ambassador, to complain about some infringements of the treaty and to incite Bayezid against the king of Naples. Dario was successful, for a new agreement was drawn up and ratified in 1485 by Benedetto Trevisano, and Bayezid began to prepare a fleet which he intimated might be used to

¹³ Sanuto, IV, 326; Albèri, series 3, III, 3; Hammer, IV, 4-5.

¹⁴ Spandugino, p. 167. Without question, Venice preferred the Turks to the King of Naples on Cefalonia. ¹⁵ Sanuto, IV, 326.

¹⁶ Hammer, IV, 4, 6; Heyd, II, 329; Albèri, series 3, III, 3.

¹⁷ Thuasne, p. 106; DaLezze, p. 183.

¹⁸ Sanuto, IV, 326; DaLezze, p. 183; Thuasne, p. 106.

¹⁹ DaLezze, p. 183; Thuasne, p. 106; Sanuto, IV, 326; Hammer, IV, 11.

attack the king of Naples.²⁰ This peace with Venice remained official until 1497 but it was extremely difficult for the Ottomans to observe it. For many years before 1481 the Ottoman empire had been expanding into Dalmatia and the Adriatic area and Bayezid's treaties with Venice ran counter to the forces within the empire pressing to expand in this direction. Had not Bayezid been extremely apprehensive of the west on account of Jem, these treaties with Venice would, undoubtedly, have been of a different character.²¹ One factor, however, in the signing of a treaty with Venice that should not be disregarded is the fact that the Ottoman government was not so oblivious to the importance of trade as is frequently supposed. A point to illustrate the economic interest of the Porte is the treaty given to the very commercial city-state of Ragusa. Though local beys in Serbia and Bosnia were permitted to raid the Dalmatian coast quite freely throughout the first twenty years of Bayezid's reign,²² Ragusa remained a zone forbidden to the raiders. Upon Bayezid's accession the Ragusans sent an ambassador to Istanbul, where a favorable treaty was arranged. All their former privileges were renewed, their annual tribute was reduced to three thousand ducats, and they received from the sultan passports assuring them safe-conduct in traveling to the Bosphorus, to the mouths of the Danube and the Dniester, and around the Black Sea.²³ The Ragusans were very jealous of their privileges, upon which their livelihood depended. In 1483, when the sanjakbey of Bosnia incorporated Herzegovina into the Ottoman empire and the prince of that province fled to Ragusa, the city, to appease the Porte, sent 12,500 ducats to the sultan and 500 to the grand vizir.²⁴

Between Turkey and Hungary during the reign of Mehmed II there had been great enmity, and hostilities opened upon the change of sultans. In 1481, forces under Iskender Pasha of Serbia crossed into Hungary but were repulsed by Kinizsi Pal, who gathered his troops at Temesvar. In the late fall there was much irregular fighting but no great victories.²⁵

²⁰ Thuasne, pp. 110, 118; Albèri, series 3, III, 3. Actually the fleet was being constructed for the war against Egypt. Sanuto, IV, 326.

²¹ An illustration of this point is indicated in Bayezid's relations with the Knights of Rhodes. When D'Aubusson found Bayezid building a fleet which he had been led to believe was to be used to attack Naples, he sent, in March, 1484, Mosco Perpiano to tell Bayezid that if the fleet left Gallipoli it would be considered a declaration of war, and all the Christian princes would unite in a league and put Jem at the head. Shortly thereafter, Bayezid ordered the fleet temporarily disarmed, forbade it to leave the port, and assured D'Aubusson that the fleet would not be deployed in the Mediterranean. D'Aubusson, then, on his part, refused to allow Jem to be taken by the kings of Spain, Hungary, and Naples, for which refusal Bayezid sent the right hand of St. John the Baptist to D'Aubusson (Thuasne, pp. 119-120).

²² Their chief interest was to capture men, women, and children to sell in the slave markets of Edirne (Adrianople) and Istanbul.

²³ Heyd, II, 347-348; Hammer, IV, 4. The route from Ragusa to Istanbul passed through Novi-pazar, Sofia, Tatar-Pazarjik, Plovdiv, and Edirne. Ragusans were stationed in each of these places as well as at Kila and Akerman. The chief articles of trade were furs, wax, paper, fine morocco leather from Edirne, and gold and silver from Serbian mines. Cloth was the main article coming into Turkey, and most of this was Florentine cloth brought by the Ragusans by way of Ancona (Heyd, II, 347-348). ²⁴ Hammer, IV, 10. ²⁵ *Ibid.*, IV, 5-6.

During the next year there was little action although Korvin Matyas, king of Hungary, tried in many ways to embarrass Bayezid. Korvin was in constant communication with D'Aubusson, Sixtus IV, and Louis XI, trying to induce them to allow him to be Jem's jailor, and when this failed, a usurper, Bayezid, purporting to be a brother of Mehmed II, was produced. This came to naught, and in 1483, after Sultan Bayezid had fortified the Danube and Korvin had become engaged in a quarrel with the king of Bohemia, a truce of five years was signed by Turkey and Hungary.²⁶ Thus, by 1483, Bayezid II had secured the throne of his father, had twice defeated his brother, and had made peace with Catholic Europe.

With Turkey quiet and at peace with European states which might possess Jem, Bayezid felt free, perhaps even obligated, to organize a *ghaza* (a raiding expedition) and to continue the expansion of the Ottoman state in directions which would not bring him into war with any powerful state. The three possibilities were Albania, Dalmatia, and the provinces across the lower Danube. In 1483 the imperial armies, with the aid of *ghazis* and *feda'is* (persons who risk or sacrifice their lives for any cause) constructed some fortifications along the Danube so that they might operate in Wallachia and Moldavia with some security from Hungarian attacks.²⁷ By 1484 all was ready. Karabogdan, the prince of Wallachia, had refused to send the annual tribute, and messengers had been sent back to the Porte empty-handed.²⁸ The Anatolian and Rumelian armies were gathered and Bayezid set out to lead the armies in person against the two objectives, Kilia and Akerman. The fleet cooperated with the armies and carried food, guns, war supplies, and siege artillery to the Danube by way of the Black Sea.²⁹ The Ottoman troops crossed the Danube and with the aid of some Wallachian troops besieged Kilia, which surrendered in July. The army, re-enforced by a band of Tartars under Mengli Khan, proceeded to Akerman, which capitulated in August. In each city, *kadis* were appointed, churches were converted into mosques, and a number of the inhabitants turned to the Moslem faith. Bayezid, after receiving tribute from Karabogdan, returned to Edirne to hold a victory celebration and to notify the world of his success.³⁰

This campaign across the Danube evidently was as much a *ghaza*, or raid, as a conquest, for not much was done at the time to incorporate the region into the empire. To be sure, Karabogdan was momentarily submis-

²⁶ Thuasne, pp. 102-103, 75, 127; Hammer, IV, 11; Giese, p. 155.

²⁷ 'Asiqpāšāzāde, p. 186; Giese, p. 155.

²⁸ DaLezze, pp. 183-184. This attack might have been made in 1483, but there was trouble with Egypt and Bayezid decided to use caution. ('Asiqpāšāzāde, p. 186).

²⁹ 'Asiqpāšāzāde, p. 187; Hammer, IV, 12; DaLezze, p. 184. A fleet of fifty ships is mentioned (Sanuto, IV, 326).

³⁰ 'Asiqpāšāzāde, pp. 186-187; Gritti, p. 20; DaLezze, pp. 183-185; Giese, p. 155; Spandugino, p. 171; Hammer, IV, 11-12.

sive, and in the autumn and again in 1485 Bayezid sent him a body of *akinjis* (irregular cavalry) to augment his forces for action against Poland.³¹ Karabogdan, however, was not loyal and aided revolts in Kilia and Akerman to such an extent that Ali Pasha, beylerbey of Rumelia, marched into Moldavia to subject the province again. Though Karabogdan escaped, the next year, 1486, Malkochoglu Bali, bey of Silistria, subdued the region, and in 1487 Wallachia and Moldavia sent envoys to the Porte with the tribute and two years' arrears.³² In each of these campaigns the Turks returned with much booty and many captives. Similar minor expeditions across the Danube followed for several years. Wallachia was lost briefly but was retaken in 1492, and Bayezid, in 1493, unsuccessfully invaded Transylvania.³³ Through these years the Porte, by *ghazas* and regular campaigns, slowly brought the Danubian provinces more and more into subjection, experiencing few insurrections.

These Ottoman expeditions north of the Danube worried the Christian princes of central Europe and none more than Korvin Matyas of Hungary. From the treaty of 1483 until his death in 1490 peace existed between the Porte and Hungary, friendly embassies journeyed back and forth, and in 1488 the five-year truce was renewed for three additional years.³⁴ Nevertheless Korvin was hoping to acquire Jem and attack the Turks; the duke of Ferrara was to kidnap Jem and place him in Korvin's hands and later, in 1487, Korvin sent an ambassador to France to negotiate for Jem, but both plans failed.³⁵ Meanwhile Bayezid was at war with Egypt, and Korvin began in 1489 to organize a three-year crusade which was to include the Pope, all Italy, France, Spain, England, the Empire, and Poland.³⁶ But when Korvin died in 1490 all thoughts were turned toward his estate and the crusade was forgotten.

Korvin's son, the Emperor Maximilian, and Vladislav, king of Bohemia, claimed the Hungarian throne, with Vladislav being victorious; but during the struggle the Turks attacked. Bayezid had hopes of taking Belgrade and sent the bey of Semendra to storm it. The Turks took the castle of Narenta in 1490,³⁷ and the next year Bayezid tried to make peace with Vladislav, who refused. To force the making of peace Bayezid set out for Sofia in March, 1492, accompanied by two Hungarian envoys. Although they saw the large army on the march, they continued to refuse the terms offered by the Porte. Numerous castles on the border and in Bosnia were taken by the Ottomans, but Kiniszi Pal inflicted a severe

³¹ Spandugino, pp. 171-172.

³² Hammer, IV, 14-15, 23; Giese, pp. 155-156, 157; 'Asiqpāšāzāde, pp. 190-192.

³³ Giese, p. 156; Sanuto, IV, 326; Hammer, IV, 36; Thuasne, p. 314.

³⁴ Giese, pp. 155, 157-159; Hammer, IV, 13-14, 23-24.

³⁵ Thuasne, pp. 146-149, 164, 167. Korvin asserted that, through secret negotiations with high officials at the Porte, many would desert Bayezid if Jem were placed at the head of an army in Hungary. Jem stated that he did not wish to lead a crusade (*ibid.*, pp. 199, 258).

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 250, 254-255, 265-268. ³⁷ DaLezze, p. 190; Hammer, IV, 32-33.

defeat upon the Turks when he forced them to raise the siege of Szoreny. The ruse had failed,³⁸ and Bayezid, to save his face, turned toward Albania and with the cooperation of his fleet ravaged parts of that country.³⁹

Coupled with the last expedition into Hungary and Albania, large raiding parties (regular *ghazas*) were sent into Dalmatia, Croatia, Carniola, Styria, and Carinthia. Such bands had invaded these districts almost yearly since 1483, and in 1492 they were repulsed by German nobles only after reaching Cilly, Villach, and St. Veit.⁴⁰ The next year Bayezid sent Yakub Pasha with eight thousand sipahis to avenge these defeats. They easily advanced to Cilly and ravaged the whole country. Simultaneously a civil war developed in Croatia. One group appealed to Yakub for assistance and the other, led by Derenczeny, looked to Vladislav of Hungary for support. In September, 1493, Yakub was victorious and led Derenczeny, a prisoner, to Bayezid, who richly rewarded Yakub for his success.⁴¹ With this proximity of the Ottoman arms, the Venetians were frightened and sent ambassadors to Alexander VI to stir up a crusade. They secretly sent a thousand ducats and offered more, but Alexander VI could not unite Christendom for such an enterprise.⁴²

The Emperor Maximilian, however, came to the fore in 1494, chased the ghazis and *akinjis* from Styria, and pursued the Turks south into Serbia. In the autumn, Peter More was sent to Istanbul to seek peace as Maximilian realized a successful war would be impossible without the cooperation of Poland and Hungary.⁴³ The treaty, sworn to in 1495, established peace for three years between the Porte and Hungary. Bayezid agreed also to return all Christian prisoners taken during the two previous years.⁴⁴ Thus peace ruled in the Danube basin between Christian and Moslem; but it was of short duration for Jem died that same year. His passing was the signal for all restless and warlike spirits within the empire to override Bayezid's peaceful nature and to carry on to the north and west the fight against Christendom.

Farther east, the incursions of the Turks to Akerman had impressed the Russian tsar, Ivan III, with the growing power of the Ottoman state. In a conference at Bielgorod between Turkish pashas and ministers of the tsar, the latter indicated that Russia wished to be on good terms with the Porte. Mengli Khan of the Crimea was appointed to represent the tsar

³⁸ DaLezze, pp. 190-191; Hammer, IV, 32-33, 36.

³⁹ DaLezze, p. 192; Hammer, IV, 33-34.

⁴⁰ Hammer, IV, 13, 33-36. It is stated that this was the fifth invasion of Styria, the sixth of Carinthia, and the seventh of Carniola (*ibid.*, IV, 34). These raids were profitable in slaves and booty, and at Villach the Turks gathered fifteen thousand captives. Raids of this nature were still occurring in the next century under Suleiman (R. B. Merriman, *Suleiman the Magnificent, 1520-1566*, p. 260 *et passim*).

⁴¹ DaLezze, pp. 192-194; Hammer, IV, 36-39; Gritti, p. 21.

⁴² Thuasne, pp. 314, 316-322.

⁴³ The first treaty between the Porte and Poland was signed in 1490 and renewed again in 1493 for three years (Hammer, IV, 43-44).

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, IV, 40-41; Thuasne, pp. 322-325.

at Istanbul. In a letter from Moscow, dated August 31, 1492, Ivan III stated that Russian merchants in Azov and Kaffa had been forbidden to trade in Turkey, because free commerce was not allowed there and discrimination against the Russians was practiced in taxation. This letter remained unanswered, and in 1495 Ivan III sent Michel Plesttscheief to Istanbul. In his commission he was instructed to secure privileges for the Russian traders, not to bend the knee to the sultan, to treat directly with the sultan, and not to cede his place to any other ambassador. Plesttscheief, however, going beyond these instructions, remained cold and haughty and even refused to attend a dinner given in his honor. In writing to Mengli Khan, Bayezid remarked that he blushed to think of the affronts to which he had submitted and that he did not intend to send a return ambassador, in order that none of his slaves would be offended or insulted. Nevertheless, in a letter to Ivan, Bayezid granted all of the privileges which had been requested.⁴⁵

This incident in Ottoman foreign relations is only another illustration of Bayezid's caution and his willingness to condone effrontery as long as Jem lived. There was little likelihood, of course, that Ivan III would acquire possession of Jem or directly support him in a bid to oust Bayezid from the throne; but apparently it was considered political wisdom to accept diplomatic insults from the tsar at a time when attacks upon the state might possibly be launched from Egypt, Italy, or the Balkans.

When Kaitbey, sultan of Egypt, received Jem in the fall of 1481 and then aided him in his return to Turkey the next spring, Bayezid, quite naturally, regarded the actions as hostile, but he was in no position to press the matter. During the reign of Mehmed II, relations between Egypt and the Porte had not been very friendly. At the time of the capture of Constantinople, the nations had been on good terms but minor incidents led to complications. Mehmed had been forbidden to build and repair roads to Mecca and Medina, and Ottoman ambassadors had been insulted. Along the border there was considerable friction, and a prince under Ottoman protection had been seized and crucified in Egypt. In 1479 there had been more trouble, especially among the Sulqadr, which probably would have led to war immediately had not internal affairs in Egypt and the death of Mehmed II delayed it.⁴⁶

Since the decline of Seljuk power in the thirteenth century had left Anatolia in a disunited condition, the Ottoman and the Mamluk states met with considerable opposition whenever moves were made to bring

⁴⁵ Hammer, IV, 46-49.

⁴⁶ Halil Edhem, "Hersekoğlu . . . esâretine . . ." in *Târih-i Othmânî enjumen-i mejmû'a-si*, V, 203-204; Hammer, IV, 15. Frequently feuds within a family or tribe led to one faction seeking aid from Egypt and the other from the Ottomans. Such was the case of the Sulqadr tribe where Kaitbey and Mehmed II supported rival claimants for the leadership of the tribe (*ibid.*).

the tribes of southern Anatolia and northern Syria into one empire or the other. Invariably the border emirs played off Mamluk against Ottoman, taking sides as exigency determined, and hoping always to escape the centralizing forces emanating from Cairo or Istanbul. In such a situation, border incidents easily developed into sizable disputes, and the affair of Jem became the affair of every border tribe and prince dissatisfied with the Ottoman government. Many of the frontier tribes joined with Jem and Kaitbey in order to weaken the government in Istanbul. When Bayezid and the government proved victorious a number of the princes supporting Jem withdrew their recognition of Kaitbey's overlordship. When the sultan of Egypt demanded their allegiance they threw themselves into the arms of Bayezid. Such were the incidents which led to war between Egypt and Turkey.⁴⁷

One of these border emirs was the prince of Sulqadr, Alaeddevlet, who apparently attempted soon after Jem's second defeat to become independent of Kaitbey of Egypt. In the summer of 1482, when Kaitbey sent an army against Alaeddevlet, the prince called upon Bayezid for support. A sanjakbey was sent to join Alaeddevlet and they captured Rum Kale and Aintab, killed the bey of Aleppo, and sent many captured nobles to Bayezid. Although the Egyptian army was nearly surrounded, it escaped and headed for Malatya. The Turkish forces proceeded to follow, but Alaeddevlet deserted and the Ottoman forces were encircled and defeated. Simultaneously, the Karaman tribes under Karagöz occupied Adana and Tarsus, which were delivered to the Porte when Karagöz entered the service of Bayezid.⁴⁸

Upon hearing of these losses, Kaitbey prepared a larger army to send to Aleppo for the recapture of Adana and Tarsus. Bayezid, however, desired peace and sent an ambassador to Egypt. The details of the proposal are unknown, but the Porte was unwilling to return the Adana district and asserted that the Karamanian tribes had taken it and presented it to the Ottoman sultan. The Karamanian action was attributed to the revolts of the Warsak tribes, to the blocking of the passes by the Turgud tribes, and to the latter's unfriendliness toward the people of Karaman.⁴⁹ As might have been expected, Kaitbey regarded the Ottoman acceptance as a receipt of stolen property and would not recognize Bayezid's lordship in Adana. An Egyptian ambassador appeared at the Porte in 1484, yet at the same time Kaitbey retook Adana and Tarsus.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ Kaitbey also failed to send condolences to Bayezid upon the death of his father.

⁴⁸ 'Āsiqpāšāzāde, pp. 225-226; Halil Edhem, V, 205-209. A number of the places taken by Karagöz had been occupied by Christians and thus the towns were considered as having been captured for Islam by the Karamans ('Āsiqpāšāzāde, pp. 225-226).

⁴⁹ 'Āsiqpāšāzāde, p. 227. Bayezid asserted in his letter to Kaitbey that Karamania was rightfully a part of the Ottoman empire and that the Karaman conquest had not been made at the suggestion of the Porte but had resulted from the hostile acts of the Warsak and Turgud tribes.

⁵⁰ Giese, p. 155; Hammer, IV, 13-14.

Up to 1485 the war had been composed only of skirmishes, but in this year with peace established between the Porte and Hungary, Venice, Ragusa, and the Danubian provinces, Bayezid was able to commit larger forces to a campaign in Asia and fighting began on a large scale. The final insult was Kaitbey's robbery of the presents that a foreign dignitary was bringing to Bayezid.⁵¹ More than this, Bayezid, through Venice, learned that Jem in France was intriguing with his mother in Egypt. When these letters came to the Porte, Bayezid sent to Egypt for Jem's mother and family, but Kaitbey refused to surrender them and in addition tried to induce D'Aubusson to sell Jem to him.⁵² Because of his promise not to give Jem to any other power, D'Aubusson could not at the moment risk the placing of his charge in Egyptian hands.

To begin the campaign Bayezid ordered Karagöz Pasha to retake Adana and Tarsus and sent Yakub Pasha to aid Alaeddevlet in Sulqadr; likewise Kaitbey encouraged the beys of Turgud and Warsak to harass Karamania.⁵³ At the same time, Bayezid prepared a fleet of one hundred fifty sail, which worried D'Aubusson, who was assured that the fleet was not intended for the Mediterranean but for Egypt.⁵⁴

After Adana and Tarsus had been taken,⁵⁵ Karagöz Pasha left Musa and Ferhad Beys in charge and set out to take the pass of Gulek. Musa and Ferhad marched to Mesch near Jihansu, and there met the beys of Warsak, who were killed or captured. With this success they returned to Adana and lay idle, enjoying the pleasures of the land. Their inactivity stirred the Egyptian leaders in Aleppo. While they were preparing an army, Bayezid ordered the beylerbey of Anatolia to Adana, who, however, proceeded no farther than Eregli. The Egyptian army under Uzbey and Temmerruz Bey marched north, passed the mountains of Bakras, bridged the Jihansu, and placed their cannon in the fortress of Ayas. Approaching Adana, they found the Turkish troops in the midst of revelry⁵⁶ and unable to offer any resistance. Ferhad and Musa were executed, and the rest of the troops were taken captive into Syria.⁵⁷

⁵¹ The ambassador from India (Halil Edhem, V, 204; Giese, p. 155). Hammer, IV, 14-15, states that the Indian ambassador, although robbed of most of his presents, arrived with elephants, giraffes, gold, and fine spices and that the Persian ambassador also was robbed by the Egyptians.

⁵² In May, 1485, an envoy of the Sultan of Egypt came to Rhodes, but because of the confusion in Europe and the uncertainty of the Egyptian campaign, D'Aubusson refused to part with Jem (Bosio, *Dell'istoria della sacra religione di S. Géo Gierosolimitano*, II, 492-495, cited in Thuasne, pp. 133-135).

⁵³ 'Āsiqpāšāzāde, pp. 227, 189-190; Hammer, IV, 16-18. Kaitbey sent them money and goods.

⁵⁴ Sanuto, IV, 326. D'Aubusson did not take much stock in the assurances of the Porte. He recalled all knights who were in foreign parts and placed the island in a state of defense. The Venetians were apprehensive and urged the Pope to bring Jem to Italy to make Bayezid cease his naval preparations (Thuasne, pp. 129, 133-135, 145).

⁵⁵ 'Āsiqpāšāzāde, pp. 189-190, 227; Hammer, IV, 15-18.

⁵⁶ Ferhad Bey was so drunk that he fell off his horse ('Āsiqpāšāzāde, p. 227).

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*; Giese, p. 156; Hammer, IV, 18-19. Musa was sanjakbey of the district and Ferhad was a brother-in-law of Bayezid. With them were many *subashis* and *timaret* holders from Karaman.

Strangely enough, the Egyptians did not take Adana and Tarsus, and Bayezid ordered Hersekoglu Ahmed Pasha, beylerbey of Anatolia, to clear the Egyptians out of this region and avenge the Ottoman defeat. Under him were Karagöz Pasha and Khizrbeyoglu Mehmed Bey, but neither cooperated, for each considered himself superior to Hersekoglu.⁵⁸ When the battle was joined near Adana between the Egyptians and Hersekoglu, the two offended officers with Sinan Bey of Trebizond and Ahmed of Ankara withdrew without delivering a single blow. Hersekoglu entered the battle personally and with two hundred janissaries fought well until, encircled and wounded, he was captured by the Egyptians.⁵⁹ Although the defeat was regarded at the time as the greatest rout ever received by the Ottomans, it was no more than the loss of a frontier battle and the Egyptian army was unable to proceed farther than Adana and Tarsus.⁶⁰

Hersekoglu Ahmed Pasha was carried in chains by Uzbey to Cairo where a great celebration in honor of the victory was held in 1486. Hersekoglu was forced to kiss Kaitbey's foot and was treated as an infidel. After a year's imprisonment, however, he was released and sent to Bayezid in the hope of establishing an accord between the two empires.⁶¹

This defeat of the Turkish army, though not disastrous, nevertheless did stimulate Bayezid and the Porte to reorganize the armed forces. The number of janissaries was increased, and these and the other troops were provided with more efficient weapons. The artillery was strengthened and the cavalry was joined with the infantry under one command. The fleet was put into order, new galleys were added to it to enable it to aid the land forces more readily, and a marine corps was established.⁶²

The new army left the Bosphorus for Anatolia in the spring of 1487 under the command of the grand vizir, Daud Pasha, who had four thousand janissaries, the Anatolian army, and Ali Pasha, the beylerbey of Rumelia. Welcomed in Karamania by Alaedddevlet and the warriors of Sulqadr, Daud Pasha proceeded toward Aleppo only to find that the Egyptian forces had withdrawn. Unable to pursue them, as the janissaries complained of the climate, Daud moved to subdue once more the Turgud and Warsak tribes. Astonished at such a large force, Mehmed Turgudoglu fled to Aleppo and the Warsak beys submitted en masse, swearing

⁵⁸ Hersekoglu Ahmed Pasha was the son of the late Duke of Herzegovina and as one of Bayezid's in-laws had taken a leading part in placing Bayezid on the throne. To a Karaman like Karagöz, and to Khizrbeyoglu Mehmed and the leaders of the Anatolian levies, Hersekoglu was looked upon as a Christian and as the representative of the Ruling Institution group at the Porte, which during the last several decades was gradually centralizing all authority in the Government at Istanbul. Khizroglu Mehmed was preceptor for Bayezid's son, Ahmed, who was governor of Amasya at this time (Gabriel, II, 43, 430).

⁵⁹ 'Asiqpāšāzāde, pp. 227-228; Giese, p. 156; Halil Edhem, V, 210-211; Hammer, IV, 19.

⁶⁰ Gritti, p. 20; Halil Edhem, V, 211; Sanuto, IV, 326.

⁶¹ Halil Edhem, V, 282; V, 211-213; 'Asiqpāšāzāde, pp. 228, 230. ⁶² Gritti, p. 21.

allegiance to the sultan.⁶³ With this success the campaign for that year ended and Daud returned to Istanbul.

The war, thus far, had been indecisive and had failed to pacify the frontier tribes, so that both Kaitbey and Bayezid prepared to renew the conflict with added energy and on a larger scale. Kaitbey sent ambassadors to Italy and to Rhodes to make treaties⁶⁴ and to prevail upon the Christians either to place Jem in Egyptian hands⁶⁵ or to bring him nearer to the scene of action. In the latter case, Hungary, Naples, and Venice were proposed, or Kaitbey was very willing that Jem should come to the Pope in Rome.⁶⁶ Bayezid, on the other hand, was preparing a fleet and sent envoys to Venice to obtain permission to anchor his fleet at Famagusta while the Porte was at war with Egypt.⁶⁷ This request, of course, was refused since Venice and Egypt were at peace. Besides these preparations a new defection occurred along the Syrian frontier. Alaedddevlet of Sulqadr deserted the Ottomans and threw in his lot with the Egyptians, giving his daughter in marriage to the son of Uzbey, the Egyptian general. Thereupon, Alaedddevlet's brother, Budak, who had been supported in Damascus by the Egyptians as a rival, escaped and fled to Istanbul to Bayezid.⁶⁸

On March 18, 1488, the new expedition left Istanbul under the vizir, Ali Pasha. With him were Halil and Sinan, beylerbeys of Rumelia and Anatolia respectively, the janissaries, sipahis, other palace troops, *asabs*, *timarijs*—in all about sixty thousand men.⁶⁹ They marched south, took Adana, Tarsus, and the fortified places of that district, and sent the captured Egyptian officers in chains to Istanbul.⁷⁰ Meanwhile, Hersekoglu Ahmed Pasha, as *kapudan*, or admiral of the fleet,⁷¹ was sent with a fleet of eighty sail⁷² to cooperate with land forces at Adana. Venice, to protect Cyprus and her interests in the Levant, sent a fleet of forty galleys under

⁶³ 'Asiqpāšāzāde, p. 229; Giese, pp. 156-157; Halil Edhem, V, 213-214; Hammer, IV, 19-20. Evidently the janissaries, unaccustomed to the summer heat of the Adana plain, would have mutinied had not Daud handled the situation with skill by requesting from Bayezid an order to retire (Giese, p. 157). Undoubtedly the Egyptians were unprepared to meet such a large force (Halil Edhem, V, 213).

⁶⁴ 'Asiqpāšāzāde, p. 229; DaLezze, p. 185; Republic of Florence to B. Salvuccio, Florence, December 20, 1487, in Müller, p. 237. Kaitbey offered a commercial treaty to Florence as an inducement for obtaining control over Jem.

⁶⁵ Kaitbey offered one hundred thousand ducats to France for Jem (Thuasne, p. 200).

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 176; DaLezze, p. 185.

⁶⁷ Sanuto, IV, 326; Hammer, IV, 22-23. In fact, Venice sent Francesco di Prioli with forty galleys to Cyprus as insurance against possible Turkish action (Sanuto, IV, 326).

⁶⁸ Alaedddevlet also sent a son as hostage to Egypt ('Asiqpāšāzāde, pp. 230-231). It appears that the feud between Alaedddevlet and Budak began when Mehmed II ousted Budak as chief of the Sulqadr in favor of Alaedddevlet (Halil Edhem, V, 218-219).

⁶⁹ DaLezze, pp. 185-186; Giese, p. 159; Halil Edhem, V, 214. Others in the army were Budak of Sulqadr, Yahya Pasha, Torhanbeyoglu Omar Bey, Musa Bey, and Gedik Ahmed Pashaoglu ('Asiqpāšāzāde, p. 232).

⁷⁰ They were freed and returned to Egypt to repay for the liberation of Hersekoglu Ahmed two years before (Hammer, IV, 25).

⁷¹ Sinan Pasha had become Beylerbey of Anatolia during Hersekoglu's captivity in Egypt (Halil Edhem, V, 282).

⁷² DaLezze, p. 186. He was sighted off Rhodes on May 28, 1488 (Thuasne, p. 198).

Francesco di Prioli. He arrived two days before the Ottoman fleet appeared and prevented Hersekoglu from landing at Famagusta.⁷³ The Turks aimed to land at the Issos River and check the Egyptian army at the narrow pass between the mountains and the sea. Some troops were landed, and Uzbey was forced to fight his way across the plain, but a severe storm arose in the gulf of Alexandretta, making Hersekoglu's fleet ineffective and allowing the Egyptians to pass the Issos and the Jihansu.⁷⁴

Uzbey with his army of forty thousand⁷⁵ then approached Adana, where they were met on August 17, 1488, by the Ottoman troops. The Turks arrived at the scene of battle later than the Egyptians, who decided to attack immediately in an attempt to offset their inferiority in numbers, experience, and weapons.⁷⁶ At first the Turks were successful, but the Anatolian army on the right wing crumpled, and with this the Karamanians on the left fled. The Egyptians nearly encompassed Ali Pasha with the janissaries and sipahis, but late in the afternoon Uzbey began to retreat, thinking that he was beaten. The Ottomans did not follow up their victory, but returned to camp to find that it had been plundered in their absence. Hersekoglu, meanwhile, had effected a landing and checked the fleeing Egyptians, who returned the next day to the scene of battle to find that Ali Pasha and his troops had departed for Eregli. Uzbey then besieged and took Adana on April 1, 1489, after the powder magazines had exploded.⁷⁷ Karagöz Pasha, who had been the first to flee, was blamed for the defeat in 1488. He was called to Istanbul and executed.

With the Egyptians in possession of Tarsus and Adana, Bayezid was unwilling to make peace, and rejected the proffers of Kaitbey's ambassador, who came to Istanbul in 1489.⁷⁸ Military affairs between Egypt and Turkey, nevertheless, were relatively quiet in this year. Jem had been brought to Rome, and with Innocent VIII urging the Christian nations to cooperate with Egypt in a crusade against the Turks, Bayezid was averse to making much of an attack upon Egypt.⁷⁹ He did feel, however, that the

⁷³ Sanuto, IV, 326; DaLezze, p. 186.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*; Giese, p. 180; Halil Edhem, V, 215-216; V, 282; Hammer, IV, 26.

⁷⁵ It was asserted that there were ten thousand Mamluk soldiers, three thousand from Karamania and the rest Arab soldiers (DaLezze, p. 186).

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 186-187. DaLezze states (pp. 186-187) that the Egyptian army had been encamped on the battlefield three days when the Ottoman army arrived. All the Egyptian soldiers were eager to see the Turkish army for they were famous veterans, experienced in war and equipped with artillery. It was agreed that they must strike at the Turks immediately while they were settling in disorder, and fatigued from a long march and that if they waited until the morning the Turks would easily win.

⁷⁷ Sinan Pasha, Beylerbey of Anatolia, was killed early in the battle, leading to the disintegration of the right wing (Giese, pp. 160-164). DaLezze relates (p. 187) that Hersekoglu was wounded, captured, and carried into Egypt, but DaLezze apparently confused the dates and events either with Hersekoglu's captivity of 1486 or with that of 1491. The Karamanians were blamed for the pillaging of the Ottoman camp (Äsiqpāšāzāde, pp. 231-232). Elements from the Turgud and Warsak tribes supported Uzbey and aided him in the besieging of Adana (Hammer, IV, 24-28; Halil Edhem, V, 217-218, 272).

⁷⁸ Giese, p. 161; Halil Edhem, V, 218.

⁷⁹ DaLezze, pp. 189-190; Thuaene, pp. 243-244. Bayezid, however, was pleased that Jem was in Rome in the hands of the Pope, for it was realized that France, Hungary, Venice, or Naples could alone attack Turkey but that the Pope would need a Christian league. At this time such a league was almost impossible to conceive (*ibid.*, p. 264).

relations might be settled between the brothers of Sulqadr, Alaeddevlet and Budak. Egypt was becoming financially embarrassed, and prices were high in Cairo;⁸⁰ so Bayezid probably presumed that Kaitbey would not be eager to support his dependent, Alaeddevlet.

Budak with Khizrbeyoglu Mehmed Bey, Prince Ahmed's governor in Amasya, marched against Alaeddevlet, and captured and blinded his two sons. But overconfidence again made the Ottomans careless. Alaeddevlet, being on the alert, attacked and defeated the army of his brother; Budak and several of the Ottoman pashas were captured and carried into Egypt.⁸¹ Alaeddevlet and his army began to ravage Anatolia to such an extent that the Turks in Rumelia were concerned, and Bayezid was moved to exert all his forces to subdue Anatolia and defeat the Egyptians.

The headquarters of the expeditionary army which was being gathered were changed from Beshiktash to Uskudar, Ali Pasha was removed as head, Hersekoglu Ahmed was put in charge, and Bayezid reflected on the advisability of his going in person. He was deterred by severe storms in Istanbul,⁸² but Hersekoglu set out in 1490 to relieve Kaysari, which Alaeddevlet and Uzbey were besieging. Arriving too late, he was captured by the Egyptians and sent as a prisoner to Cairo for the second time.⁸³ There was, however, a famine in Anatolia which forced Uzbey to retreat and kept Bayezid from sending a large contingent to drive out the Egyptians.⁸⁴ Both nations were ready for peace, and, with the death of the king of Hungary, it was advantageous for the Porte to settle affairs in Anatolia.

Tunis, attacked by Spain, sent an ambassador to obtain aid from Bayezid. On his way to Istanbul, the ambassador passed through Egypt with the hope of bringing about a settlement between the two Moslem sultans so that they could support Tunis in her struggle. Arriving in Istanbul, he, with the mufti of Bursa, Zeineddin Ali, brought about the rapprochement.⁸⁵ The first Egyptian ambassador, Mamay-el-Haski, was discredited and arrested in Istanbul. To replace him, the Emir Jambalat was sent to draw up the treaty of peace with the ambassador of Tunis and Zeineddin Ali. Adana, Tarsus, and a fortress on the frontier were

⁸⁰ Halil Edhem, V, 220.

⁸¹ Äsiqpāšāzāde, pp. 232-233; Giese, pp. 160-161, 164-165; Halil Edhem, V, 219-220; Hammer, IV, 28-29. The troops were largely feudal levies from Anatolia, *ahinjis*, and the soldiers of sanjakbeys of Anatolia. Other officers were Mikhaloglu Iskender Bey, Sanjakbey of Kaysari, and Mutanzaroglu Mahmud, first bey of Karamania.

⁸² The storms were considered omens of misfortune and, perhaps of more importance, lightning struck the arsenal, killing between five and six thousand people and blowing the dome of the arsenal into the sea (Giese, pp. 165-166; Äsiqpāšāzāde, p. 234; Hammer, IV, 31).

⁸³ Äsiqpāšāzāde, pp. 233-234; DaLezze, p. 190; Giese, pp. 165-166; Halil Edhem, V, 202, 220-222, 282-283.

⁸⁴ Giese, p. 166.

⁸⁵ Halil Edhem, V, 221, 273-274; Hammer, IV, 30; Giese, p. 166. Zeineddin Ali is also referred to as Ali Chelebi (Halil Edhem, V, 274) and as Ali Arabi or Molla Arabi (Hammer, IV, 30).

ceded to Egypt, but they were to be considered as pious foundations belonging to Mecca and Medina.⁸⁶ Zeineddin Ali took the keys of these places to Cairo, Hersekoglu and many Ottoman prisoners were released, and the treaty was finally signed by both parties in 1491.⁸⁷

Both Turkey and Egypt had suffered greatly from loss of men and money, and neither derived any lasting dominance over the other from the war. Egypt was confirmed in her possession of the Adana district but did not succeed in drawing the border tribes under her protection for any considerable period. For Turkey, the six campaigns⁸⁸ had been very costly in men,⁸⁹ and no definite gain could be immediately cited,⁹⁰ but the war greatly weakened the non-Ottoman tribes in the south; they were, in fact, quiet and submissive for ten years. Had Bayezid not been concerned with the fate of Jem and a possible crusade from the west, it is likely that he would have been far more successful against the Egyptians and perhaps might have taken Jerusalem as he had boasted to Charles VIII of France.⁹¹ It was evident, however, that the Ottoman forces did not enter the lists against Egyptians with as much enthusiasm as they did against Europeans. War to the Turkish soldier was still a means of acquiring slaves, booty, and land and a holy crusade against the infidel.

During the war with Egypt, Bayezid pursued a definite policy in regard to the west. It was one of peace at all costs, though veiled by threats of war. Ambassadors, Turkish and Italian, traveled back and forth from Italy, France, and the Porte. In the background loomed Jem, ever a cloud on the horizon, threatening to disturb Bayezid and the tranquility of his empire.

The Turks, in their campaign in the Balkans in 1483 and 1484, had seized Herzegovina, taken Castelnuovo on the gulf of Cattaro, expelled the Cernovitch from their lands, and raided Chimera.⁹² Because these expeditions irritated the Venetians, they sent Giovanni Dario to Istanbul in December, 1483, to negotiate for new agreements with Turkey and to excite Bayezid against Naples, which was allied with the Pope and the duke of Ferrara against Venice.⁹³ These agreements were drawn up the next year and confirmed by Benedetto Trevisano in 1485.⁹⁴

At the moment, Bayezid was building a fleet to attack Egypt, and the Venetians were seeking its use against Naples; but D'Aubusson, in March,

⁸⁶ No doubt this scheme was arranged to save Bayezid's face.

⁸⁷ 'Asiqpāshāzāde, p. 232; Giese, p. 166; DaLezze, p. 190; Halil Edhem, V, 222, 272-274; V, 282-283; Hammer, IV, 31-32. Kaitbey had sent an envoy to Italy to stir up a league against Bayezid. When this move proved unsuccessful, the Egyptian court was more willing for peace (DaLezze, pp. 189-190).

⁸⁸ First, 1482; second, 1483; third, 1485; fourth, 1487; fifth, 1488; and sixth, 1490.

⁸⁹ The losses were estimated at one hundred thousand (Spandugino, p. 171).

⁹⁰ This war was, in fact, the beginning of the Ottoman conquest of the Arabs and was the first move in the acquisition of Egypt (G. W. F. Stripling, *The Ottoman Turks and the Arabs*).

⁹¹ Thuasne, pp. 217-218.

⁹² Thuasne, p. 118n.

⁹³ Alberi, series 3, III, 3. Dario remained in Istanbul as the Venetian secretary until 1486 (Sanuto, IV, 326).

⁹⁴ Spandugino, pp. 162, 172; DaLezze, p. 185.

1484, sent Mosco Perpiano to the Porte with the threat of an attack by a league of Christian princes with Jem at its head if the fleet should leave Gallipoli. Bayezid pretended to stop the shipbuilding and to disarm the galleys, and wrote to D'Aubusson in April that he desired nothing but peace. Therefore when D'Aubusson refused to permit Hungary, Naples, or Spain to take Jem, Bayezid sent the alleged right hand of John the Baptist to the Knights.⁹⁵

D'Aubusson was a political opportunist, however, and would have jumped at the chance of attacking the Ottoman empire if he had thought that Christendom was united and able to support him. In 1485 Pope Innocent VIII agitated for a crusade and proposed a common fleet⁹⁶ to offset Bayezid's fleet, but D'Aubusson, though in favor of such a plan, realized that Europe was not united and that nothing would come of the plans. Yet, in February, 1486, D'Aubusson signed a treaty with the Pope, whereby Jem was to be brought to Italy and placed under the jurisdiction of the Pope.⁹⁷

By 1487 there was common knowledge in Italy of the Pope's scheme to bring Jem into Italy and place him at the head of a crusade. Many of the city states, however, wished to remain on the safe side and sent word to the Porte of these arrangements. Venice again dispatched Giovanni Dario⁹⁸ to assure Bayezid of Venetian innocence, but at the same time she wrote Innocent VIII that, "Jem, in the hands of the Holy Father, would be a marvelous means of holding Sultan Bayezid in check. . . ."⁹⁹ In addition, both the king of Naples and Buccolino Guzzoni, duke of Osimo, sent envoys to the Porte to notify Bayezid of these plans and to malign Venice.¹⁰⁰

Evidently they were successful, for a Turkish ambassador was sent to Italy to inquire the reasons for Venetian armaments,¹⁰¹ and to investigate the proposals of the duke of Osimo. Guzzoni had seized Osimo, southwest of Ancona, and then, receiving no support in Italy, offered it

⁹⁵ Bosio, II, 477, cited in Thuasne, pp. 119-120.

⁹⁶ The whole was to cost about 2,220,000 ducats. The Pope was to furnish 40,000 ducats, Naples 75,000, Milan 75,000, Florence 30,000, and the rest of Italy in proportion, except for Venice, which was under an interdict (Rinaldi, *Annales Ecclesiastici*, XXX, cited in Thuasne, pp. 125-126).

⁹⁷ Lamansky, *Secrets d'état de Venise*, pp. 263-269, cited in Thuasne, pp. 139-140.

⁹⁸ Sanuto, IV, 326. Dario, seven years before, had concluded a peace with Mehmed II (Hammer, IV, 21-22).

⁹⁹ The policy of Venice was not clear. Giovanni Dario told Bayezid that although Jem was in France, the King of Hungary and the Pope were attempting to obtain him. However, Venice sent word to the Pope that Jem should be brought to Italy and Venice was willing to aid financially in bringing him to Italy in order to deter Bayezid from attacking in Italy. At the same time, instructions went to the Venetian envoy in France to use every effort to keep Jem in France and away from the Pope (Thuasne, pp. 152-154).

¹⁰⁰ Martorelli, *Memorie storiche dell'antichissima e nobile città d'Osimo*, pp. 368-376, cited in Thuasne, pp. 150-152. Envoys from Naples arrived in Istanbul to inform Bayezid of the plans of Venice and the Pope and also to obtain confirmation of peace between Naples and Turkey. Meanwhile Naples was urging the Pope to bring Jem to Italy to force peace upon Bayezid (Thuasne, pp. 151-156).

¹⁰¹ Sanuto, IV, 326; Hammer, IV, 21-23; Pray, *Annales regum Hungariae*, IV, 199, cited in Thuasne, p. 150. It was also at this time that the Ottoman ambassador requested the use of the port of Famagusta in the war against Egypt.

to Bayezid in 1484, saying that, as the name Osimo was a derivative of Osman, the city should belong to the Porte. With Bayezid's envoy and his interest in Osimo,¹⁰² Italy was moved to act. Naples, Florence, and the Pope besieged Osimo; and Florence, to be on good terms with the Porte, sent Andrea de' Medici to Istanbul in June, 1488, to congratulate Bayezid upon his accession to the throne¹⁰³ and to draw up a commercial treaty.¹⁰⁴

While the Italian courts were busy negotiating for Jem, Bayezid was engaged in rebuilding and renovating his navy. Italy was frightened and feared that some Italian prince would invite the Turks to invade Italy. Naples imagined that the preparations were meant for her and sent word to the Porte that she would deliver Jem to Bayezid if he would turn the storm toward the Pope or Venice.¹⁰⁵ The latter sent a new *bailo* to Istanbul¹⁰⁶ and the Pope pressed Charles VIII of France either to send Jem to him or to come in person and lead a crusade against the Turks. Finally in March, 1488, Charles VIII gave his consent to the removal of Jem, but stipulated that the Pope should not allow Jem to fall into other hands without the approval of the king of France.¹⁰⁷

With these developments Bayezid sent an ambassador to persuade Charles VIII to keep Jem in France.¹⁰⁸ Bayezid offered the Holy Sepulcher and Jerusalem, which he would soon take from Egypt, many holy relics for which he would scour his empire, and fifty thousand ducats annually, if Jem were refused departure from France. Bayezid threatened to make peace with Egypt and then, together with Kaitbey, to attack Christendom if Jem were placed in the hands of Hungary, Venice, Naples, or the Pope.¹⁰⁹ But Charles VIII felt that these were empty offers and threats and did not change his plan of sending Jem to Rome.

¹⁰² Osimo, under the leadership of Guzzoni, had thrown over all allegiance to the Pope; Guzzoni, however, realizing his weak position in Italy, offered by a letter to Bayezid, dated January 24, 1484, to hold Osimo in fief from Bayezid (Hammer, IV, 22, 373). The first ambassador sent from Osimo, Piero de Cichino Baligiani, requested aid in the form of troops and money from Bayezid and was unsuccessful. Later, Angelo Guzzoni was sent but Bayezid dismissed him in June, 1487, empty-handed (Thuasne, pp. 159-157, 165).

¹⁰³ In 1483 Bayezid had sent Ismail to Florence to invite the Florentines to trade with Turkey as they had under his father. Florence had planned to send Antonio Ridolfo in reply, but for some reason he never left Florence (Müller, p. 235).

¹⁰⁴ Andrea de' Medici was to get a confirmation of the articles, privileges, and immunities granted to Florentines by Mehmed II. He was to secure the right for the Florentine consul to try cases between Florentines and between Florentines and citizens of nations which did not have a resident consul in Turkey, and to present evidence in cases between Florentines and citizens of other nations. He was to arrange a better schedule of custom duties and to see that these should be paid only at the goods' first entry into Turkey. Most important, he was to return with a copy of the trading regulations, since Florence was then at a disadvantage without them (Instructions to Andrea de' Medici, Florence, June 2, 1488, *ibid.*, pp. 238-239). Laws regulating the Florentine colony in Istanbul were also sent ("Capitoli circa il reggimento del Consolo et governo de' mercatanti di Levante, a tempo di Andrea de' Medici imbasciadore al Turco," Dec. 15, 1488, *ibid.*, pp. 313-330). These requests and laws were confirmed by the Porte, and only a two per cent duty was levied on imports coming from Florence (Richards, *Florentine merchants in the age of the medici*, p. 50). Andrea de' Medici was also instructed to call to order colonists whose disorderly conduct would injure the Florentine name throughout the Ottoman empire (Heyd, II, 342-343).

¹⁰⁵ Mariana, *Historiae de rebus Hispaniae*, XXX, 428, cited in Thuasne, p. 188.

¹⁰⁶ Unfre Zustignan succeeded Antonio Ferro as Venetian envoy and *bailo* in Istanbul in 1488 (Sanuto, IV, 326).

¹⁰⁷ Thuasne, p. 186; Hammer, III, 365.

¹⁰⁸ In 1483 Bayezid had sent an ambassador to France, but Louis XI died before an interview was had (Thuasne, pp. 110-114).

¹⁰⁹ Thuasne, pp. 216-223; Hammer, III, 365.

Jem came to Rome in 1489, and the sunny clime of Italy improved his health and spirits. Encouraged, Innocent VIII invited all the kings of Christendom to join in a league against the Turks. At a congress of Christian princes in Rome in March, 1490, attended by an ambassador from the sultan of Egypt,¹¹⁰ a crusade was outlined in detail, but upon the death of the king of Hungary all plans were discarded. Bayezid, nevertheless, was moved by these schemes, and sent his *kapujibashi* (head gatekeeper), Mustafa, to Innocent VIII. In November when the ambassador arrived in Rome, he told the Pope that Bayezid wished to make an agreement with him concerning the pension of Jem. Mustafa stated that D'Aubusson had broken his pact, but notwithstanding, Bayezid was happy that the Pope held Jem and wished to make a convention with him in regard to the captivity of his brother. Turkey promised to pay annually for Jem's support and agreed not to attack the Christians as long as Jem was confined.¹¹¹ Innocent VIII then learned the sum that the Knights had received for Jem and also was informed that *Christians* meant only Rhodes, Venice, and the Pope.¹¹²

Upon the conclusion of peace with Egypt in 1491 and the obvious disunity in Italy and Hungary, the Ottoman Turks were free, even with Jem very much alive in Rome, to pursue a more vigorous policy in the Balkans and to adopt a firmer attitude toward the Knights of St. John, Venice, and western Christendom in general. Without doubt, the Ottoman soldiery was clamoring for campaigns and raiding expeditions in Europe where land, slaves, and booty could be found. To many, the ghazi ideals still prevailed, and for these, north and west were the only legitimate directions for conquest or raids. Throughout the period of the war against Egypt numerous petty raids occurred along the Danube, in Bosnia and Croatia, up and down Dalmatia, and among the islands of the Aegean and the Adriatic. In 1492, however, Bayezid gathered an army to march

¹¹⁰ In a crusade against the Ottomans, the Pope had indicated to Jem that he might be sent to Hungary to be on the European frontier of Turkey. Jem, who refused to raise his turban or bend his knee, replied that he would not give up his religion and that should he go to the frontier his death, prescribed by Ottoman law, would be justified (Hammer, III, 366-367; DaFiezze, pp. 187-189). The envoy from Egypt offered between 150,000 and 200,000 ducats for Jem and agreed to give the holy places to the Pope as a basis for an alliance. The crusade was to be composed of a fleet and three armies. The papal fleet was to be under the direction of the king of France, Spain, or England, and, accompanied by a number of cardinals, it was to attack in the Morea and Negroponte. The first army would be made up of soldiers furnished by the Italian states and the Pope; the second army of soldiers from Germany, Hungary, Poland, and the Balkans; and the third army of soldiers from France, Spain, and England. The first and third armies were to meet in Italy and the second in Vienna. In all there were to be twenty thousand cavalry and one hundred thousand infantry (Thuasne, pp. 265-268; Hammer, IV, 67).

¹¹¹ Mustafa came with 120,000 ducats, three years' pension, but he could not give it to the Pope until he had seen Jem, personally. Also he brought the lance which had pierced Christ's side and the sponge which, soaked with vinegar, had quenched His thirst (Hammer III, 368; Thuasne, pp. 270-283).

¹¹² Thuasne, pp. 278, 283. That year the Porte and Venice reached an agreement over their frontier (Hammer, IV, 32), but Bayezid broke relations with the Knights when he learned that they had no power over Jem (Thuasne, p. 264). Actually Bayezid was pleased that Jem was in the Castle of Saint Angelo, as he realized that a Christian league was hardly possible (*ibid.*).

against Hungary¹¹³ and began a new shipbuilding program. The former, as is explained above, was unsuccessful and turned west to attack Albania, Chimera, and Corfu in conjunction with the fleet. For a number of years a kind of undeclared piratical warfare was being waged in the eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean between Moslem and Christian. D'Aubusson was harboring pirates who attacked Turkish trade in the Aegean, and Bayezid protected and encouraged Turkish pirates (often Greek or Italian in origin) on Ottoman-controlled islands.¹¹⁴ The new Ottoman fleet was to give official recognition and aid to the Ottoman privateers and to assist the efforts of the land forces in the Balkans.

The Venetian *bailo* in Istanbul, Hironimo Marcello, sent secret letters to his government describing these developments, but he was given his leave when they were intercepted, and Venice was notified not to send anyone to replace him.¹¹⁵ Venice, however, placed little confidence in Bayezid's peaceful assurances and urged the Pope to intervene. A letter was sent from Rome threatening Turkey with a crusade if these preparations did not cease,¹¹⁶ but Bayezid remained steadfast and sent his army into the Balkans and his fleet into the Adriatic. Chimera, Dalmatia, and Istria were ravaged.¹¹⁷ But upon finding Nicolo Pisano and the Venetian fleet at Corfu, Bayezid, who was with the army, asked, "Since I have been told that the Venetians could not have another fleet than that in the Archipelago, whose fleet is this?" No reply was given,¹¹⁸ and Bayezid, not caring to investigate, returned to plunder Albania.¹¹⁹

The next year the Turks continued their pillaging in Croatia, and Venice tried to straighten out her affairs with Turkey. Domenico Trevisano was sent to Istanbul, but Bayezid would not alter his decision of not allowing foreign consuls to remain there.¹²⁰ Venice, moreover, was not sincere, for she was secretly aiding Pope Alexander VI with money to stir up a crusade.¹²¹ Matters, however, took a complete turn when Italy

¹¹³ See above, p. 33.

¹¹⁴ Enrichi, a "Turkish" pirate, had been appointed *subashi* of Negroponte and from there raided Christian commerce in the Aegean, dividing the profit with Bayezid. Ambruoso Contarini, carrying grain from Salonica to Venice, paid Enrichi for protection, but in 1491 a dispute arose between them and Enrichi caught Contarini and roasted him alive. Later, in 1501, some Venetians caught Enrichi and roasted him at Melos (Letter to Venetian Government, Dec. 12, 1501, Melos, summarized in Sanuto, IV, 206).

¹¹⁵ Sanuto, IV, 327. It was stated that Turkey was building a fleet of sixty ships, twenty-five of which were triremes. At first it had been supposed that the shipbuilding was solely against the pirates, but when the full scope of the project became known it was considered too extensive for use against piracy. At this point Venice became alarmed (Thuasne, pp. 297-299). Bayezid informed the Venetian merchants that they should have no fear in remaining in Turkey and that he did not intend to break the peace (Heyd, II, 329).

¹¹⁶ Thuasne, p. 302.

¹¹⁷ Sanuto, IV, 326; DaLezze, p. 192. The army was reported to number 100,000 (DaLezze, p. 191).

¹¹⁸ DaLezze, pp. 190-192.

¹¹⁹ It was upon this campaign that Bayezid narrowly escaped assassination by a dervish (Spandugino, pp. 247-248), and it is asserted that this incident was the cause for the introduction of the custom of holding the arms of all who approached the Sultan thereafter (Hammer, IV, 33-34). The same assertion has been made for the assassination of Murad I.

¹²⁰ Sanuto, IV, 327; Heyd, II, 329-330; Thuasne, pp. 308-310.

¹²¹ Thuasne, pp. 314, 316-317.

learned of the proposed invasion by Charles VIII. Naples, Venice, and the Pope joined forces in an effort to discourage this French invasion and maintained it would surely bring the Turks to Italy. Venice refused to aid France;¹²² Naples threatened to call upon Bayezid if attacked by Charles VIII; and Alexander VI agreed to send an ambassador to the Porte.¹²³

Both King Alfonso of Naples and Alexander VI sent ambassadors to Bayezid. The former asked for six thousand men in case Charles VIII attacked him,¹²⁴ and the latter requested a subsidy. By instructions from the Pope, dated at Rome, June 26, 1494, Georgio Buzardo was to tell Bayezid that Charles VIII with many Europeans was coming to Italy to seize Jem and lead him to Naples and southern Italy from where they were planning to cross to Greece and take the land of Turkey.¹²⁵ To cope with the problems arising from this impending invasion the Pope would need much money, and Buzardo, therefore, was to request that the annual payment of forty thousand ducats for Jem's pension be made early. More than this, the Pope would need the material support of Venice, and Bayezid was to be urged to send immediately an ambassador to the Venetians to warn them that the Porte would consider it unfriendly if they did not aid the Pope, because the Pope's friends and enemies were Bayezid's friends and enemies. Buzardo was also to threaten Bayezid with a united Christian attack led by the Pope if he did not accede to these demands.¹²⁶

Buzardo was more than successful in his mission, for he returned with a letter in which Bayezid not only yielded to everything the Pope wished, but suggested the means whereby Alexander VI might obtain a sum of three hundred thousand ducats. Bayezid stated in the letter¹²⁷ that he was averse to having Jem in the hands of Charles VIII, and insinuated that, for the repose of both the Pope and himself, Jem should be relieved of his tiresome journeys upon this earth and that his spirit

¹²² DaLezze, pp. 195-196; Thuasne, pp. 318-319. Venice refused, however, to come out openly for the Pope and Naples (Sanuto, *La spedizione di Carlo VIII in Italia*, pp. 31-32).

¹²³ Charriere, I, cxxv; DaLezze, pp. 195-196; Sanuto, *La spedizione*, p. 33; Thuasne, pp. 319-320.

¹²⁴ Sanuto, *La spedizione*, p. 53. Alfonso knew the value of Ottoman soldiers, for after the Turkish surrender at Otranto in 1481, some units of the Turkish army joined the army of the King of Naples (Thuasne, pp. 326-327).

¹²⁵ The King's agent in Rome received from Andrea Paleologo the title of Emperor of Constantinople.

¹²⁶ Buzardo told Bayezid of the nature of Charles VIII's army and its composition. Naturally Bayezid was told that Charles VIII intended to cross over to Greece and march on Istanbul. It was explained to Bayezid that his envoy to Venice should have authority to remain in Venice until the measures requested had been done. Furthermore, Buzardo related the grand offers which the Pope had received from the Sultan of Egypt and emphasized how the Pope had declined to accept them. Above all, Buzardo expressed the view that Bayezid should act because of his own interests, and with great speed (Pfeffermann, *Die Zusammenarbeit der Renaissancepäpste mit den Türken*, pp. 108-116; DaLezze, pp. 196-199).

¹²⁷ Dated at Istanbul, Sept. 12, 1494 (*ibid.*, 201). Doubt as to the authenticity of the letter has been expressed, but Sanuto gives the same version (*La spedizione*, pp. 46-47) as DaLezze, and Thuasne (pp. 338-339) does not doubt the validity.

would rest easier in another world. If this should be accomplished, Bayezid promised the Pope the above sum, to be paid when Jem's body should be brought to some Ottoman port.¹²⁸ Buzardo with three Ottoman ambassadors landed in Italy in November, 1494. One went to Venice to induce her to aid Naples and the Pope;¹²⁹ the second went to Naples to exhort King Alfonso to remain firm in his resistance to the French and to promise him succor from Turkey; and the third, Assam Bey, was carrying to the Pope the pension of Jem.¹³⁰

At Sinigaglia, near Ancona, Buzardo and Assam Bey were surprised by Prefect Giuliano della Rovere, who robbed them of the money and their letters. Rovere had an alliance with Venice, but he refused to return the stolen money, asserting that the Papacy owed him the sum.¹³¹ Probably he was in the pay of France, for Charles VIII published at Florence the correspondence between the Pope and the sultan. At the same time, Charles VIII issued a letter to all the world, inviting each nation to join in a crusade against the Turks.¹³²

It is likely that the ultimate aim of Charles VIII's invasion of Italy was the conquest of Naples. Early in 1494 the king had died, and the Pope had recognized Alfonso as his successor. Charles VIII presumably talked of the crusade and of Jem to force the Pope's permission and to frighten Bayezid into refusing aid to Naples. Perhaps if Charles VIII had been able to secure the support of all Italy he might have ventured across the Adriatic, but with enemies in his rear he could hardly risk it. Late in 1494 he sought to pacify the Pope, but becoming impatient, he entered Rome, and on January 11, 1495, Alexander VI was forced to consign Jem to Charles VIII. According to the terms, the Pope agreed to lend Jem for six months for twenty thousand ducats, but it was stipulated that Jem was to be used only to keep the Turks from landing in Italy.¹³³

Accompanied by Jem, Charles VIII marched south, much to the consternation of Bayezid, who called all the pirate captains to Istanbul and hastily gathered workmen to repair and rebuild the fleet.¹³⁴ But Jem fell

¹²⁸ DaLezze, pp. 199-201. The letter from Bayezid indicated that Jem's life in the Pope's prison was equivalent to death for Jem. Thus, the Pope's action would be life to Jem, would give benefit and repose to the Pope, and would bring great contentment to Bayezid. It was suggested that Bayezid would consign the 300,000 ducats to some third party who would hold the money until Jem's corpse had been turned over to the Ottomans. Also it was pointed out that the Pope would be able to purchase considerable land for his sons with this money. ¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 212.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 201-202, 205-206; Thuasne, pp. 334-340; Hammer, III, 370-371.

¹³¹ DaLezze, pp. 201-202; Sanuto, *La spedizione*, pp. 124-126. Venice sent an envoy, Sagudino, to obtain the stolen money and return it to Bayezid (Thuasne, pp. 334-340).

¹³² Charles VIII to Alexander VI, Lyon, March 14, 1494, in Pélicier (ed.), *Lettres de Charles VIII, roi de France, publiées d'après les originaux pour la Société de l'histoire de France*, IV, 28-30; DaLezze, p. 206. Charles VIII indicated that Naples would be the point of departure for the crusade (Thuasne, p. 319). The Emperor Maximilian tried to arrange a peace settlement in Italy so as not to interfere with the crusade, which would probably force Bayezid to withdraw from his activities in Hungary and therefore remove the pressure on the Empire (*ibid.*, pp. 322-325).

¹³³ DaLezze, pp. 208-210; Thuasne, pp. 349-351; Hammer, III, 370.

¹³⁴ DaLezze, p. 214; Thuasne, p. 362; Sanuto, *La spedizione*, pp. 221-222.

ill and died at Capua on February 25, 1495.¹³⁵ Though Charles VIII pretended not to give up the idea of a crusade,¹³⁶ Bayezid was fully aware of the political situation in Italy; he disbanded his fleet and ceased all preparations.¹³⁷ He realized that a crusade against him would not be immediate and doubted if it would ever materialize.

In April, 1495, when Sagudino arrived in Istanbul from Venice with the news, Bayezid was relieved to learn of Jem's death, although his religious and pious character overshadowed all emotions of joy. For three days the bazaars were closed, public prayers were offered for Jem's soul, and alms were given to the poor in Edirne and Istanbul. Bayezid sent ambassadors to Naples to bring back the body in order that it might be buried in Moslem soil.¹³⁸ In February, 1496, they appeared in Naples, but five thousand ducats were demanded for the body, and the ambassadors, who were imprisoned, were never heard from again.¹³⁹ France, Naples, and the Pope tried to collect the sum promised for Jem's death, and the body was to be held until the money arrived.¹⁴⁰ In 1498, Charles VIII died, and Naples again opened negotiations to send Jem's body to Turkey; Bayezid, however, was becoming impatient and in January, 1499, he threatened to descend upon the kingdom of Naples if the body was not placed in his ambassador's hands within eight days.¹⁴¹ In April the body was carried to Valona,¹⁴² and in August, 1499, it was taken to Gallipoli and Bursa, where the bones of Jem were interred in the turbeh of his grandfather, Sultan Murad II.¹⁴³

Concluding an important episode in Ottoman history and in the life of Bayezid, the death of Jem marked the end of a definite period of Turkish foreign relations. For fourteen years, Bayezid had been hampered in the formulation of an aggressive and positive foreign policy by the thought that his own subjects might turn against him and clamor for the return

¹³⁵ Sanuto, *La spedizione*, pp. 243-244. The cause of Jem's death has often been debated. Any sudden death in that age was usually attributed to poison, and Bayezid's letter to Alexander VI might lead one to suppose it, especially since Alexander VI tried to collect the 300,000 ducats from Bayezid. However, Jem was taken ill on February 12 and did not die until February 25, 1495 (DaLezze, p. 213). Furthermore, the illness as described by attendants would seem to indicate a natural death from pneumonia or erysipelas (Thuasne, pp. 364-367).

¹³⁶ Charles VIII to Alexander VI, Chieri, Aug. 21, 1495, in Pélicier, IV, 264-269. Charles VIII also ordered carpenters and caulkers to come to Naples and encouraged D'Aubusson to equip a fleet (Thuasne, p. 376). ¹³⁷ DaLezze, pp. 214-215, 219.

¹³⁸ Thuasne, pp. 377-380; DaLezze, p. 215.

¹³⁹ Sanuto, I, 56. The five thousand ducats were for Charles VIII (Ringiadori, Venetian consul, to the Venetian Government, Naples, March 26, 1496, summarized in Sanuto, I, 94). Jem's body was in a leaden casket (*ibid.*, I, 394).

¹⁴⁰ Lunardo Anselmi, Venetian consul, to the Venetian Government, Naples, Dec., 1496, summarized in Sanuto, I, 436. Bayezid offered to free all French prisoners serving in his galleys in the place of giving up the money (*ibid.*, I, 394).

¹⁴¹ Jacomo Lion to the Venetian Government, Brindisi, Jan. 8, 1499, summarized in Sanuto, II, 436. Previously, Bayezid had tried various means and channels to obtain Jem's body (*ibid.*, I, 1007).

¹⁴² Venetian envoy to the Venetian Government, Naples, April 20, 1499, summarized in Sanuto, II, 66a.

¹⁴³ Hammer, III, 373; Thuasne, pp. 384-387.

of Jem, and by the fear that some foreign enemy might obtain Jem, place him at the head of an army, and attack the Ottoman empire successfully. With Egypt and the border tribes, such as the Warsak, hostile to the Ottomans and willing to support Jem to divide or weaken the growing Ottoman empire, Bayezid was forced to hold in check as much as possible the warlike character of the numerous expansionists at his court and to pacify the campaigning spirit of the soldiers. Had their desires been allowed free reign in the Balkans, in Italy, or on the Mediterranean, one or more of the Christian nations might have joined with Egypt and the tribes of southern Anatolia in defeating Bayezid and placing Jem on the throne of a much-reduced Ottoman state. *Ghasas* in Europe and piracy on the seas were reduced to the barest minimum and official campaigns practically ceased. The actions of the Knights of St. John on Rhodes, Spain, France, Venice, Florence, the Pope, Naples, the Holy Roman Emperor, Hungary, and Poland had to be followed with care, for in any and all negotiations with any of them, the Porte was usually in a disadvantageous position. Although it may be said that at no time was there much likelihood that the states of Europe would settle their differences and join in a combined attack upon Turkey, Bayezid and his court showed considerable diplomatic finesse in escaping from the simultaneous attack by two or more of these potential enemies. With Jem removed from the picture, Bayezid and his officials could threaten their neighbors and enemies more openly. The Ottoman Turks were able to wage war without restraint, and in the following years a definite change in the foreign policy of the Porte is discernible.

CHAPTER V

PRELUDE TO WAR, 1496-1499

THE DEATH of Jem in 1495 reversed conditions and placed Europe, and especially Italy, on the defensive. Although the change did not become apparent immediately, its growth was perceptible, and moreover, it began once more the course of history which had temporarily lapsed upon the death of Mehmed II. Furthermore, Bayezid, feeling secure on his throne, left more of the business of government to his officials, not all of whom were so peacefully inclined as he.

For more than five years there had been no major campaign, and the soldiers were growing restless. The eight thousand janissaries¹ were particularly so, and in the summer of 1496, an outbreak occurred in Istanbul between the janissaries and the sipahis of the Porte, between whom, for a time, neither Bayezid nor the officials dared to intervene, even though some of the officials were being robbed by the janissaries. Finally the riot was quelled and some of the agitators paid with their lives,² but the situation indicated that prolonged inactivity for these professional soldiers was not conducive to peace and harmony within the empire. The extent to which this was realized by Bayezid and the vizirs is not known, but undoubtedly the tense situation was one factor leading to the renewal of the raids and minor campaigns which began to occur in the Balkans. With the death of Jem it was no longer possible to hold in check the Ottoman soldiers and to keep them from organizing expeditions for booty and slaves.

The Venetians sensed a change in attitude upon the part of Turkey before this disturbance, and in May, 1496, sent Alvise Sagudino³ to Istanbul to advise Bayezid of the peaceful sentiments of Venice and of her intention of maintaining friendly relations with the Porte.⁴ If he could not induce Bayezid to reinstate the *bailo*, he was, at least, to persuade the Porte to receive a Venetian ambassador.⁵ Although Bayezid showed interest in the affairs of Italy and France and asked many questions, probably to check the reports of Ottoman envoys and spies, he would not consent to the request for a resident Venetian *bailo*. Sagudino argued that such an official would keep the Porte better informed on western affairs,

¹ In 1496 Bayezid's armed forces were estimated to include 34 sanjakbeys in Anatolia and 28 in Europe, with 32,000 soldiers under them, 8,000 janissaries, 8,000 sipahis, and about 115,000 others. Also he had a fleet of about 250 ships, including 100 galleys, 50 *fuste*, 50 brigs, and 10 large ships (Relation of Alvise Sagudino to the Venetian Government, Venice, Dec. 2, 1496, summarized in Sanuto, I, 398-399).

² The rioting first broke out in the *bedistan* and appears to have lasted four days (*ibid.*, I, 399; Alvise Sagudino to the Venetian Government, Istanbul, n.d., summarized in *ibid.*, I, 359).

³ Sagudino was sent because he knew both Turkish and Greek (Sanuto, I, 402).

⁴ *Ibid.*, I, 137.

⁵ *Ibid.*, I, 402.

but Bayezid did not rescind his order because in Turkey a *bailo* was regarded as an official spy.⁶

There were numerous reasons, other than the official diplomatic relations, for Sagudino's visit. Turkey had closed her ports to Italian grain merchants, because there was a wheat shortage in the country, and this embargo affected the Venetians, who heretofore had depended greatly upon grain from Salonica, Negroponte, and the Black Sea ports.⁷ Later in the year, when news came that Andrea Gritti⁸ had procured the removal of this restriction, the price of flour fell in Venice.⁹

Other very important objects of Sagudino's mission were the investigation of shipbuilding activities in Turkey and the diminution of the insidious propaganda of Italians against Venice. The Turks were building a navy, and Sagudino found that they had a fleet of over two hundred fifty ships, including one hundred galleys, several galleons, and two large *barza*¹⁰ of about three hundred fifty and five hundred tons each.¹¹ The Porte explained that this program was launched against the numerous pirates who infested the Aegean, and it was true that an attempt was being made to exterminate them,¹² but the Venetians felt, and perhaps rightly, that the construction was more extensive than the need warranted. It was also explained that Bayezid wished to be ready in case Charles VIII should return to Italy.¹³

The other Italian states were justly apprehensive of the intentions of Venice and her friendliness with France. In case of another Italian campaign by the French, they wished to call upon the Turks to aid them and to attack Venice. The Pope,¹⁴ the king of Naples,¹⁵ the duke of Milan,¹⁶ and the duke of Ferrara¹⁷ sent ambassadors to Turkey to malign Venice

⁶ Sagudino wished to kiss Bayezid's hand but this was refused. Bayezid indicated that it had been a long time since he had had a letter from the doge and that he would appreciate one full of news so that he might check the reports of his spies (Alvise Sagudino to the Venetian Government, Istanbul, July 3, 1496, summarized in *ibid.*, I, 323).

⁷ Sanuto, I, 326, 459. Venetian merchants also carried on a trade in wool from Salonica, for at this time a Venetian ship carrying 20,000 ducats worth of wool from that port was lost at sea (*ibid.*, I, 514).

⁸ He was then a merchant in Istanbul with considerable influence at the Porte.

⁹ Sanuto, I, 508, 552.

¹⁰ A round ship with a lower, narrower, and straighter prow than a merchantman, which came into use at the end of the fifteenth century (F. C. Lane, *Venetian ships and shipbuilders of the Renaissance*, p. 50).

¹¹ Six hundred and eight hundred *botti* (Alvise Sagudino to the Venetian Government, Istanbul, July 3, 1496, summarized in Sanuto, I, 323). One *botte* equaled about six-tenths of a ton (Lane, 246).

¹² It appears that the attempt was to exterminate the Christian pirates and to incorporate within the Ottoman navy the Moslem pirates and any of the Christians who so desired. Bayezid sent out a force to bring in one pirate named Kemal, who upon arrival in Istanbul was greatly honored and put in command of part of the Ottoman fleet (Sanuto, I, 10, 83, 135-136; Giovanni di Tabia to Venetian Government, Chios, April 14, 1496, summarized in *ibid.*, I, 204-205; Hironimo Barbarigo to his brother, Corfu, Oct. 15, 1496, summarized in *ibid.*, I, 387; Relation of Alvise Sagudino to Venetian Government, Venice, Dec. 2, 1496, summarized in *ibid.*, I, 399).

¹³ Giovanni di Tabia to Venetian Government, Chios, July 18, 1496, summarized in *ibid.*, I, 295.

¹⁴ Buzardo was again sent to Istanbul and honored by Bayezid (Giovanni di Tabia to Venetian Government, Chios, Jan. 26, 1496, summarized in *ibid.*, I, 84; I, 136-137).

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, I, 137.

¹⁶ Angelo da Lavello, the ambassador, did not reach Bayezid, but he exchanged presents with the sanjakbey of Bosnia, who was Bayezid's son-in-law (*ibid.*, I, 371).

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, I, 417.

and to secure the aid and cooperation of Bayezid against that state. Sagudino tried to assure Bayezid that Venice was friendly with Turkey and that the reports of the other ambassadors were false. He thought he was successful,¹⁸ but later developments proved otherwise.

Late in the summer of 1496, trouble arose between Turkey and Venice in the region of Montenegro and the gulf of Cattaro. Ottoman forces appeared and ousted the local lord, George Cernovitch,¹⁹ who straightway fled with his family and goods to Venice.²⁰ The Venetians claimed jurisdiction over Cattaro and some of the adjacent lands, and to settle the affair peaceably Sagudino was again sent to the Porte in January of 1497. He was commissioned to go to the sanjakbey of Skodra, Firuz Bey, the Ottoman official given authority over this area, but if Sagudino could get no satisfaction in this quarter he was to proceed to Istanbul.²¹

Evidently Firuz Bey was unable to make a satisfactory settlement, for Sagudino was in Istanbul in May, 1497. His reception was cool, as Bayezid had learned that Venice and France were allied, and he feared that they had united against him.²² Milan, Ferrara, Mantua, and Florence had representatives at the Porte offering fifty thousand ducats a year if the Turks would attack Venice with them.²³ More than this, Bayezid asserted that the Venetians were subsidizing the Hungarians and the Poles in their war against Turkey.²⁴ Bayezid and the vizirs tried to deceive Sagudino and to make him believe that they were friendly toward Venice. They would have succeeded, and thus duped Venice, if the Venetian merchants in Istanbul had not been wiser and informed Sagudino that he had, in truth, received little attention.²⁵

The Venetian influence in the Cattaro region became less, and the inhabitants of Montenegro accepted the Turkish rule willingly, rather than suffer from incessant raids. Firuz Bey sent officials and troops to occupy the Cernovitch lands and no overt act was committed.²⁶ In June, 1497, Marchio Trevisano arrived at Cattaro with some galleys and reported no damage. In an exchange of notes between him and Firuz Bey, each vouched for the peaceful intentions of his government; Venice was asked

¹⁸ Relation of Alvise Sagudino, Venice, Dec. 2, 1496, summarized in *ibid.*, I, 399.

¹⁹ There are two accounts of the origin of this incident. One asserts that Stefan Cernovitch, who had become an Ottoman, came from Istanbul and drove his brother, George, from the family lands (Piero Lion to Venetian Government, Cattaro, Nov. 27, 1496, summarized in *ibid.*, I, 421). The other claims that a native of the area, upon becoming a favorite at the Porte, sent money to his father. Thereupon he came before George Cernovitch and demanded that he be made chief of his village. Cernovitch had the man cut to pieces, which act led the Turks to send the expedition to punish Cernovitch for killing the father of one of Bayezid's favorites (DaLezze, p. 220).

²⁰ DaLezze, pp. 219-220; Sanuto, I, 402. At about this same time, the Turks were also raiding in the neighborhood of Trau on the Dalmatian coast (*ibid.*, I, 417).

²¹ DaLezze, p. 220; Sanuto, I, 402, 425, 428, 454.

²² Alvise Sagudino to Venetian Government, Istanbul, May 4, 1497, summarized in Sanuto, I, 640; Sagudino, Istanbul, Sept. 17, 1497, summarized in *ibid.*, I, 809.

²³ Hammer, IV, 51; Sagudino, Istanbul, Oct. 1497, summarized in Sanuto, I, 846.

²⁴ Sagudino to Venetian Government, Istanbul, Sept. 17, 1497, summarized in *ibid.*, I, 809.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, I, 644.

²⁶ DaLezze, p. 220; Sanuto, I, 643-644, 702.

to surrender Cattaro, but Trevisano maintained that the coastal region belonged to Venice, basing his argument on the maps joined to the treaties confirmed by both Mehmed II and Bayezid.²⁷ Sagudino in Istanbul, however, was unable to persuade the vizirs to return any of the land that had been seized.²⁸ Affairs were left as they were, and an uncertain feeling was produced between Venice and the Porte; it has been asserted²⁹ that this was the first of a series of incidents which led to war two years later between the two states.

The Aegean Sea and the islands that make up the Archipelago were a happy hunting ground for pirates of all kinds from the most ancient times to the introduction of steam. During Bayezid's reign, piracy was rife, and Christian as well as Moslem encouraged the pirates of his own faith to attack the shipping of the other. Rhodes and Cyprus served as bases for many of the Christian pirates, and the Ottoman grain trade between the Greek mainland and the Dardanelles suffered to a large extent. To counteract this and bring personal gain to some of the Ottoman officials, the Porte encouraged Moslem pirates and privateers. Such names as Kemal, Karahasan, Enrichi, Barbata, and Karafa struck fear in the breasts of all Christian traders and sailors, because none could say which one might be lurking in the lee of the next promontory. Capture by any one of them meant the loss of ships and goods, and death or slavery for the men on board. But the Moslem ships had the same to fear from any Christian. For example, the very ship which carried Sagudino to the Porte took two Turkish ships in the Aegean, sinking one with all the men on board.³⁰ Such conditions were not conducive to good feelings on either side, and with the rapid increase of such occurrences in 1496 and 1497, it is remarkable that open hostilities between Venice and Turkey came no sooner than they did.

It can not be questioned that the Porte encouraged such proceedings,³¹ for in June, 1497, the Venetian galley *Sappho*, carrying gold and many pilgrims to the Holy Land, encountered Enrichi and Barbata off Cerigo. Though it was a drawn battle and the Turks maintained they had mistaken the boat for a French galley,³² Enrichi was honored when he returned to Istanbul. The vizirs notified Venice that such incidents were not desired or planned by the Porte.³³ With the Knights of Rhodes bring-

²⁷ Albèri, series 3, III, 3; Firuz Bey to Marchio Trevisano, Skodra, received June 24, 1497, and Marchio Trevisano to Firuz Bey, Cattaro, June 24, 1497, quoted in Sanuto, I, 678-680.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, I, 702, 823.

²⁹ Though opinion at the moment held that this would not lead to war (*ibid.*, I, 643), later views are that it was a significant incident in bringing on the war in 1499 (Hammer, IV, 42).

³⁰ Sanuto, I, 810.

³¹ Each of these pirates, at one time or another, served as a captain or squadron leader in the Ottoman navy during peacetime, and all were called to the fleet in time of war.

³² Alvise Zorzi, Captain of the *Sappho*, declared that the Turks attacked him first (Alvise Zorzi to Hieronimo Zorzi, Candia, July 10, 1497, summarized in Sanuto, I, 728-732), but Enrichi evidently related to Bayezid that Zorzi had fired at him after a refusal to return the sign of friendship (Gritti, p. 22).

³³ Andrea Gritti to Andrea Gabrieli, Pera, Jan. 17, 1498, summarized in Sanuto, I, 916.

ing artillery from France to fight Turkey,³⁴ with three thousand ship-builders and carpenters gathered in Istanbul, and with a ship of eighteen hundred tons under construction,³⁵ open war between Moslem and Christian could not be far distant. Venice, on the other hand, had been given numerous assurances that Turkey was not planning any attack against her, and evidently she was confident in the sincerity of these, since the navy was only slightly increased and no move was made to strengthen Modon,³⁶ one of the most important ports-of-call on her route to the Levant.

The partial unconcern of Venice over the Ottoman armaments may perhaps be ascribed to the fact that Turkey at the time was embroiled in a war with Poland and Hungary. In 1496 King Albert of Poland³⁷ had invaded Moldavia and, in the spring of that year, the Hungarians attacked and defeated the Ottoman garrisons along the frontier. It was learned in Istanbul that King Vladislav of Hungary also planned to send troops to attack Kilia on the Danube.³⁸ The Turks prepared so vigorously to repulse him that he sent an ambassador to Istanbul to negotiate a treaty between the Porte and the kingdoms of Hungary and Poland. This was unsuccessful,³⁹ because Bayezid would not recognize Hungarian suzerainty over Moldavia, which was the province that had suffered from the Polish raids.⁴⁰ The next year, 1497, it was reported that Moldavia, Hungary, Poland, and Russia had formed a league against Turkey,⁴¹ but, if this were true, none except Poland was faithful to the agreements.

The Hungarians were molested by the Turks of Bosnia, so that their support to Poland was ineffective,⁴² and Karabogdan discovered that it was more to his advantage to side with the Porte.⁴³ With the coming of the Poles to Kilia and Akerman in 1497, Bayezid called the sanjakbeys of Rumelia to gather at Edirne with their troops in preparation for a Polish campaign. An army of eighty thousand, including janissaries, sipahis, *azabs*, and *timarjis*, set out under Ali Pasha of Silistra to recover

³⁴ *Ibid.*, I, 463.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, I, 552, 644, 846, 897; Giovanni di Tabia to Piero Dolfi, Chios, Dec. 15, 1497, summarized in *ibid.*, I, 909.

³⁶ Marchio Trevisano to Venetian Government, Corfu, Feb. 10, 1497, summarized in *ibid.*, I, 538.

³⁷ King Albert of Poland, younger brother of King Vladislav of Hungary, had renewed in 1493 for a three-year period a treaty which King Casimir had concluded with Bayezid II in 1490 (Hammer, IV, 43-44).

³⁸ Giovanni di Tabia to Venetian Government, Chios, July 18, 1497, summarized in Sanuto, I, 295.

³⁹ Letter, Istanbul, Jan. 20, 1497, summarized in *ibid.*, I, 552; Pray, *Annales regum Hungariae*, IV, 309, cited in Hammer, IV, 51.

⁴⁰ Pray, *Annales regum Hungariae*, IV, 274, cited in Hammer, IV, 44.

⁴¹ Such a league suited Venice and all Italy for they believed that it would keep Bayezid's thoughts away from them (Sagudino to Venetian Government, Corfu, Aug. 3, 1497, summarized in Sanuto, I, 740). In the summer of 1497 Bayezid sent an ambassador to Emperor Maximilian, perhaps with the hope of negotiating a peace with Poland through him (*ibid.*, I, 641, 699-700, 736). If this were true, the ambassador was ineffectual, for Maximilian soon suggested by way of the Duke of Milan that all the western princes, including Venice, attack Turkey (*ibid.*, I, 847).

⁴² *Ibid.*, I, 674; Sebastiano Zantani to Venetian Government, Gradisca, July 6, 1497, summarized in *ibid.*, I, 686.

⁴³ He became an honorary pasha and an officer of the janissaries (Hammer, IV, 46).

Kilia and Akerman from the army of the allies, which numbered one hundred thousand.⁴⁴ The Turks were routed several times and a great many were killed, but the Christian league had no overwhelming victories.⁴⁵

The Turks, nevertheless, were persistent. Bayezid sent an ambassador to Vladislav to draw up a treaty and thus to separate him from the enemy. Naturally King Albert of Poland tried to keep his brother in the alliance, but a truce was signed by Turkey and Hungary.⁴⁶ Bayezid, as well, sent an ambassador to Venice to inform the doge of the Ottoman successes on the Danube and to impress him with the strength of Turkish arms.⁴⁷ But with the Polish army remaining in Moldavia during the winter of 1497-1498, the Porte was compelled to use every possible means to strengthen its position. Merchants were forbidden to ship grain out of Istanbul,⁴⁸ work on the navy was rushed, and all the troops were prepared for a great campaign in the coming spring.

Ali Pasha crossed the Danube with a force of sixty thousand in April, 1498,⁴⁹ but the expedition was only a magnified raiding party. He returned with more than ten thousand captives and then was sent again in September with a larger army, which was more successful.⁵⁰ They crossed the Dniester on a bridge of boats and plundered a large area on the far side of the river, taking many fortresses. The Polish army was severely routed,⁵¹ and King Albert sought aid from Venice and Hungary, each of whom refused.⁵² Hungarian ambassadors were at the Porte, declaring that Vladislav was not in agreement with Albert and that Hungary wished peace with Turkey.⁵³ Karabogdan of Moldavia proved a poor ally for Poland; in fact, Bayezid rewarded him for his loyal service against the Poles. Winter and a shortage of food in the Ottoman camp saved the Poles from further attack, and Ali Pasha returned to Kilia, where the Ottoman troops were disbanded.⁵⁴

Early in 1499, messages were exchanged between Bayezid and Vladi-

slav with the idea of formulating a truce. The nobles of Hungary were dissatisfied with Vladislav's policy of taxing them for a Turkish war and then not using the income for that purpose.⁵⁵ Bayezid, on the other hand, was preparing for a war with Venice and did not desire that Hungary join Venice. In July at the instigation of Maximilian,⁵⁶ a truce was drawn up between Bayezid and Maximilian, Albert, and Vladislav.⁵⁷ Eight camels carried presents from the Porte to Hungary; Vladislav sent costly gifts to Bayezid;⁵⁸ and the Turkish troops were ordered to cease all attacks upon Hungary and Poland. Even after the truce was signed, minor outbreaks and raids occurred along the frontier,⁵⁹ but these were not official, and, in general, peace reigned between the allies and Turkey.

In the year 1499 Ivan III, tsar of Russia, also sent an ambassador, Alexis Golokvastof, to the Porte to re-establish good relations with Turkey. Golokvastof visited Bayezid and his son Prince Mahmud, who was governor of Kaffa, with the idea of furthering commercial relations in the Crimea, which, under the Tartar khans, had become subject to the Porte, and to express the friendly attitude of the tsar because of the recent incursions of the Ottomans into Poland. Golokvastof was received more favorably than Plesttschief had been seven years before and returned to Russia with a commercial treaty from Bayezid.⁶⁰

During these years following Jem's death, the political interests of the Porte were not confined solely to the north and west. In 1489 at a grand celebration in Istanbul, Bayezid had given three of his daughters in marriage, each to a great lord, one of whom was a Persian, Ahmed Mirza, son of Ugurli Mehmed, and grandson of Uzun Hasan.⁶¹ In 1496 the shah of Persia died, and in January, 1497, a group of Persian nobles came to Istanbul to invite Ahmed Mirza to become their ruler.⁶² He accepted, returned to Persia, and assumed the throne, but the country as a whole did not receive him.⁶³ In 1498, Bayezid prepared an army to assist his son-in-law, who was fighting the opposing Persian nobles,⁶⁴ but Persia was distant, and at the time the chief interests of the Porte lay in Europe. As

⁴⁴ Sanuto, I, 800; Giovanni di Tabia to Piero Dolfin, Chios, June 25, 1497, summarized in *ibid.*, I, 756-757.

⁴⁵ Sagudino to Venetian Government, Istanbul, Sept. 17, 1497, summarized in *ibid.*, I, 809.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, I, 800, 819, 846. ⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, I, 845.

⁴⁸ There had been a scarcity of grain in Turkey and in the east in general in 1497 (*ibid.*, I, 752). Toward the end of the year the grain trade between Venice and the Greek ports was permitted since there was a good harvest, but because of the Polish War no one was allowed to ship grain from Istanbul (Francesco Nani to Venetian Government, Corfu, Sept., 1497, summarized in *ibid.*, I, 799-801).

⁴⁹ Giovanni di Tabia to Venetian Government, Chios, May 5, 1498, summarized in *ibid.*, I, 994; Hammer, IV, 44.

⁵⁰ Andrea Gritti to Zaccaria di Freschi, Istanbul, Sept. 25, 1498, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 137; Antonio Moro to Venetian Government, Corfu, Nov. 1, 1498, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 169.

⁵¹ Bernardo Zustugnam to Antonio Moro, Pera, Nov. 8, 1498, summarized in Sanuto, II, 291-292; Piero Malipiero to Venetian Government, Veja, Jan. 25, Jan. 31-Feb. 2, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 394, 420-421; Hammer, IV, 44-46.

⁵² Piero Boldu to Venetian Government, Arbe, Feb. 1, 1499, summarized in Sanuto, II, 422.

⁵³ Andrea Gritti to Zaccaria di Freschi, Istanbul, Sept. 25, 1498, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 137.

⁵⁴ It was reported that forty thousand Turks perished from exposure and the cold (Hammer, IV, 45-46; Sanuto, IV, 327).

⁵⁵ Alvise Sagudino to Venetian Government, Cattaro, June 9, 1499, summarized in Sanuto, II, 849.

⁵⁶ An Ottoman ambassador had visited Maximilian in 1497 (Zorzi Pisani to Venetian Government, Imps, July 19, 1497, summarized in *ibid.*, I, 699-700; I, 736).

⁵⁷ Andrea Zanchani to Venetian Government, Gradisca, July 18, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 939-940.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, II, 1369; III, 77; Nicolo Gondola to Venetian Government, Ragusa, Aug. 7-13, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 1154.

⁵⁹ Giovanni di Tabia to Venetian Government, Chios, Dec. 5, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 129-130. To quell small and unorganized raids in the Balkans by the Ottoman feudatory and garrisons was impossible; there was, however, one organized raid led by Iskender Pasha into Hungary which had to be disavowed. ⁶⁰ Hammer, IV, 49.

⁶¹ Ašiqpāšāzāde, p. 233; Giese, "Die altsmanischen anonymen Chroniken," in *Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, XVII, No. 1, 161.

⁶² Letter, Istanbul, Jan. 20, 1497, summarized in Sanuto, I, 552; Alvise Sagudino to Venetian Government, Istanbul, May 4, 1497, summarized in *ibid.*, I, 644. ⁶³ *Ibid.*, I, 844-845.

⁶⁴ Francesco Nani to Venetian Government, Corfu, March, 1498, summarized in *ibid.*, I, 922. Religious differences also separated Ahmed Mirza from the majority of the Persian lords.

Ahmed Mirza was given little support because of the troubles with Venice, he soon succumbed, and was replaced almost immediately by Ismail, who attacked the Taurus region in 1499.⁶⁵ This was the beginning of a much larger affair which will be discussed in a subsequent chapter, but its importance here rests upon the fact that it aroused Venetian interest to such an extent that an alliance between Persia and Venice was proposed.

Trade between Egypt and Italy at this time was one of the main sources of Egyptian as well as Italian income, and the sultan of Egypt showed displeasure over the growing hostility of Turkey and Venice. In May, 1498, when Kemal was in Egypt escorting a group of Turkish pilgrims on their way to Mecca, the sultan of Egypt implored him not to injure any Italians or Rhodians.⁶⁶ Late in that year, however, the Egyptian sultan was killed,⁶⁷ and the Porte deemed this a favorable moment to attack Alaeddevlet and aid Karta Bey of Damascus, who had rebelled against the dominance of Egypt.⁶⁸ A force of fifteen thousand soldiers under one of Bayezid's sons was gathered in the spring of 1499 at Selefke to conquer Adana and Tarsus.⁶⁹ The fleet was sent to cooperate with the land forces,⁷⁰ but upon the outbreak of the war with Venice, presents were carried to the new Egyptian sultan, and an embassy, including a sister of Bayezid, went to Damascus to bring about a peaceful settlement.⁷¹

There had been no official Venetian representative at the Porte since 1492, but Andrea Gritti, who was the wealthiest Venetian merchant in Istanbul, kept his government well informed of all developments in Turkey. In January, 1498, he wrote that the vizirs were not inclined to peace with Venice, that they were preparing a great fleet, and that Bayezid was disposed to wage war and had the means to carry on a war.⁷² During the summer of 1498, Ottoman naval activities proceeded at a great pace, and the ports of Valona and Butrinto on the Adriatic were

⁶⁵ E. D. Ross, "The early years of Shāh Isma'il, founder of the Safavi dynasty," in *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, n.s., XXVIII, 297-300; DaLezze, p. 268.

⁶⁶ But there was no objection to Kemal capturing a Portuguese ship and impaling its crew (Letter to Alvise Arimondo, Alexandria, June 4, 1498, summarized in Sanuto, I, 1032-1033).

⁶⁷ Alvise Mora to Venetian Government, Alexandria, Nov. 26, 1498, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 311; Andrea Gritti to Zaccaria di Freschi, Pera, Dec. 11, 1498, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 507.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*; Antonio Moro to Venetian Government, Corfu, Dec. 10, 1498, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 291.

⁶⁹ Nicolo da Cha da Pesaro to Venetian Government, Modon, April 14, 30, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 684-685, 783; Piero di Mussi to Governor of Cyprus, Rhodes, April 9, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 784.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*; D'Aubusson to Andrea di Martini, Rhodes, April 5, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 670.

⁷¹ Bortolo Sanuto to Governor of Cyprus, Damascus, April 8, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 784; Beneto Sanuto to Venetian Government, Damascus, April 15, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 1040. Even the fact that a group of Turks of high position were killed on their way to Mecca by Arabs did not seem to alter the decision of the Porte to seek peace (Hironomo Tiepolo to Venetian Government, Alexandria, June 1, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 1043). Another object of this embassy was to claim Jem's daughter who was the widow of the dead sultan of Egypt (Thuasne, p. 388).

⁷² Andrea Gritti to Andrea Gabrieli, Pera, Jan. 17, 1498, summarized in Sanuto, I, 916-917. Bayezid's annual income at that time was estimated at 2,400,000 ducats, and it was asserted that there were 3,000,000 ducats in the treasury (Relation of Alvise Sagudino, Venice, Dec. 2, 1496, summarized in *ibid.*, I, 398-399).

filled with workmen building ships and making munitions.⁷³ Messengers were sent to all parts of the empire to get pitch, canvas, cloth, and men to pull the oars of the galleys,⁷⁴ and notorious pirates were being commissioned by the Porte to captain the ships.⁷⁵ Trade in the Aegean was daily becoming more dangerous because all restraint had been lifted from Turkish, Rhodian, Venetian, Genoese, and Portuguese pirates, who made the most of their opportunities.

The Christian nations of the West knew, or thought they knew, that Turkey was planning an assault upon them, but exactly where her arm would strike was a matter of conjecture. The Knights of Rhodes believed with many others that the Turkish fleet was destined for them, and the grand master moved to avert it but also to place everything in readiness. He sent an envoy to Bayezid in October, 1498, to settle their difficulties in an amicable fashion, but no audience was granted.⁷⁶ With this rebuff, Rhodes ordered artillery and munitions from France and Venice and sent out couriers to notify all the brethren to be in Rhodes by March of the coming year.⁷⁷

The people of Puglia in southern Italy feared a repetition of the Turkish occupation of Otranto in 1480. Mustafa, the sanjakbey of Valona, was collecting a fleet, and in September, 1498, he was in Istanbul seeking permission to descend upon Puglia. These events, coupled with the Porte's renewed claim upon Otranto, frightened the inhabitants and the Venetian representatives in southern Italy.⁷⁸ Perhaps the latter were more apprehensive because Taranto, if she had to choose between Turkey and Naples, maintained she preferred the former.⁷⁹

On the whole, however, Venice had the most reasons for fear. She controlled the Dalmatian coast, the Ionian Islands, Crete, Cyprus, several islands in the Archipelago, and many cities in Greece, including Lepanto, Modon, Coron, and Napoli di Romania. Within her extensive dominions there were many vulnerable spots easily accessible to either the Ottoman army or navy. The repeated reports from Istanbul, Chios, and Corfu of

⁷³ Antonio Moro to Venetian Government, Corfu, Nov. 27, 1498, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 233; Vido Diedo to Venetian Government, Durazzo, Nov. 11-16, 1498, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 248, 256.

⁷⁴ Fifteen thousand *azabs* as well as twenty-four thousand oarsmen were being enlisted (Andrea Gritti to Zaccaria di Freschi, Pera, Dec. 11, 1498, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 506-507).

⁷⁵ Giovanni di Tabia to Piero Dolfin, Chios, April 5, 1498, summarized in *ibid.*, I, 977-978.

⁷⁶ Giovanni di Tabia to Piero Dolfin, Chios, Dec. 15, 1497, summarized in *ibid.*, I, 909; Nicolo Pesaro to Venetian Government, Modon, Oct. 17, 1498, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 233; Francesco Bragadin and Scipione Bon to Venetian Government, Napoli di Romania, Dec. 14, 1498, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 386. The envoy from Rhodes also hoped to obtain the return of a boat which the Turks had taken (Letter, Modon, Oct. 22, 1498, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 128).

⁷⁷ D'Aubusson to Venetian Government, Rhodes, Oct. 7, 1498, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 154; Nicolo Pesaro to Venetian Government, Modon, Nov. 26, 1498, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 379.

⁷⁸ Nicolo Pesaro to Venetian Government, Modon, Aug., 1498, summarized in *ibid.*, I, 1090; Andrea Gritti to Zaccaria di Freschi, Istanbul, Sept. 25, 1498, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 136-137; Antonio Moro to Venetian Government, Corfu, Nov. 27, 1498, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 233; II, 257; Piero Sanuto to Venetian Government, Lepanto, Dec. 1, 1498, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 289.

⁷⁹ Bernardino di Ambrosii to Venetian Government, Naples, Oct. 12, 1496, summarized in *ibid.*, I, 367.

Turkish activity should have stirred the Venetian government to prepare her navy and to send supplies to her garrisons, but apparently she felt assured of her power and entered into preparations only halfheartedly.⁸⁰

Throughout the year of 1498, the Turks worried most of the Venetian outposts. The *bailos*, the governors, and the captains stationed in Corfu and Dalmatia sent in a steady stream of dispatches which told of the work of the various sanjakbeys who were preparing to take Corfu, Lepanto, Parga, Durazzo, and many other of the Venetian possessions in the Adriatic.⁸¹ Bayezid had assigned three thousand janissaries, two thousand *azabs*, five thousand horsemen, and three thousand workmen to Mustafa at Valona⁸² in order to prepare a fleet and a naval base for operations in Albania, Dalmatia, and the Adriatic. The Venetian *bailo* in Corfu wrote that his available supplies and means would not enable him to repulse an attack or a siege, but the Venetians did not act to strengthen their position.⁸³ Even nearer St. Mark's than Corfu, the people of Spalato and Sibenico complained to Venice that Turks under Iskender Pasha had raided their lands and had taken away cattle and slaves.⁸⁴ Cattaro and Dulzigno as well as Spalato and Sibenico sought more protection from Venice, whereas Narenta surrendered to the Turks⁸⁵ rather than suffer from raids which alone it was unable to prevent.

The reason for Venetian assurance and confidence in her position is difficult to understand, but it may be partially explained by the fact that Venice was negotiating an alliance with France and evidently felt that the Turks would fear Louis XII as much as they had Charles VIII.⁸⁶ Louis XII was pressing a hereditary claim on Milan and sought Venice as an ally in order to isolate Lodovico Sforza. Venice was quite willing to see the French in Milan, but before signing the treaty, Louis XII was compelled to include Turkey as a possible enemy and, in case of a Turkish attack upon Venice, to render aid and to relieve her from the obligation of declaring war against Milan.⁸⁷ Louis XII wished to include

⁸⁰ Vido Diedo to Venetian Government, Durazzo, Nov. 16, 1498, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 248; Antonio Moro to Venetian Government, Corfu, Dec. 10, 1498, and Jan. 7, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 291, 382; Piero Sanuto to Venetian Government, Lepanto, Dec. 1, 1498, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 292; Deposition of Giovanni Mosco, Lepanto, Nov. 13, 1498, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 293-294; Francesco Bragadin and Scipione Bon to Venetian Government, Napoli di Romania, Dec. 14, 1498, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 386; Andrea Gritti to Zaccaria di Freschi, Pera, Dec. 11, 1498, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 507.

⁸¹ Antonio Moro to Venetian Government, Corfu, Nov. 27-Dec. 2, 1498, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 233-234; Vido Diedo to Venetian Government, Durazzo, Nov. 16, 1498, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 248; Piero Sanuto to Venetian Government, Lepanto, Dec. 1, 1498, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 289-290.

⁸² Antonio Moro to Venetian Government, Corfu, Nov. 1, 1498, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 169; Vido Diedo to Venetian Government, Durazzo, Nov. 16, 1498, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 248.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, II, 235; Antonio Moro to Venetian Government, Corfu, Nov. 27-Dec. 2, 1498, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 233-234.

⁸⁴ Arseni Diedo to Venetian Government, Sibenico, and Marino Moro to Venetian Government, Spalato, Oct., 1498, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 104; Andrea Gritti to Zaccaria di Freschi, Pera, Dec. 11, 1498, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 507.

⁸⁵ Alvise Barbarigo to Venetian Government, Liesna, Oct. 2, 1498, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 30.

⁸⁶ Also at that time Venice was experiencing the first depressing effects of the Portuguese's rounding of Africa. ⁸⁷ Sanuto, II, 124, 144, 336.

Rhodes in the alliance, but the Venetians declared that this would surely bring Turkey into the conflict,⁸⁸ and Venice wished, if possible, to keep the Porte neutral. The duke of Milan, however, was not standing idly by while Venice and France divided his dukedom. The Pope, Florence, and Naples, objecting to an invasion of Italy by Louis XII, joined with Milan in protesting against France to Bayezid who, heretofore, had always been interested in Italian affairs. They sent ambassadors to the Porte to lament the fact that Venice had invited the French into Italy again, and to encourage Turkey to assail the Venetians⁸⁹ by relating that after Louis XII should have conquered Italy, he was planning to cross to Greece and, with the aid of his fleet, attack Turkey.⁹⁰

The Pope, Florence, and Milan were on good terms with Bayezid, but the Porte did not look upon Naples with a great deal of favor, mainly because she had failed to send the body of Jem to Turkey. To settle this affair and to create friendly relations, King Federico of Naples sent Tomaso Paleologo Asani to Istanbul to draw up a treaty, which was completed July 15, 1498, and formally signed ten days later.⁹¹ By its terms,⁹² which, in general, were concessions to Naples, it was to endure only for the lives of the two rulers and would not be fully confirmed by Bayezid until Jem's body had been sent to Turkey. Besides the commercial articles⁹³ of the treaty, the Porte swore to administer justice to subjects of Naples, not to take slaves from land under the jurisdiction of Naples, and to punish all who injured citizens of Naples, and it adjured King Federico to do the same towards Turks. While the treaty, as published, did not mention any form of support for Naples against her enemies, it did affirm the friendship between the two, and it is not unlikely that a mutual understanding was reached concerning the alliance of France and Venice and an invasion of Italy by the French.

Bayezid, however, did not wish to chide Venice too strongly for her alliance with Louis XII; so an ambassador was sent to Venice in the summer of 1498 to smooth over difficulties and at the same time to investigate the relations between France and Venice. Minor disturbances

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, II, 123.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, I, 1090; II, 124; Letters, Istanbul, Sept. 5, 15, 1498, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 101; Count of Amalfi to the Lord of Salerno, Dec., 1498, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 366.

⁹⁰ It was also noted that the Milanese envoy was a skillful diplomat and that he corrupted several of the pashas (Gritti, pp. 22-23; Sanuto, I, 1096; DaLezze, p. 221).

⁹¹ July 17, 1498 (Peace between Bayezid and King Federico, Istanbul, July 17, 1498, summarized in Sanuto, II, 1020-1023), but von Hammer states (IV, 52) that Sanuto is mistaken and that the fifteenth is correct.

⁹² Peace between Bayezid and King Federico, Istanbul, July 17, 1498, summarized in Sanuto, II, 1020-1023.

⁹³ "... all merchants, subjects and vassals, of your [Federico's] majesty can carry on commerce and business, safely, freely, and securely, with their persons, ships, and goods of whatever nature they may be, by land and sea, and by all the ports, coasts, cities, islands, provinces, and places of the Sultan, and all the places under his jurisdiction in the manner that his vassals with their own persons and goods are secure and free from all injury, impediments, and offenses, not otherwise if those be in his dominions, paying therefore the direct usual and accustomed dues on the merchandise and goods that they carry from one country to another, by land or by sea. And similarly, the aforesaid King Federico promises and will order to be done the same in all his kingdom, by land and by sea, as is written in the aforesaid article."

which had occurred at Antivari were settled⁹⁴ and certain slaves were returned,⁹⁵ but what he learned of French and Venetian intentions is not known. Probably he discovered a great deal, because secret diplomacy is ever difficult to keep hidden and because lack of preparation of defense is usually obvious.

To return this visit, to carry the tribute of Zante, to renew the treaty with Bayezid, to settle all questions between the two nations, and to assure the Porte of Venetian friendship, Venice decided in November, 1498, to send Andrea Zanchani to Istanbul. In his instructions⁹⁶ he was ordered in reply to questions on Italy to say that the war was caused by Pisa, Milan, Florence, and the Holy Roman Emperor, and that for this reason his government had allied with France. He was, moreover, to complain of the damages inflicted upon Trau, Spalato, and Sibenico by the Ottoman sanjakbeys, to offer three thousand ducats each for Cefalonia and the coastal district around Cattaro, and to request permission for a resident *bailo* in Turkey. Zanchani reached Istanbul in February, 1499, and was well received, but the Porte, wishing to postpone the discussions with Venice, delayed conferences with him on the pretext that it was busy with Hungarian negotiations.⁹⁷

On March 4, 1499, Zanchani was formally received by Bayezid, who, after the credentials had been presented, asked news of Italy and Venice, whereupon Zanchani replied that his government wished peace with Turkey, but that this depended upon Bayezid. Turning his eyes towards his vizirs, Bayezid smiled and said that he had always hoped for the same from Venice.⁹⁸ This terminated the audience, and on the ninth, the vizirs⁹⁹ called Zanchani to them to learn and to discuss his mission.¹⁰⁰ Hersekoglu lamented that difficulties over the boundary had arisen in Cattaro, and Ibrahim stated that this city rightfully belonged to the sultan; but after conferring with Bayezid, they agreed that the question should be settled by Firuz, sanjakbey of Skodra, and another man appointed by Venice. The vizirs rejected the offer of three thousand ducats for Cefa-

⁹⁴ The Turkish envoy was a *chaush* of Faïd, Pasha of the Morea, and in Venice was considered diabolical (Sanuto, I, 1095-1096).

⁹⁵ Venice asserted that these five Turks should be hung but, because of Venetian esteem for Faïd Pasha, they would be freed. Others would be freed if they could be found (*ibid.*, II, 426-427).

⁹⁶ Another point in his instructions was to obtain assurance that the sanjakbeys near the frontier would cease their raids (*ibid.*, II, 139-140).

⁹⁷ Andrea Zanchani to Venetian Government, Istanbul, Mar. 2, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 598-599; DaLezze, p. 221. Two Hungarian ambassadors had arrived in Istanbul on February 20, 1499 (Sanuto, II, 703-704).

⁹⁸ Andrea Zanchani to Venetian Government, Istanbul, Mar. 4, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 599-600.

⁹⁹ Ibrahim Pasha, who was the grand vizir, one of Bayezid's former teachers, and the fifth generation from father to son of Ottoman vizirs; Hersekoglu Ahmed Pasha, who was 43 years old, audacious, gracious, Venice's friend, and son of a former Duke of Herzegovina; and Yakub Pasha, a presumptuous eunuch. Zanchani also conferred with Mustafa Pasha, Beylerbey of Rumelia, who was in Istanbul at this time (*ibid.*, II, 599-600; II, 696, 699; Hammer, IV, 59).

¹⁰⁰ Andrea Zanchani to Venetian Government, Istanbul, Mar. 10, 12, 1499, summarized in Sanuto, II, 610-612; Relation of Andrea Zanchani, Venice, May 10, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 699-702.

lonia, stating that twelve thousand ducats was the annual income from the island and that the Venetians were fortifying Zante contrary to the articles of the treaty. They refused to restore any captured Venetian ships on the score that they were needed at present, but said that these would be returned when the Turkish fleet was completed. In reply to Zanchani's request for a Venetian *bailo* in Turkey, the vizirs said that Bayezid wished that the resident Venetian merchants would elect one of themselves and that he would confirm their choice, but that he never desired a *bailo* sent from Venice. On their part the vizirs were interested in France and the Holy Roman Empire, and inquired which of the two rulers was nobler and which was more powerful. To this Zanchani answered that they were equal in the former respect but that Louis XII was stronger than Maximilian. In conclusion,¹⁰¹ the vizirs told Zanchani that Bayezid wished peace if Venice did, and that the sultan desired a treaty in writing, but Zanchani could not procure one written in Turkish, and Gritti had informed him that a treaty in Latin would not be considered valid by the Porte.

On the twelfth of March, Zanchani was again called to the sultan's audience, where he was given presents from Bayezid to the doge, dismissed, ordered to leave Turkey, and instructed not to investigate Turkish shipbuilding activities along the way.¹⁰² A treaty, written in Latin, was signed,¹⁰³ but probably this was done in the hopes of dispelling any fears the Venetians might have in regard to the future intentions of the Porte. Zanchani left Istanbul hurriedly, and arrived in Venice in May, but by that time events had taken such a turn that peace was almost an impossibility.

Simultaneously with Zanchani's visit to Turkey, a messenger from Firuz Bey, sanjakbey of Skodra, was in Venice, ostensibly to settle and to adjust damage in the district of Cattaro. Firuz Bey complained that a Turkish merchant had been robbed near Dulzigno, that Venetians had killed some Turks near Antivari, that the citizens of Cattaro had raided Montenegro, and that in none of these instances had Venice punished the offenders. The messenger, moreover, was to return with a satisfactory reply.¹⁰⁴ The Venetians, however, thought that he had come to spy out Italy,¹⁰⁵ and if this were true he had many opportunities, for he was in the city when the league between France and Venice was officially cele-

¹⁰¹ Zanchani also informed the vizirs of the alliance with France, complained of the raids in Dalmatia, and requested the release of a Venetian merchant, Zuam di Ciovatazi, who was being held for a debt of 2,000 ducats. The vizirs also alleged that Venice was harboring pirates and indicated that Iskender Pasha in Bosnia had been offended by the mission of Alvise Sagudino to Cattaro (*ibid.*).

¹⁰² Andrea Zanchani to Venetian Government, Istanbul, Mar. 12, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 611-612.

¹⁰³ Hammer, IV, 53n. The Turks maintained that Bayezid had not signed a treaty (Relation of Marco Saracho, Venice, Oct. 4, 1499, summarized in Sanuto, III, 14).

¹⁰⁴ Sanuto, II, 529.

¹⁰⁵ Francesco Querini to Venetian Government, Cattaro, Feb. 11-12, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 504.

brated.¹⁰⁶ To placate Firuz Bey, Alvise Sagudino was authorized to accompany the messenger to Skodra,¹⁰⁷ and then to go on to Sarajevo to confer with Iskender Pasha, sanjakbey of Bosnia.¹⁰⁸

Venice was not alone in sending an ambassador to the Porte, but the others came to Istanbul for different reasons. In 1498, the Porte had granted a treaty to the king of Naples on the condition that Jem's body be sent to Turkey, but the body did not arrive. Bayezid grew impatient, and in January, 1499, threatened to send his fleet to Naples if the body were not placed in Turkish hands within eight days.¹⁰⁹ Although Naples had been urging the Turks to attack Venice, King Federico tried to hedge and asked the Venetians what aid they would give if Bayezid should send his fleet to Otranto or Brindisi.¹¹⁰ Since Federico was notoriously shifty, Venice was noncommittal. Later, in May, 1499, after the Porte had confirmed the treaty with Naples and the war between Venice and Turkey was a foregone conclusion, Federico excused himself from helping Venice on the grounds of poverty and said he could not send his fleet to defend another country.¹¹¹

Within Turkey, the Florentines had greatly increased their trade,¹¹² much to the irritation of the Venetians; consequently a war between the Porte and Venice would be to their advantage. The *emino* of Florence in Istanbul kept urging it upon the vizirs, and in February, 1499, Geri Risaliti was sent to renew the treaty and concessions of 1488, and to protest that Venetians hindered the Florentine merchants in their trade with Turkey.¹¹³ Risaliti was well received,¹¹⁴ because Florence was on the best of terms with the Porte, which aided and continually befriended the Florentine merchants within the empire.

In addition to Naples and Florence, there were envoys at the Porte from the Pope¹¹⁵ and the dukes of Ferrara and Mantua,¹¹⁶ of which the

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, II, 549. This treaty, signed at Bles, February 9, 1499, stated that Venice would not be held to declare war against Milan if Turkey sent her fleet against Venice, the Archipelago, Rhodes, or Italy. However, if Turkey had not sent out her fleet when war against Milan began, Venice would be obliged to use her army and fleet against Milan until the end of the war even though Turkey should meanwhile send out her fleet (Articles of the League between Louis XII and Venice, Bles, Feb. 9, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 524).

¹⁰⁷ Sagudino carried two fine dogs to Firuz Bey, who, it had been learned, desired them (*ibid.*, II, 661).

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, II, 538, 605.

¹⁰⁹ Giacomo Lion to Venetian Government, Brindisi, Jan. 6, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 436.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, II, 430.

¹¹¹ "Nui femo armata per conservation di li lochi nostri, licet havemo bona paxe col Turcho a hora confirmata, e non semo por defender el paese d'altri" (*ibid.*, II, 736).

¹¹² After the death of Lorenzo de' Medici in 1492 and the resulting confusion, many Florentines went to Istanbul, Bursa, and Edirne to carry on business (Richards, *Florentine merchants in the age of the Medici*, p. 50).

¹¹³ In addition, Risaliti was to indicate that the political uncertainties of late in Florence had prevented the sending of envoys to the Porte but that all through this period Florence had preserved the same affection for Turkey. Furthermore, Risaliti was to express the city's appreciation of all the courtesies which Bayezid had shown to Florentine merchants in his empire (Instructions to Geri Risaliti, Florence, Feb. 18, 1499, Müller, pp. 243-244, 337-339).

¹¹⁴ Heyd, II, 343.

¹¹⁵ The Pope denied that his ambassador had tried to influence the Porte to war against Venice or Christendom (Sanuto, II, 686, 776, 932, 967), but that Ambruoso Buzardo had been sent to investigate the activities of the Duke of Milan (*ibid.*, II, 1088).

¹¹⁶ Piero Nadal to Venetian Government, Dulzigno, June 25-26, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 900; Giovanni Dolze to Venetian Government, Turin, July 16, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 933.

latter two were goading Bayezid to attack Venice; but the archenemy of Venice was the duke of Milan, who, according to Andrea Gritti, induced Bayezid to declare war upon Venice.¹¹⁷ While Lodovico Sforza reiterated to Venice that he wished to unite Italy against the Turks,¹¹⁸ he sent envoys to the Porte to report that the Venetians had called France into Italy and, moreover, that Louis XII planned to cross to Greece after he had conquered Italy.¹¹⁹ What is more, Sforza admitted in August, 1499, that Bayezid, Maximilian, and he were leagued against Venice because she had invited France to come; he did not deny that he was the cause of the Turkish attack.¹²⁰

The Turkish fleet left the Straits on June 30, 1499, for Tenedos, where they were to unseal the orders and proceed to their destination.¹²¹ During the winter and spring Rhodes had been maintained as the objective, but the Porte signed a treaty with the grand master which eliminated this possibility.¹²² The suspicions of many were soon confirmed; the news came that the fleet had been ordered to Corfu and the Venetian strongholds on the Greek mainland.¹²³ Thus began the war which proved to be exceedingly disastrous to Venice, which served to illustrate the sharp decline in Venetian power, particularly in the Levant, and which gave notice to all Mediterranean states that henceforth Turkey was a sea power.

The immediate causes of the war between Venice and Turkey were the numerous frontier incidents occurring all along the line from Istria to Rhodes and the alliance which Venice made with France. Venice gave protection and asylum to George Cernovitch when he fled from the Cattaro district, whereupon the Turks indicated that Venice apparently cared more for this assassin than for the friendship of Bayezid, who had resolved to secure and pacify his frontier sanjaks.¹²⁴ The frequent raids along the Dalmatian coast kept Venetian nerves in a state of tension so that outbursts, such as the ambushing and slaughtering of five hundred Turks near Napoli di Romania in the spring of 1499 by a band of Venetian mercenaries, were not unknown. Bayezid was particularly irritated by this incident when he learned that Venetians were joyful over the triumph.¹²⁵ Also the Porte was greatly disturbed by the various encounters between Venetian and Ottoman ships and often referred to the

¹¹⁷ Gritti, p. 22.

¹¹⁸ Marco Lippomano to Venetian Government, Milan, May 16, 1499, summarized in Sanuto, II, 737; Lodovico Sforza to Marco Lippomano, Milan, July 19, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 1004.

¹¹⁹ Gritti, pp. 22-23; DaLezze, p. 221; Sanuto, III, 12.

¹²⁰ Relation of Marco Lippomano, Venice, Aug. 8, 1499, summarized in Sanuto, II, 1032-1033.

¹²¹ Antonio Moro to Venetian Government, Corfu, July 2, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 930; Bartolo Coresi to Simone Guoro, Chios, June 29, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 1013.

¹²² Piero Nadal to Venetian Government, Dulzigno, Feb. 3-26, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 567; Andrea Zanchani to Venetian Government, Istanbul, Mar. 2, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 599; Letter, Corfu, April 1, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 610; Relation of Andrea Zanchani, Venice, May 10, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 700; II, 696.

¹²³ Deposition of Vola Lendari, Corfu, n.d., summarized in *ibid.*, II, 939.

¹²⁴ See above, page 53. Gritti, pp. 21-22; Sanuto, II, 519; III, 12.

¹²⁵ Gritti, p. 22; Halil Pasha to Francesco Bragadin, June 21, 1499, and Mehmed Bey to Francesco Bragadin, June 28, 1499, Corinth, summarized in Sanuto, II, 980-982.

affair of the *Sappho*, claiming that her captain had shot cannon balls at Enrichi instead of making signs of friendship.¹²⁶

It appears, however, that the alliance which joined France and Venice was a factor more important in leading the Turks to war than were the various frontier disturbances. The Porte had been led to believe that the duke of Milan and Maximilian, along with Naples, Florence, Bologna, Mantua, and Ferrara, would break with Venice in May, 1499, and form a league to combat Venice, France, and the Pope. Bayezid promised aid to the league but later when he saw that the Italian states did not attack Venice he had the Milanese envoy decapitated and wished to recall his fleet. Ibrahim, the grand vizir, however, persuaded him to carry through the plans for the seizure of Corfu and the Venetian strongholds in the Morea.¹²⁷

Although these points were, at the time, considered the causes of the war, they were hardly more than manifestations of the fundamental differences between Turkey and Venice which in that age usually resulted in war. The Ottoman empire was in its prime vigor, ready and able to expand in almost any direction; the Venetian republic was decadent and old, vulnerable on land and sea. Ottoman ghazis and sanjakbeys were unable to resist plundering the Venetian cities and towns in Greece and Dalmatia, and the Porte could not hold these warriors in check. The Venetians possessed several islands and numerous strongholds along the trade route to the Levant. It was from these points that the Venetians sallied forth to meet the ghazis and the Ottoman feudatories; it was these points which kept the Turks from exercising a free hand in the western Balkans and the Aegean Sea. In addition to all these factors, there were the basic differences of religion and civilization. Since Venice was a sea power she was the last to succumb to the Ottomans; the Ottoman sultan could not reign supreme in the eastern Mediterranean as long as Venetian galleys were free to plunder at will and find shelter in a Venetian harbor and protection under the cannon of a Venetian castle.

¹²⁶ See above, page 54. Gritti, p. 22.

¹²⁷ Gritti, pp. 22-23; DaLezze, p. 221; Sanuto, III, 12-13.

CHAPTER VI

WAR WITH VENICE, 1499-1503

THE EXACT size and strength of the fleet which sailed in June, 1499, for Corfu and the Ionian Sea is not known, but numerous estimates and descriptions are recorded, ranging from one hundred fifty to four hundred ships. A Venetian spy who had been in Gallipoli and Istanbul in March mentioned one hundred fifty-eight vessels of various descriptions, among which there were seventy-eight regular galleys, twenty-five long galleys, and two new ships of eighteen hundred tons each—at that time the largest in the world.¹ In addition to these ships, there were others in the Black Sea and at Ismid, Salonica, Negroponte, and Valona,² probably amounting in all to two hundred fifty.³ To man the oars, fifteen thousand *azabs* were recruited, because it was feared that Christians might not be faithful in time of battle; just before the fleet left, the gates of Istanbul were closed for three days until fifteen hundred oarsmen were found to complete the crews.⁴

To mislead the Venetians and perhaps to fend off an attack from Rhodes, Bayezid had gathered two armies — one at Ipsala in Rumelia and one near Bursa in Anatolia.⁵ In May, however, the Anatolian army was camped at the Straits opposite Gallipoli, waiting for transportation to cross to Europe. Bayezid was determined to participate in the campaign and from Edirne went with an army to Plovdiv, Samakov, Uskub, Monastir, and Lepanto, while the beylerbeys of Rumelia and Anatolia were camped near Salonica.⁶ In the army there were between sixty and seventy thousand men organized in three divisions under Bayezid, and the Anatolian army would concentrate on the coast opposite Corfu, and

¹ In Istanbul there were 24 new and 32 old galleys, 14 transports, 16 transports resembling light galleys, 12 new long galleys of 10 to 14 benches each, 2 new large ships of 1,800 tons each, 6 old large ships, 3 long light galleys, and 10 captured merchant ships; and in Gallipoli, 18 new galleys and 4 still in construction, 4 transports, and 4 new and 9 unfinished long galleys of 14 to 18 benches each (Sanuto, II, 568-569).

² Letter, Corfu, Mar. 13, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 596; Francesco Bragadin to Venetian Government, Napoli di Romania, Feb. 14, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 597; Andrea Zanchani to Venetian Government, Istanbul, Mar. 2, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 599.

³ Bayezid was personally interested in the fleet and visited the shipyards in Istanbul to watch the progress of construction (*ibid.*, II, 559).

⁴ Piero Nadal to Venetian Government, Dulzigno, Feb. 3-26, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 567; Andrea Zanchani to Venetian Government, Istanbul, Mar. 2, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 599; Bortolo Coresi to Simone Guoro, Chios, June 29, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 1013; Zinkeisen, *Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches in Europa*, III, 282. It also was asserted that one-third of the sailors on the Turkish fleet were Jews (Marco Saracho to Venetian Government, Lepanto, July 26, 1499, summarized in Sanuto, II, 1065).

⁵ Letter, Corfu, Apr. 13, 1499, summarized in Sanuto, II, 677; Alvise Sagudino to Venetian Government, Cattaro, May 23, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 806.

⁶ *Ibid.*, II, 888; Zorzi Tarona to Francesco Tarona, Lepanto, May 28, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 867; Francesco Querini to Venetian Government, Cattaro, July 24, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 1019; Marco Saracho to Venetian Government, Lepanto, July 26, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 1065; Martin Albanese to Venetian Government, Durazzo, July 24, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 1066.

Mustafa Pasha with the Rumelian army would attack the Morea and Lepanto, and cooperate with the fleet.⁷

The Turks quickly occupied most of the Morea except the coastal cities of Napoli di Romania, Coron, Modon, and Navarino. As usual they lived off the land; from every five houses in the Morea, they conscripted two bushels of wheat, two bushels of barley, four animals, and other supplies.⁸ At the same time the Venetian merchants in Istanbul were imprisoned and their goods confiscated.⁹ Accompanying this confiscation and the occupation of the Morea, there was considerable friction between the Turks and the Venetians, but no pitched battle occurred.¹⁰ Previously there had been a conflict in the Morea near Napoli di Romania,¹¹ and the invasion of the Morea was partially to avenge this ambush, as the Turks called it, and to punish the Venetians for inciting the Albanian peasants in the Morea to plunder the Turks.¹²

As early as April, it was common talk in Istanbul that the fleet was destined for Corfu, and bridges were being built over the rivers in Albania to facilitate the cooperation of the land forces;¹³ but after the fleet under Kapudan Daud Pasha had passed the Negroponte and Napoli di Romania, it was becalmed for nearly a month at the island of Sapienza, off Modon.¹⁴ The delay greatly disturbed Bayezid and his plans. He took counsel, and Faïd, sanjakbey of the Morea, intimated that Kemal, Enrichi, and the other captains of the fleet were thieves,¹⁵ and that it would have been better had Bayezid sent three or four sanjakbeys in their stead; however, Ibrahim Pasha, the grand vizir, advised sending the army to Lepanto, and this course was followed.¹⁶

With the anticipation of the Turkish fleet in the Adriatic and Ionian seas, the Venetians commissioned Antonio Grimani to gather the fleet at Corfu or Modon to watch the Turkish fleet and guard the Venetian possessions.¹⁷ In July at Corfu, the Venetian fleet numbered about one

⁷ Francesco Querini to Venetian Government, Cattaro, July 16, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 1072; Marco Saracho to Venetian Government, Lepanto, July 24, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 1073.

⁸ Nicolo Marcello to Alvise Emo, Modon, July 13, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 1057.

⁹ Giovanni di Tabia to Piero Dolfi, Chios, Aug. 8, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 15; DaLezze, pp. 222-223. The Venetian artisans and workmen in Istanbul were placed on a ship and sent to Venice, while the merchants were imprisoned in the "Castel Nuovo" at the mouth of the Black Sea (Giovanni di Tabia to Piero Dolfi, Chios, Nov. 1, 1499, summarized in Sanuto, III, 129; Letter, Istanbul, Dec. 17, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 131).

¹⁰ Gabriel Venier and Fantin Zorzi to Venetian Government, Modon, Jan. 22, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 577; Francesco Bragadin and Alvise Bon to Venetian Government, Napoli di Romania, Aug. 14, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 1287. ¹¹ Gritti, p. 22.

¹² Halil Pasha to Francesco Bragadin, June 21, 1499, and Mehmed Bey to Francesco Bragadin, Corinth, June 28, 1499, summarized in Sanuto, II, 980-982.

¹³ Nicolo Gondola to Venetian Government, Ragusa, Apr. 10, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 625; Bortolo Calbo to Venetian Government, Puola, April, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 690.

¹⁴ Antonio Grimani to Venetian Government, Modon, July 9, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 979; Deposition of Nicolo Aurami, Corfu, Aug. 4, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 1128; Hammer, IV, 55.

¹⁵ Most of the captains were ex-pirates.

¹⁶ Deposition of Andrea Signanti, Corfu, Aug. 7, 1499, summarized in Sanuto, II, 1128.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, II, 662.

hundred ships, and though in numbers the Turks were superior, the Venetians had more large galleys and galleons.¹⁸ In addition, the Turkish fleet was poorly provisioned and plague had broken out which greatly impaired the crews.¹⁹

According to the treaty between France and Venice, Louis XII had promised to aid his ally in case the Turks should attack, but he balked at fulfilling the agreement.²⁰ Eventually he promised to assist Venice;²¹ he relieved her from attacking Milan, and sent his fleet toward the Levant to join the Venetian fleet.²²

The Ottoman fleet was anchored at Portolongo,²³ and three times Daud and Kemal, the commanders, prepared to leave, but each time they turned back through fear of the Venetians.²⁴ Upon learning that the Venetian fleet was at Modon, the Turks set sail slowly north along the west coast of the Morea. The Venetians followed, and on August eighth, they were reinforced by Andrea Loredano; however, Antonio Grimani, the Venetian commander, was hesitant. For three days the two fleets manoeuvred around Navarino, where on the twelfth they met, disastrously for Venice.²⁵ The Turks had two hundred forty-one ships and the Venetians one hundred twenty-three, but the latter were stronger in the number of large ships. Grimani was not a seaman²⁶ and at the last moment reversed the orders. He and Loredano, who was a brilliant commander, were unfriendly, and when Loredano proceeded to attack, Grimani held back and would not join in the engagement. Borrak, who commanded one of the great Turkish ships, became separated from the fleet, and Loredano and Alban d'Armer attacked him. They were locked together when Borrak, seeing his helplessness, fired his ship and all three went up in flames. The burning ships terrified the Venetians, who gave up the contest and stood off to sea.

The following day the Turks were left in possession of the west coast of the Morea, and the Venetians sailed for Zante, where the French fleet

¹⁸ Spandugino, p. 173; Letter, Corfu, July 29, 1499, summarized in Sanuto, II, 1045-1046.

¹⁹ Sanuto, II, 1045-1046; Agustin Malipiero to Venetian Government, Cattaro, Aug. 14, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 1155.

²⁰ Antonio Loredano to Venetian Government, Angiers, Feb. 9, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 454; Antonio Loredano to Venetian Government, Bles, Apr. 11-26, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 678-679.

²¹ Antonio Loredano to Venetian Government, Lyon, July 11-13, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 931; Louis XII to Venetian Government, Lyon, July 20, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 1015.

²² Antonio Loredano to Venetian Government, Bles, Apr. 26, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 679; Hironimo Cesoto to Venetian Government, n.p., Aug. 21, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 1235.

²³ This must be at the southern end of the westernmost peninsula of the Morea between Modon and Coron and protected by the island of Sapienza.

²⁴ Relation of Marco Saracho, Venice, Oct. 4, 1499, summarized in Sanuto, III, 13.

²⁵ Hironimo Cesoto to Venetian Government, n.p., Aug. 21, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 1233; Alvise Marzello to Venetian Government, Zante, Aug. 16, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 1257; II, 1290-1291; Giovanni Foscarini to Piero Dolfi, Modon, Sept. 2, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 16; Spandugino, p. 13; DaLezze, pp. 225-229; W. Miller, *The Latins in the Levant*, p. 493.

²⁶ Grimani was a member of a wealthy Venetian family and owed his position to politics rather than to any naval skill. The Venetian sailors did not like him and said that it was one thing to be a merchant and another to be a sailor (DaLezze, p. 228).

had arrived. The Turkish objective was Lepanto and the gulf of Corinth; so the Venetians, with the twenty-four French ships, gathered at Castle Tornese to block their passage. The Turks arrived there on August 22, and the engagements of Belvedere, Chiarenza, and Cape de Pappas followed on the three successive days, respectively. In these not only were they successful, but their two enemies became estranged when the Venetians did not succor some French ships at Chiarenza. On the twenty-sixth, the French went to attack Cefalonia, and the next day the Venetians sailed to Zante, allowing the Turks to enter the gulf of Corinth.²⁷

While the two fleets were engaged, the Turkish army under Bayezid and Mustafa Pasha had been besieging Lepanto. Giovanni Moro, the Venetian captain in Lepanto, lacked artillery, but he held out until the fleet was defeated. With all chances of re-enforcement gone, he surrendered the city on August 28, 1499,²⁸ to prevent its sack by the soldiers.²⁹ The fall of Lepanto shocked the people of the Morea, and when the Turks began to build a castle on each side of the entrance to the gulf of Corinth,³⁰ the Venetians realized that their trade in the Levant was greatly endangered. They sought their revenge in bringing Grimani back to Venice in chains and sending him into exile.³¹

After Lepanto had been taken, Bayezid returned to Edirne, and the campaign of 1499 was drawn to a close. The fleet remained in the gulf of Corinth, and the main winter quarters of the army were at Vardari, near Salonica. The attack of the Turks had been centered in Greece, but along the Dalmatian coast Iskender Pasha had been conducting *ghazas* into the Venetian possessions. Although these raids were outside the main area of the war and gained little of lasting importance, they did divert the attention and resources of Venice. Even in peacetime, the Porte had not hindered, either through inability or unconcern, the beys in Bosnia from raiding the Venetian coastal cities. Zara, Trau, Sibenico, Spalato, Budua, Antivari, Dulzigno, and Durazzo suffered continually,³² and the Venetian captains in these places were not provisioned sufficiently to take the offensive or to protect their charges adequately. The summer of 1499 was a special ordeal for them. To divide the Venetian forces, to thwart an attack upon Bosnia, and to carry the war nearer to the Rialto, Bayezid ordered Iskender Pasha to lead his troops from Sarajevo into Friul and

²⁷ Sanuto, II, 1250, 1291; Hironimo Cesoto to Venetian Government, n.p., Aug. 21, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 1239; Antonio Grimani to Venetian Government, Cao di Papa, Aug. 25-29, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 1286-1287; Spandugino, p. 173; DaLezze, pp. 229-230.

²⁸ DaLezze, p. 231; Antonio Moro to Venetian Government, Corfu, Sept. 1, 1499, summarized in Sanuto, II, 1287; Antonio Grimani to Venetian Government, Zante, Sept. 8, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 1339; Relation of Marco Saracho, Venice, Oct. 4, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 12.

²⁹ A city taken by storm was usually given over to the soldiers for three days.

³⁰ Sanuto, III, 38-39.

³¹ DaLezze, p. 231. More than twenty years later Grimani became doge of Venice.

³² Andrea Zanchani to Venetian Government, Sibenico, Jan. 9-13, 1499, summarized in Sanuto, II, 376; Letter, Sibenico, Feb. 14, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 645; Vido Diedo to Venetian Government, Durazzo, June 13, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 861-862.

Carinthia.³³ In June the Turks were between Trieste and Ljubljana,³⁴ and with re-enforcements from Lepanto, Iskender Pasha ravaged the country around the Isonzo River in September and sent a cavalry force across the Tagliamento.³⁵ The Venetians were frightened and imagined that Venice would be attacked or that the Turks were planning to join forces with Milan, but with the approach of winter, Iskender Pasha withdrew his men and returned to Bosnia.

Even before the Ottoman storm broke, Venice had considered sending Sagudino to Bayezid to assure peace,³⁶ and after the loss of Lepanto there was more agitation to make peace with the Porte.³⁷ Finally, Alvise Manenti was sent to Turkey, but not being sure of making peace, Venice began to seek aid from Hungary, offering a subsidy, and to urge the Pope to form a general crusade against the infidels.³⁸ There was cause to worry, for the French fleet had deserted the Venetians, and the Turks were vigorously preparing a new fleet at Lepanto, Valona, and Gallipoli, and in the Black Sea.³⁹

Alvise Manenti went to Castle Tornese where Faid Pasha met him and escorted him to Patras, whence he set out for Edirne with Ali, sanjakbey of the Morea. On February 22, 1500, Manenti conferred with the vizirs, Mesih,⁴⁰ Hersekoglu Ahmed, and Yakub Pashas, and Mustafa Pasha, beylerbey of Rumelia. Manenti told them that Venice wished four things: Lepanto, the liberation of prisoners, the restoration of the goods taken from the merchants in Istanbul, and the reaffirmation of peace. To the vizirs these seemed outrageous demands, considering the outcome of the test of arms, and they stated that the restitution of Lepanto could not be discussed. After the vizirs had conversed with Bayezid, they replied two days later that he wished the Turco-Venetian frontier to be the sea; this meant that Napoli di Romania, Monemvasia,

³³ Victorio Bragadin to Venetian Government, Sibenico, July 1, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 898-899.

³⁴ Alvise da Mula to Venetian Government, Caodistria, June 2, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 785.

³⁵ Domenego Bolani to Venetian Government, Udine, Oct. 4, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 19; Alvise Loredano to Venetian Government, Isonzo, Oct. 4, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 20; DaLezze, p. 232; Spandugino, pp. 172-173.

³⁶ It was proposed in the Venetian Senate that Sagudino with Nicolo Arduin or Antonio Arduin be sent to Turkey (Sanuto, II, 913, 951). Later, rumors came from Corfu that Bayezid would confirm peace if an envoy were sent. The Senate again considered sending Sagudino or Antonio Arduin (*ibid.*, II, 1005, 1009).

³⁷ The Senate voted down a proposal to send an envoy to Turkey, September 28, 1499 (*ibid.*, II, 1375).

³⁸ *Ibid.*, II, 1374-1375; Venetian Government to Vladislav, Venice, Sept. 29, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 1376-1377; Letter, Rome, Sept. 18, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 1344; Bull of Alexander VI, Sept. 18, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 1348-1351; DaLezze, p. 240. Although the Pope did issue a jubilee bull, the Venetians also sent pleas to the Emperor and to the King of France for a crusade as great as the one in the days of Pope Urban II. In particular, they asked for 300,000 Christian soldiers to fight against the Turks (Sanuto, II, 1374-1375).

³⁹ *Ibid.*, II, 1331; Donato Carazolo to Venetian Government, Dulzigno, Sept. 4-5, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 55; Marchio Trevisano to Venetian Government, San Nicolo de Civita, Nov. 23, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 64; Giovanni di Tabia to Piero Delfin, Chios, Oct. 15-Dec. 5, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 127-130.

⁴⁰ Upon Ibrahim Pasha's death, Mesih Pasha, who had been a vizir before, took the place at the head of the court (*ibid.*, III, 128, 131, 182).

Coron, and Modon would be ceded to Turkey. In addition, Bayezid demanded an annual tribute of ten thousand ducats. Manenti answered that an agreement to these requests was not in his instructions, but Bayezid stated that he would send a messenger to Venice to receive a reply.⁴¹

This envoy, Alexio, reached Venice in April, and appeared before the Senate, which delayed giving a response. Eventually, he was handed a letter which refused the demands of the Porte, and Venice declined to send another ambassador to return with Alexio to Bayezid.⁴² This action signified that the Venetians felt they were prepared to carry on the war.

Apparently Bayezid had placed little faith in these negotiations, for he had proceeded with building a greater navy. During the winter and spring, ships were constructed at various ports of the empire. Carpenters, coopers, and caulkers were sent with more than two hundred thousand ducats to Lepanto, Valona, and Prevesa on the gulf of Arta to prepare fleets to meet the Venetians and French in the coming summer. Barnacles, boring worms, and green timbers had ruined many of the ships of the fleet,⁴³ and Bayezid was determined to have a fleet larger and more powerful than that of the previous year. The galleys were modeled along Venetian lines, whereas the galleons followed those of the French,⁴⁴ and when the ships were completed some of them were sunk to prevent the green wood from warping.⁴⁵ By June, thirty-four new galleys had been completed at Lepanto,⁴⁶ twenty-six at Prevesa,⁴⁷ and thirty at Valona;⁴⁸ in all, the fleet with additions from Gallipoli and the Black Sea again numbered about two hundred fifty. There were many delays in construction and launching,⁴⁹ but by July the fleet left Lepanto, joined with that of Prevesa, and sailed toward Modon.⁵⁰

To oppose this, the Venetians gathered a fleet of seventy ships at Zante under Beneto Pesaro,⁵¹ but it was in poor condition and the Turks

knew it. Twice during the spring, appropriations had been made; Louis XII had sent Ravenstein to Genoa to arm the French fleet, and Spain promised to send her fleet, but neither came in time to aid.⁵² Although the Venetian fleet was not a match for the Ottoman fleet, it set out for Modon in July to protect Venice's most valuable port in Greece and her most important harbor between Venice and the Levant.

In 1499, Louis XII had been unable to capture Milan, and to free Venice from the war with Turkey, he sent two ambassadors to Bayezid in April, 1500, to mediate the difficulties. In Edirne they had an audience with Bayezid, who said that he wished peace with Venice and declared that Venice had promised him some land; he would not make peace without it.⁵³ Success for the French mission was impossible because neither Venice nor the Porte was prepared to retract or to cede a point to the other. Finally, in the face of threats of war with France and a host of real and imaginary allies, Bayezid granted that he would wait sixty days before striking, during which time Venice would be able to make peace. Bayezid, however, still demanded Modon, Coron, and Napoli di Romania; he maintained that he wished peace and would make it on the terms proposed by Manenti, who he asserted had offered these cities to the Porte.⁵⁴

During the spring of 1500, Venice was wildly in search of other allies. Both the French and Venetian ambassadors in Hungary were urging the king to break with Turkey, and Venice offered a subsidy of seventy thousand ducats annually as an inducement,⁵⁵ but Bayezid's ambassador at Buda threatened that the Porte would call upon the Tartars and the Moldavians to attack Hungary if the truce were not renewed.⁵⁶ For several months the king wavered between the two policies and even sent two missions to Edirne in the hope of arranging peace between Bayezid and

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, III, 118, 125, 127, 177; Relation of Alvise Manenti, Venice, April 1, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 179-181, 190-193.

⁴² *Ibid.*, III, 193-194. Alexio spoke Greek and Latin.

⁴³ Relation of Alvise Manenti, Venice, April 1, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 180-182.

⁴⁴ Letter to Marchio Trevisano, Chios, Jan. 12, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 182.

⁴⁵ Andrea Michiel to Venetian Government, Medoni, April 5, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 279.

⁴⁶ In April they were launching one every six days (Deposition of Michali Vethialati, Corfu, May 8, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 336).

⁴⁷ Deposition of Mathias, Corfu, June 16, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 443. Orders came to Prevesa that all were to be finished by the end of June or the officer in charge would be impaled (Piero Lion to Venetian Government, Corfu, June 17, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 450).

⁴⁸ Giovanni Paulo Gradenigo to Venetian Government, Cattaro, July 1, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 457. The keels of the ships were laid in the stream of Vajussa a few miles north of Valona and then brought to Valona, where they were finished (*ibid.*, III, 276).

⁴⁹ The Venetians placed stones so that the Valona fleet was unable to pass. Mustafa Bey was ordered on pain of death to bring out the fleet and was then sent a black robe which signified death, but agents from the Porte came to sound the water, and since he was Bayezid's son-in-law his life was spared (Vido Diedo to Venetian Government, Durazzo, June 16, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 467; Domingo Dolfin to Venetian Government, Aug. 15-Sept. 17, 1500, Durazzo and Vajussa, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 679, 731, 875).

⁵⁰ Marchio Trevisano to Venetian Government, Anti Pasu, July 8-9, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 526; Letter, Naples, July 29, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 593.

⁵¹ Marchio Trevisano, who replaced Antonio Grimani, died July 17, 1500, and Pesaro was elected to his position (Zorzo Negro to Venetian Government, Guardini, July 18, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 583; III, 553).

⁵² *Ibid.*, III, 119, 312; Beneto Trevisano to Venetian Government, Lyon, May 6, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 318. The men of the fleet complained that they were short of powder and ball, and that the biscuits sent them were of the worst sort and had caused much sickness (Hironimo Pisani to Venetian Government, Nata, July 31, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 641; Beneto Pesaro to Venetian Government, Zante, Aug. 21, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 772).

⁵³ J. D'Auton, *Chroniques de Louis XII*, I, 294; Sanuto, III, 337-338, 373, 374, 448, 489, 526, 596. The two heralds or envoys went to Rhodes where they were joined by a Rhodian envoy. From Rhodes they crossed to Anatolia and proceeded to Edirne, where they were received by the vizirs on April 7, 1500. They refused to talk with them and demanded an audience with Bayezid. When questioned about presents from Louis XII to Bayezid they stated that their king was not accustomed to giving presents. Also they were told that they must not spit in Bayezid's presence but they replied that if they wanted to spit, they would spit. Finally they were led to Bayezid's tent, distant from the others and covered with red; Bayezid arose and took their hands and acknowledged the King of France as a brother. They kissed his hand (*ibid.*, III, 549-550, 558-559).

⁵⁴ The two French envoys asked Bayezid how it came about that he had broken the peace with Venice and declared that if he did not make peace with Venice, France and her allies would come to attack him. When Bayezid asked who these allies were, the envoys said: the Pope, the King and Queen of Spain, the King of Portugal, England, Scotland, Hungary, Russia, and all the allies of France. Bayezid named his terms in a letter to Louis XII, written at Chios on April 14, 1500 (Sanuto, III, 558-560, 563).

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, III, 201; Sebastiano Zustignam to Venetian Government, Buda, July 16-17, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 566. The French indicated, however, that he had nothing to offer Hungary unless the latter would join a league with the Pope, the Emperor, France, and Venice (Buda, May 16, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 356).

⁵⁶ Sebastiano Zustignam to Venetian Government, Buda, May 18-25, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 288. Special envoys from Spain, Naples, the Empire, and Poland were at the Hungarian court at this time (Buda, May 16, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 356).

Venice;⁵⁷ however, after Venice raised the subsidy to eighty and then, in July, to one hundred thousand ducats, he sent away the Turkish envoy,⁵⁸ though a definite break did not occur at that time. Disorders along the frontier, nevertheless, violated the truce, and Bayezid sent eight sanjakbeys with a large force against the Hungarians who had attacked near Semendra.⁵⁹ The king of Poland was willing to join with Hungary, but he wanted a part of the Venetian subsidy. In fact, he was not particularly interested in the affair and was equally willing to sign a treaty with Turkey.⁶⁰ His policy in regard to Turkey was largely dependent upon that of Hungary.

In Rome, the Venetian envoy persistently urged the Pope to proclaim a jubilee, and to remit the church tithe to the various governments which would apply these funds in a war or crusade against the Turks. In April, the Pope consented in regard to France, Germany, and Hungary,⁶¹ but although considerable sums were obtained, the clergy did not appreciate the tax and opposed it as much as possible. Pope Alexander VI also wrote to the Wallachians and Moldavians, urging them to attack the Turks, and at another time he declared that he would lead a crusade against the Turks⁶² though little aid came to Venice from this source. In truth, Venice did not receive much support from any of her allies.

Likewise, Prospero Colonna and the Italian states of Milan, Ferrara, Florence, Mantua, and Naples sent envoys and messengers to the Porte to induce Bayezid not to relax in his attack on Venice and to pledge their support. Turkey was eager to keep their friendship and in that year formally signed a treaty with Florence and officially recognized her consul in Istanbul as the *emino*, or administrator, of Florentine affairs in Turkey.⁶³ Bayezid also offered to send twenty-five thousand Turkish soldiers to aid the king of Naples against his enemies, but asked for Taranto in exchange.⁶⁴ Consequently the king never called for the support, but he was very friendly toward Turkey.

Milan fell to the French on April 11, 1500, and the news of this traveled swiftly to the Porte. The ambassadors whom Bayezid had sent

to France and Venice to receive the answers concerning the proposed peace were rebuffed and returned to Turkey.⁶⁵ After the sixty days were up, the armies began their march in the Morea toward Modon.

Bayezid, moreover, had apparently not placed much faith in Venice's acceptance of his demands. The camp at Vardari had been augmented, roads had been built in the Morea, and camel trains were bringing artillery, powder, and war supplies from Istanbul.⁶⁶ By June, all was prepared, although some of the soldiers showed little enthusiasm for the campaign.⁶⁷ The main camp was located at Leondari, and the sanjakbey of the Morea was sent to Castle Tornese to meet the fleet and to accompany it to Modon by land.⁶⁸

Near Navarino, the Turkish fleet met the Venetians, who realized that the Turks must be held there if Modon were to be saved. The Turks had many more ships, men, and munitions, and when the fleets met on the twenty-fourth of July, the Venetians were unable to stop them,⁶⁹ the Turkish fleet then blockaded Modon. Early in the year that city had been attacked, but thinking it safe, Trevisano had not provisioned it sufficiently to withstand a long siege. The commander within Modon, moreover, was not energetic and, with the little support he was receiving from Venice, felt that his position was hopeless. Throughout the month of July, Bayezid, leading his land forces in person, bombarded Modon.⁷⁰ The Ottomans, however, became discouraged and were ready to give up the siege, when on the ninth of August five Venetian ships ran the blockade and entered the port. The inhabitants and the troops were so happy and so eager to unload the ships that the walls were nearly deserted. Perceiving this, the Turks stormed the walls and won their way into the city. On the tenth, the Ottoman standard floated over the city and the most important key to the Venetian trade in the Levant was forever lost.⁷¹

On the fall of Modon, Ali Pasha, sanjakbey of the Morea, went with some captured Venetians to Coron and demanded its surrender. The Greek inhabitants overthrew their rulers, and Coron capitulated on the

⁵⁷ The envoys said it made no difference to Bayezid because he was not afraid of the French King (*ibid.*, III, 646).

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, III, 471; Nicolo Marcello to Venetian Government, Zante, June 12, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 444.

⁵⁹ The janissaries at Lepanto, which they had not been allowed to sack, had had their fill of war. They said they did not want to be killed by the Venetians and preferred to return to Istanbul. A large feast was held to please them, but it did not quiet them entirely (Jacomo Venier to Venetian Government, Canal de Viscardo, June 22-23, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 481; Deposition of Marco Antonio Contarini, Corfu, June 25, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 500).

⁶⁰ Marco Orto to Venetian Government, Viscardo, June 22, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 501.

⁶¹ Hironimo Contarini to Venetian Government, Prodano, July 25, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 610-612. Andrea de Re, the boatswain of one of the ships captured at this time, was taken to Turkey and for several years he designed and built ships for the sultan (DaLezze, p. 251; Beneto Pesaro to Venetian Government, Corfu, Feb. 19, 1501, summarized in Sanuto, III, 1521).

⁶² At the time he was ill with a fever (Sanuto, III, 750).

⁶³ Beneto Pesaro to Venetian Government, Zante, Aug. 13, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 690-695, 717; Bayezid to Vladislav, Modon, Aug. 10, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 797-798; Spandugino, pp. 173-174; DaLezze, pp. 241-260. This last account was written by Andreas Balastro, who was third in command at Modon and who was spared by the Turks because he was able to pay a ransom.

⁵⁷ The Hungarian envoy declared that Hungary would make war upon the Porte if Ottoman soldiers made the slightest attack upon any Christians (*ibid.*, III, 373, 460).

⁵⁸ Sebastiano Zustignam to Venetian Government, Buda, July 16-17, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 566.

⁵⁹ Deposition of Demengo, Corfu, April 29, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 333; Giovanni Paulo Gradenigo to Venetian Government, Cattaro, July 1, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 457-458.

⁶⁰ Sebastiano Zustignam to Venetian Government, Buda, July 5-6, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 512; Octaviano de Gucci to Venetian Government, Cracow, June 29, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 548.

⁶¹ Polo Capelo to Venetian Government, Rome, April 9, May 6-7, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 217, 309.

⁶² *Ibid.*, III, 398, 567, 635, 702.

⁶³ Republic of Florence to Bayezid, Florence, May 23, 1500, in Müller, pp. 245-246; Heyd, II, 344-345. Andrea Carnesecchi was sent to Istanbul as the *emino* to administer Florentine justice in Turkey.

⁶⁴ Sanuto, III, 119-120, 143, 252, 275, 291, 326, 357, 373, 383, 403, 413, 417, 419, 473.

fifteenth.⁷² Another Ottoman force was sent to Navarino, where at first the Venetian commander would not surrender, but when he was convinced that Modon had fallen, he gave up, as Coron had done.⁷³ The Ottoman army then proceeded to Napoli di Romania, but the Venetian commander remained steadfast and refused to capitulate.⁷⁴ Bayezid returned to Edirne and left the taking of the city to a pasha, who was unsuccessful. With the coming of autumn, the campaign in the Morea drew to a close, but Turkish troops were stationed at Argos to harass Napoli di Romania and to keep the Morea in submission. Monemvasia and Napoli di Romania were the only two cities in the Morea remaining in Venetian hands.⁷⁵

During the campaign in Greece, the Turks also ravaged Albania and the Dalmatian coast, except for the city of Ragusa. In the former, Firuz Bey directed the raids which centered around Durazzo. The inhabitants were poorly protected by Venice⁷⁶ and probably would have surrendered if the Turks had brought much of a force. In Dalmatia, the raids of 1499 were repeated at Spalato, Sibenico, Cattaro, Zara, Mona, and Trau,⁷⁷ and reports continually came to Venice that Iskender Pasha was planning an expedition into Friul. Ragusa was spared because she was an enemy of Venice and because she furnished Bayezid with tin, hemp, steel, and implements of war which were purchased in Italy.⁷⁸

Bayezid had hurriedly returned to Edirne from the Morea because the Hungarians were pressing from the north. Turkish forces had been routed at Semendra and Widin, and although an ambassador was still at Buda, Bayezid realized that Hungary, Poland, Russia, and Wallachia were preparing to strike. Finally, in August, 1500, two Hungarian envoys brought the news to the Porte that Hungary had declared war. Bayezid replied that the truce would not be over for six months, but that Turkey would declare war now if the Hungarian king wanted it.⁷⁹ Couriers were sent to all the sanjakbeys and *timarijs* in Europe to prepare for an Hungarian attack, and the janissaries were recalled from Valona; the Turks,

⁷² DaLezze, pp. 260-261; Jacomo Venier to Venetian Government, Zante, Aug. 18, 1500, summarized in Sanuto, III, 726-727; Deposition of Pollo Contarini, Vatica, Sept. 2, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 901-902.

⁷³ Beneto Pesaro to Venetian Government, Zante, Aug. 15, 1500, summarized in Sanuto, III, 718-719; III, 1056.

⁷⁴ Beneto Pesaro to Venetian Government, Zante, Aug. 23, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 774; Nicolo Marzello to Venetian Government, Zante, Sept. 8, 11, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 833, 874; Piero Liom to Venetian Government, Corfu, Sept. 25, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 895; Deposition of Pollo Contarini, Vatica, Sept. 2, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 901-902.

⁷⁵ Andrea da Riva to Venetian Government, Monemvasia, Sept. 17, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 1017.

⁷⁶ Piero Liom to Venetian Government, Corfu, Sept. 4, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 812; Vido Diedo to Venetian Government, Durazzo, Sept. 11, Oct. 1, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 970.

⁷⁷ Victorio Bragadin to Venetian Government, Sibenico, Apr. 4, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 218; Francesco Venier to Venetian Government, Zara, July 18, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 538-539; DaLezze, p. 262.

⁷⁸ The Fair of Rechanati, which was held near Ancona, was one of the chief markets (Hironimo Zorzi to his brother, Ragusa, Oct. 17, 1500, summarized in Sanuto, III, 1060).

⁷⁹ Deposition of Constantin de Michali, Zia, Sept. 12, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 950-951; Hironimo Zorzi to his brother, Ragusa, Oct. 17, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 1060.

however, were defeated near Semendra and many officers were captured.⁸⁰ Although winter halted the serious fighting, the Ottoman armies built many bridges and prepared for a campaign in the spring.

Upon the loss of Modon and Coron, Venice redoubled her efforts. Eleven extra taxes were passed,⁸¹ and supplies of all kinds were sent to Corfu, Cattaro, and Brindisi to protect those places from the Turks.⁸² The commander at Corfu not only wished to fortify the island but also sought to prevent the Corfiotes from trading with Turkey.⁸³ Venice, in addition, sent envoys to Spain, Portugal, France, England, Germany, and the Pope to persuade them to make war against the Porte. Spain, France, and Portugal promised to send fleets, and France and Hungary formed a league stipulating Turkey as one of their mutual enemies. They urged all to break with the Porte, and Maximilian, wavering between Turkey and France, finally notified Venice that he would not attack her because of her war with Bayezid.⁸⁴

The arrival of a Spanish fleet off Sicily in the summer of 1500 placed King Federico of Naples in a difficult position. His interests lay with Turkey, but he could not resist the Spaniards. Bayezid sent an ambassador to Naples to promise Turkish support in case of a Spanish attack. Federico chose the wise course, remained neutral, and tried to please both belligerents, whereas Bayezid warned France that if any harm came to Naples he would attack Rhodes.⁸⁵

Venice, to gain allies, and to raise her prestige, took the offensive late in 1500. The Turkish fleet, after the refusal of Napoli di Romania to surrender, returned to Gallipoli and practically left the seas to Venice.⁸⁶ The Venetian sailors felt that they had received little benefit from the campaign; so to please them the fleet went to Mytilene, where they were

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, III, 1216; Letter, Cattaro, Nov. 16, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 1239; Piero Querini to Venetian Government, Caodistria, n.d., summarized in *ibid.*, III, 1318; Beneto Pesaro to Venetian Government, Corfu, Feb. 19, 1501, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 1521. Bayezid was aided by the Tartars who attacked Russia and Poland (Letter, Cracow, Sept. 9, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 883).

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, III, 1003.

⁸² *Ibid.*, III, 733. Throughout 1500, Marchio Trevisano had pleaded for supplies from Venice. His tone had been most urgent for usually he ended his letters, "dimanda danari amore Dei," or "Dimanda monitioni, amore Dei, e danari" (his letters to Venetian Government, Corfu, April 16, May 2, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 280-281, 334).

⁸³ The Corfiotes sold arms to Turkey and were active in carrying goods of all sorts between Neapolitan and Venetian merchants in Puglia (*ibid.*, III, 253; Francesco Florian to Venetian Government, Messina, Sept. 8, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 863; Alvise Contarini to Venetian Government, Otranto, Oct. 6, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 998; Beneto Pesaro to Venetian Government, Demata, Jan. 29, 1501, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 1415).

⁸⁴ DaLezze, pp. 263-265; Sanuto, III, 987; Letter, Bles, Oct. 4, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 913-914; Polo Capelo to Venetian Government, Rome, Sept. 9, Oct. 17, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 781, 954; Francesco Foscari to Venetian Government, Bles, Dec. 26, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 1286.

⁸⁵ Vido Diedo to Venetian Government, Durazzo, Nov. 29, 1500, summarized in Sanuto, III, 1197; Francesco Moresini to Venetian Government, Naples, Dec. 12, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 1229; Giovanni Badoer to Venetian Government, Naples, Dec. 17, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 1252; Letter to Jacomo Barbaro, n.p., n.d., summarized in *ibid.*, III, 1258. When Venice heard of Bayezid's threat, she implored France to attack Naples in order to throw Rhodes into the Venetian camp (Francesco Foscari to Venetian Government, Chiamom, Jan. 1, 1501, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 1297).

⁸⁶ Letter to Piero Sagredo, Cao Schilo, Sept. 24, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 973.

allowed to plunder anywhere within two miles of shore.⁸⁷ Following this, they raided some places on the Anatolian coast and then returned to Zante. Plans were made to retake Modon in October, but since the Spanish captain pointed out that this idea was impracticable,⁸⁸ Cefalonia was chosen for the attack.

Earlier in 1500, the Venetians had come to Cefalonia to seize it, but they had not been successful. The island was valuable for timber, and from there an attack upon Santa Maura and Prevesa might be launched. Late in October, the combined fleets of Venice and Spain appeared and began to bombard the island. Ferrando Consalvo, the Spanish commander, desired to ask for surrender,⁸⁹ but the Venetians wished to take it by storm. Throughout November and most of December, the Turks resisted, until on December 24, 1500, the main fortress of the island was captured and the Turks surrendered.⁹⁰

Wishing to be free from the Venetian war because of Hungarian, Polish, Moldavian, and Russian military preparations, and because of a simmering rebellion in Anatolia, Bayezid offered peace to Venice. He was, however, not willing to return any of his conquests, and since the other powers were coming to Venice's aid, she felt that this was not the right moment for peace. In January, 1501, Valerio Marzello was freed in Istanbul, and Mesih Pasha informed him that the Porte did not desire war, because there was more gain from peace than from war. He also added that Bayezid would come with five hundred galleys to Venice if peace were not made. Hersekoglu Ahmed told Marzello that Venice should treat for peace through Mustafa Bey of Valona, and he intimated that Bayezid would be content with Napoli di Romania and that Modon and Coron would not be returned because Venice had been compensated from Milan.⁹¹

Receiving no reply to this overture, Bayezid continued to push his naval program. Orders were given in the autumn of 1500 to build light galleys at Valona, Prevesa, Gallipoli, Ismid, and Istanbul. Greatly pleased with the lines of a captured Venetian galley, he sent it to Sinope on the Black Sea to have fifty made similar to it.⁹² A fleet of four hundred

⁸⁷ Beneto Pesaro to Venetian Government, Legina, Sept. 30, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 990-991.

⁸⁸ Orders to take Modon, Zante, Oct. 30, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 1108-1109; Beneto Pesaro to Venetian Government, Cefalonia, Nov. 5, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 1127.

⁸⁹ Hironimo Pisani to Venetian Government, Cefalonia, Nov. 2, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 1106.

⁹⁰ Beneto Pesaro to Venetian Government, Cefalonia, Dec. 24, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 1272-1273; Spandugino, p. 174. Meanwhile, Navarino was retaken by the Venetians on December 3, 1500 (Beneto Pesaro to Venetian Government, Cefalonia, Dec. 6, 1500, summarized in Sanuto, III, 1217).

⁹¹ Sanuto, III, 1555.

⁹² Francesco Moresini to Venetian Government, Naples, Oct. 31, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 1049; Relation of Mathio Perozin, Corfu, Nov. 30, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 1223. Turkish galleys built at Prevesa were made of great double oak timbers and were two feet wider and two yards longer than Venetian galleys (*ibid.*, IV, 9-10).

ships was planned,⁹³ including two hundred light galleys and fifty heavy ones; to complete them during the winter, work was done at night by torch light.⁹⁴ No more large galleons were built because galleys were found more manageable and more practical.⁹⁵

The Venetian fleet was not being neglected, though finances were a serious problem. In January, 1501, a special tax of ten per cent, to be paid by April, was levied on all Venetian real estate. The proceeds from this were to go to the fleet, but this was hardly enough, and in March several galleys in Corfu could not be used because of a lack of men.⁹⁶ When France was called upon, Louis XII commissioned Ravenstein, governor of Genoa, to prepare and lead his fleet against the Turks with Istanbul as the final goal.⁹⁷

In addition to gaining the support of the fleets of France, Spain, and Portugal, Venice moved to form a definite league with Hungary and the Pope. Zorzi Pisani was sent to Buda in January, and the articles were completed in February, although the organization of the league was not announced until May and even then the Pope did not fully agree to it. The articles stated⁹⁸ that the alliance would continue until the end of the war with Turkey, and that none should make a separate peace. The Pope and Venice were to give forty thousand and one hundred thousand ducats respectively to Hungary annually in order that Vladislav might accompany his army against Turkey, but if the Turks invaded Friul or Dalmatia, he was to aid Venice there. Poland had promised to enter the league along with Hungary and would receive a share of the subsidy; it was recognized, however, that Poland would not be expected to assist Hungary if the Tartars attacked, though nothing was to be deducted from the Hungarian subsidy if this developed. The Pope never signed the treaty, but of the twenty articles he confirmed eight which included the subsidy to Hungary.⁹⁹

At the opening of spring, the main Ottoman fleet did not leave the Straits as the Venetians had expected. Although small contingents manoeuvred along the Greek coast, the Porte did not push the war in the West because of the movements of the Hungarian army, the coming of the Portuguese, Spanish, and French fleets, and the dangers threatening in Anatolia and Persia. In the Morea the troops harassed the garrison of Napoli di Romania and Monemvasia, and in ten hours on May 20, 1501,

⁹³ Deposition of Lazaro Padoano, Trani, Jan. 3, 1501, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 1348-1349.

⁹⁴ Antonio Moro to Venetian Government, Corfu, Feb. 6, 1501, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 1548; III, 1556.

⁹⁵ Beneto Pesaro to Venetian Government, Corfu, Mar. 6, 1501, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 1583.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, III, 1288, 1585.

⁹⁷ Francesco Foscari to Venetian Government, Bles, and Lochiers, Jan. 16-18, Feb. 26, 1501, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 1372, 1535.

⁹⁸ Zorzi Pisani to Venetian Government, Buda, Feb. 13-Mar. 2, 1501, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 1535-1537; League between Vladislav and Venice, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 1537-1538. Land retrieved from Turkey went to the one who had lost it. If none had lost it, it went to the conqueror.

⁹⁹ Letter, Rome, Mar. 22, 1501, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 1605-1606.

Kemal took Navarino.¹⁰⁰ In Albania, even though Venice sent the son of Scanderbeg to lead the people, Firuz Bey held the inhabitants firmly and was able to take Durazzo in July, 1501,¹⁰¹ because Venice had failed to provision it adequately. Along the Dalmatian coast the cities of Zara, Trau, Sibenico, and Spalato suffered from Turkish raids as they had in the two previous summers. The fighting with Hungary was relatively unimportant, partly because Vladislav was reluctant to spend his subsidy, and partly because Bayezid's attention was drawn in another direction. Shah Ismail had risen to power in Persia and the Karamanian tribes were in revolt.¹⁰²

The real war between Turkey and Venice was over and all that remained were raiding expeditions until peace was signed. In June, 1501, Kemal, Bayezid's most intrepid sea captain, with eleven ships left Modon, where the Venetians lost sight of him until he appeared at Kelibia near Tunis. From there he went to the Balearic Islands, Pianosa near Elba, and Sardinia, and then returned to the Greek Archipelago,¹⁰³ with more than a thousand slaves. The results, however, were inconsequential.

King Federico of Naples had angered the Christian powers of Europe by his continual intrigue with the Porte. He had threatened to invite the Turks to come to Italy and had offered to give them Taranto if he were attacked by France or Spain.¹⁰⁴ Since the Ottoman armies were in Hungary and Anatolia, France and Spain deemed it an opportunity to strike at Naples, whereupon in June, 1501, they divided Federico's kingdom, and in August the French entered Naples.¹⁰⁵ Turkish troops were massed in Epirus, but they never crossed because of the presence of the enemy fleets.

To prevent the Turks from succoring Naples and to draw their attention nearer to Istanbul, the French fleet with the aid of the Venetians set out in September to plunder the Anatolian coast and the Archipelago. On the seventeenth of October, they came to Mytilene and ravaged much of the island; although Beneto Pesaro urged the taking of the fortress, Ravenstein hung back,¹⁰⁶ and the ships of D'Aubusson did not reach there in time to be of any assistance. Four hundred janissaries were landed on the island by Bayezid's son Korkud, and the Christians left.¹⁰⁷ A storm

¹⁰⁰ Piero Liom to Venetian Government, Corfu, May 26, 1501, summarized in *ibid.*, IV, 47-48.

¹⁰¹ Antonio Bom to Venetian Government, Alessio, May 7, 1501, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 1637-1638; IV, 91.

¹⁰² Lorenzo Loredan to Venetian Government, Otranto, May 13, 1501, summarized in *ibid.*, IV, 43. This subject will be dealt with in the following chapter.

¹⁰³ Letter, Genoa, July 20, 1501, summarized in *ibid.*, IV, 71; Beneto Pesaro to Venetian Government, Valona, June 23, 1501, summarized in *ibid.*, IV, 74; Hironimo Bragadin to Venetian Government, Otranto, Aug. 15, 1501, summarized in *ibid.*, IV, 106.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, IV, 39-40.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, IV, 97.

¹⁰⁶ It is asserted that he had been bribed by the Turks.

¹⁰⁷ Giovanni di Tabia to Venetian Government, Chios, Oct. 21, 1501, summarized in Sanuto, IV, 180; Alvise Contarini to Venetian Government, Otranto, Nov. 4, 1501, summarized in *ibid.*, IV, 608-609; Giovanni di Tabia to Venetian Government, Chios, Nov. 25, 1502, summarized in *ibid.*, IV, 207-208, 242-243; IV, 181, DaLesse, pp. 265-266; Spandugino, 175-176; Halil Edhem, V, 284; D'Auton, *Chroniques de Louis XII*, II, 149-204; J. Molinet, *Chroniques*, V, 183-191.

separated them, and the pusillanimity of the French so angered the Venetians that a reunion was never attempted.

During the winter of 1501-1502, the Ottoman fleet was repaired, and forty new galleys were constructed on the Black Sea shore,¹⁰⁸ but the Porte had no intentions of sending out the fleet unless it seemed absolutely necessary. In October, 1501, soon after the raid on Mytilene, Bayezid issued the order that "no one — of any nationality whatsoever — Jews, Armenians, Greeks, Catholic Christians — should leave his domain under pain of life, nor write, nor order anything from any land."¹⁰⁹ This decree was rescinded January 9, 1502, and at the same time the Venetian merchants in Turkey were freed from prison,¹¹⁰ which act was the first successful move toward peace upon the part of the Porte. Andrea Gritti, the leading Venetian merchant in Turkey, and Hersekoglu Ahmed Pasha, the grand vizir, were warm friends, and before Gritti left for Venice, he was commissioned to urge his state to seek peace.¹¹¹

Bayezid wished peace, because the league between Venice and Hungary was a continual menace, and because the tranquility of Anatolia was being disturbed by the invasions of Shah Ismail of Persia and the devotion of many Turks to the heresy which he professed. Venice, also, was in the mood for peace. In September, 1501, Doge Augustino Barbarigo died, and the new doge, Leonardo Loredano, could find no legitimate reason for the war.¹¹² The citizens were weary, the treasury and the arsenal were nearly empty, Venetian credit was seriously impaired,¹¹³ and above all Hungary was beginning to waver. The king had sent an ambassador to Turkey to talk of peace, and Bayezid had agreed to subsidize the Tartars if Poland and Moldavia united with Hungary.¹¹⁴

After much argument throughout the spring and summer, Venice decided on September 13, 1502, to send Zaccaria di Freschi to Istanbul to make peace. His commission, based on the treaty of 1481, required him to get the acceptance of a *baïlo* and the restitution of the Venetian merchants' goods, to see that the frontiers and the possessions of each party remained as they then were, and, most difficult of all, not to make a treaty unless it included Rhodes, Hungary, and the other Christian nations.¹¹⁵

¹⁰⁸ Beneto Pesaro to Venetian Government, Corfu, Mar. 13, 1502, summarized in Sanuto, IV, 246.

¹⁰⁹ Giovanni Maringhi to Nicolo Michelozzi, Pera, Jan. 14, 1502, in Richards, *Florentine merchants in the age of the Medici*, pp. 141-142.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 142.

¹¹¹ Sanuto, IV, 244, 248, 285; Beneto Pesaro to Venetian Government, Corfu, Mar. 13, 1502, summarized in *ibid.*, IV, 246.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, IV, 144.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, IV, 202-203. Notes against the Government were selling for less than half their face value (*ibid.*, IV, 300).

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, IV, 243; Beneto Pesaro to Venetian Government, Corfu, Mar. 13, 1502, summarized in *ibid.*, IV, 246.

¹¹⁵ Albèri, series 3, III, 4-5; Sanuto, IV, 319-320. Neither Louis XII nor the Pope was eager for Venice to make peace with Turkey (Marco Dandolo to Venetian Government, Lyon, Oct. 6, 9, 1502, summarized in *ibid.*, IV, 366; Sebastiano Zustignam to Venetian Government, Buda, Nov. 5, 1502, summarized in *ibid.*, IV, 471).

In Istanbul, there was a great scarcity of grain,¹¹⁶ and to facilitate its movement from the Aegean, Bayezid sent Pantaleo Coresi, a Genoese high in favor at the Porte, to meet Beneto Pesaro, the Venetian admiral, to arrange for a truce while peace negotiations were in progress. They met in July, but Pesaro gruffly replied that he had been sent by Venice to prosecute the war and, that not having orders to the contrary, he would not discuss peace.¹¹⁷

Throughout the summer of 1502, therefore, Venice, Hungary, and Turkey carried on the war in a desultory manner. Iskender Pasha besieged Jajce to revenge the defeat his son had suffered there. Although this fortress did not fall, the Turks were victorious over the Hungarians and would have proceeded far into Hungary if high water in the autumn had not impeded them.¹¹⁸ Through Poland, moves toward peace between Hungary and Turkey were made, and the Hungarian envoy was commissioned to meet Zaccaria di Freschi at Enos, whence they would be escorted to Istanbul.¹¹⁹ The Hungarians, however, did not hold to their agreements with Venice concerning a separate peace, for in November before di Freschi reached Turkey a preliminary truce had been arranged between Turkey, and Hungary¹²⁰ and Poland.¹²¹

On the sea, trade was still greatly hampered because of the raiding and pillaging of the fleets and the privateers in the Archipelago. The fleets evaded each other, and no great assaults were made until late in the summer, when the Venetians appeared at Santa Maura with eighty ships. On August 30, 1502, after an attack of fourteen days, the main fortress on the island fell. The sanjakbey of Valona had attempted to succor the defenders, but his sally failed.¹²² When Bayezid heard of the loss of Santa Maura, he was furious and began arming his fleet and declared he would not receive the Venetian envoy.¹²³ The news reached Venice the day before di Freschi departed for Turkey, and evidently she felt that the

¹¹⁶ Domenico Dolfin to Venetian Government, Rhodes, Sept. 14, 1502, summarized in Sanuto, IV, 407.

¹¹⁷ Giovanni di Tabia to Venetian Government, Chios, July 27, 1502, summarized in *ibid.*, IV, 309-310. Even after di Freschi left for Turkey, Venice notified Pesaro that he was to profess ignorance of peace and to continue the preparations for an attack on Durazzo (*ibid.*, IV, 364).

¹¹⁸ Sebastiano Zustinian to Venetian Government, Buda, July 9, 1502, summarized in *ibid.*, IV, 284; Giovanni Antonio Dandolo to Venetian Government, Spalato, n.d., summarized in *ibid.*, IV, 299-300; Piero Marcello to Venetian Government, Dec. 4, 1502, summarized in *ibid.*, IV, 569-570.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, IV, 319.
¹²⁰ Sebastiano Zustinian to Venetian Government, Buda, Oct. 8-rr, 20, 1502, summarized in *ibid.*, IV, 373, 415; Beneto Sanuto to Venetian Government, Ragusa, Nov. 25, 1502, summarized in *ibid.*, IV, 619.

¹²¹ Nicolo Gondola to Venetian Government, Ragusa, Nov. 6, 1502, summarized in *ibid.*, IV, 502.

¹²² Beneto Pesaro to Venetian Government, Santa Maura, Aug. 24, 30, 1502, summarized in *ibid.*, IV, 308, 315-318; Marco Rizo to his brother, Santa Maura, Aug. 30-Sept. 4, 1502, summarized in *ibid.*, IV, 315-318; Spandugino, pp. 176-177.

¹²³ Piero Foscolo to Venetian Government, Zante, Oct. 25, 1502, summarized in Sanuto, IV, 565; Marco Pizamaro to Venetian Government, Napoli di Romania, Oct. 12, 1502, summarized in *ibid.*, IV, 608-609; Giovanni di Tabia to Venetian Government, Chios, Nov. 25, 1502, summarized in *ibid.*, IV, 636.

capture of Santa Maura might aid her in bargaining, for Pesaro was ordered to strengthen the fortifications of the island.¹²⁴

Finally through the efforts of Hersekoglu Ahmed Pasha, Bayezid gave a safe-conduct to di Freschi when he arrived in Turkey, although naval activities in Turkey went on apace.¹²⁵ Zaccaria di Freschi reached Istanbul on December 7, 1502, conferred with the vizirs three days later, and had an audience with Bayezid on the seventeenth. At first, di Freschi proposed a delay in the negotiations until the arrival of the Hungarian ambassador, but Hersekoglu informed him that it would be several months before the Hungarian arrived.¹²⁶ The fact was that Bayezid wished to separate his two enemies and therefore desired to treat with them individually. Hersekoglu, who had been delegated to arrange the peace, told di Freschi that a treaty was impossible if it did not include the restitution of Santa Maura and Cefalonia. The Venetian replied that these were not mentioned in his instructions, but later Bayezid asked him, "Has there not come a letter from Venice since you departed?" When di Freschi answered in the negative, the Porte decided to send two messengers to Venice for the cession of Santa Maura and the approval of the Turkish articles of peace.¹²⁷

Drawn up on December 14, 1502, and consisting of thirty-one articles,¹²⁸ the peace treaty proposed by Turkey stated that: Venice had

¹²⁴ Albèri, series 3, III, 30. Venice justified the taking of Santa Maura by citing the attacks of Ali Pasha on Napoli di Romania and the raids on Farga by Turkish ships from Santa Maura (Sanuto, IV, 390-391).

¹²⁵ A fleet of 300 galleys and 200 ships of other types were being constructed or repaired in various Turkish ports from the Black Sea to the Adriatic (Leonardo Bembo to Andrea Gritti, Istanbul, Oct. 3, 1502, summarized in Sanuto, IV, 511; Zaccaria di Freschi to Venetian Government, Istanbul, Dec. 31, 1502, summarized in *ibid.*, IV, 669; Matheus Murianus to Venetian Government, Zozavia, Jan. 5, 1503, summarized in *ibid.*, IV, 806).

¹²⁶ Zaccaria di Freschi to Venetian Government, Istanbul, Dec. 11, 13-19, 31, 1502, summarized in *ibid.*, IV, 651-652, 645-646, 668.

¹²⁷ Zaccaria di Freschi to Venetian Government, Istanbul, Dec. 11, 13-19, 21, 31, 1502, summarized in *ibid.*, IV, 651-652, 645-646, 751, 668-669; Halil Edhem, V, 285.

¹²⁸ The thirty-one articles (Articles sent by Bayezid to Venetian Government, Istanbul, Dec. 17, 1502, summarized in Sanuto, V, 42-47) were: (1) Venice sought peace by sending an ambassador to the Porte; (2) Santa Maura, island, castle, men, guns, and munitions, must be restituted to Turkey; (3) a Turk and a Venetian were to be appointed to go over and delimit the boundaries of Turkey and Venice in the district of Cattaro; (4) all things taken on land and sea since the coming of the ambassador were to be restored and the individuals and their goods, taken by soldiers of Napoli di Romania while the Venetian envoy was discussing a treaty at the Porte in 1499, were also to be restored; (5) the island of Zante was to pay 500 ducats annually to Turkey; (6) the Porte and Venice were to appoint officers to delimit the boundaries of Monemvasia and Napoli di Romania; (7) Venice was to keep what it had at the time and the people thereon; (8) Turkey would keep what it had and would not injure Venetians or damage their property; (9) Venetians, or those who trade in the name of Venice, might come and go to Istanbul, Pera, Trebizond, Kaffa, and pass the Straits; (10) Turkish sailors, ships, merchants, and goods were not to be molested by Venetians but assisted by Venetians; (11) neither Turks nor Venetians were to supply pirates but were to castigate them; (12) Venice should not protect Venetian merchants fleeing from Turkey and would not assist them in avoiding the payment of their debts in Turkey; (13) Turks buying in Venice and not paying were to be punished in Turkey; (14) Venice would be responsible for Venetians fleeing from Turkey with debts only if they came to Venetian lands; (15) Venice might send a *baido* to Turkey if he came with good intentions, if he remained only one year, and if he were not one of the great lords of Venice, and he might bring his family with him; (16) if a slave escaped from Venice, came to Turkey, became a Moslem, and his owner or agent came for him, the Porte would reimburse the owner 1,000 aspri, but if the slave had not become a Moslem he would be returned to the owner, and on this article Venice would give reciprocal treatment; (17) Venetians and their goods shipwrecked in

sought peace by sending an ambassador to Turkey; Santa Maura and all things taken from that island would be returned; Venetians and Turks would be appointed to delimit the frontiers at Cattaro, Napoli di Romania, and Monemvasia; Venice and Turkey would keep what they now possessed; the island of Zante would pay five hundred ducats to the Porte annually; the citizens of each nation would be permitted to trade freely in the other state; criminals would be punished and fugitives would be returned; neither would harbor nor provision pirates but would castigate them; the Porte would receive a Venetian *bailo* for one year, and likewise merchants would be permitted to reside in Turkey for one year; and Bayezid swore to keep the peace if Venice would accept these articles.

Since Bayezid demanded the cession of Santa Maura, messengers were sent to Venice with these articles to obtain the confirmation of the doge. While di Freschi had been on his way to and in Istanbul, Venice had written him that Santa Maura was to be restored to Turkey only if Durazzo were returned to Venice, but she later insisted that Santa Maura remain in her hands.¹²⁹ Bayezid's demands, however, were greater.

When the messengers came to Venice with the sultan's peace, the senate debated; then, on January 23, 1503, it instructed di Freschi to acquiesce in the matter of Santa Maura and, if necessary, to promise fifteen thousand ducats for damages.¹³⁰ By March, the letters reached Istanbul, and peace was formulated March 24, 1503. Besides Santa Maura, di Freschi had to agree to pay fourteen thousand ducats for money taken and twelve thousand for munitions. Other Christians were to be allowed to trade freely in the Adriatic if they paid the regular dues at Venetian ports. Venice had objected to this, but Daud Pasha, who was friendly to Florentine and other Italian merchants, had enough power over Hersek-

Turkish waters were to be free, and Venice was to accord reciprocal treatment to Turks in similar cases; (18) any Turkish ship leaving port without an officer of the government would give a bond against damaging Venetians and any damage which might occur would be settled out of this bond, and Venice was to accord reciprocal treatment; (19) a fugitive from Turkish justice would not be accepted in Napoli di Romania or other Venetian territory but would be handed over to Turkish officers; (20) Venice would not harbor an individual guilty of murder in Turkey, and Turkey would grant reciprocal treatment to Venice; (21) the Venetian *bailo* would have the authority to settle all cases between Venetians in Turkey; (22) all Venetians should secure permission from the *bailo* to travel in Turkey and anyone traveling without permission would be held by the Turkish authorities; (23) Venetian sailors coming to Turkey on boats would not be permitted to engage in work in Turkey but must return to Venice; (24) Venetians might reside in Turkey for one year and then reasonable treatment would be accorded them for any additional period; (25) testimony of Venetians would be accepted in Turkish courts against Bayezid's Christian subjects; (26) if any Venetian were robbed and killed in Turkey, his heirs or agents would be able to obtain justice and his property; (27) if any Venetian should die and his heirs come for his property, the testimony of Bayezid's Christian subjects would be accepted in court in settling the estate; (28) Venice would not impede in any way any Moslem from any land going to or coming from Turkey by land or sea if all proper customs and dues were paid; (29) sailors and ships, either Venetian or otherwise, going to or coming from Venice would be free from any hindrance by Turks in the Adriatic and the Gulf of Corinth; (30) if any Venetian merchant died in Turkey, his agent could secure his property upon coming to Turkey and proving ownership; and (31) Bayezid swore that he and all his men would abide by this treaty if it was accepted by Venice.

¹²⁹ Albèri, series 3, III, 30-31. In November, 1502, the Venetian Senate voted 112 against 66 on the issue of asking for Durazzo but giving it up if it was necessary to obtain peace. Sixty-six voted to continue the war because of the difficulties the Porte was having with Persia and a heresy in Anatolia (Sanuto, IV, 491).

¹³⁰ Sanuto, IV, 652-653.

oglu Ahmed Pasha, who favored Venice, to retain this article in the treaty.¹³¹

Di Freschi left Istanbul with Ali Bey the day the treaty was drawn and reached Venice late in April. The peace was discussed, and though it was disliked, the senate realized that the articles must be accepted or the war continued. On the twenty-first of May, the doge swore on the four Gospels to maintain the treaty, and Ali Bey departed for Turkey, accompanied by Andrea Gritti, who had been commissioned to arrange the modification of some points.¹³² He was to try to obtain a longer residence for the *bailo*, the rescue of prisoners, the return of the possessions of merchants, and the restriction of trade in the Adriatic to Venetian and Turkish merchants, and to others only if they obeyed Venetian laws.¹³³

On the way to Istanbul, Gritti disembarked at several places to gain information,¹³⁴ and thus he did not reach the Porte until July 9, 1503. Venice could not have selected a more suitable man for this mission than Gritti. He had lived for a number of years in Turkey, knew the language and customs, and, more important, was well acquainted with Hersekoglu Ahmed Pasha, the grand vizir. Arriving in Istanbul, Gritti notified the vizirs of his presence, and they arranged an audience with Bayezid on the sixteenth. After presenting his credentials and conversing with the sultan, Gritti spoke of boundaries and many things in his commission, but Bayezid was uninformed on these matters. Tactfully, Gritti requested that the settlement be made with the vizirs, who could then confer with their master.¹³⁵

A week later Gritti met with the three vizirs.¹³⁶ After formalities were over he asked if Florence was to be included in the trading articles. Daud Pasha was interested in this and told Gritti that Venice was wrong not to grant every favor to the Florentines. In reply, Gritti intimated that Daud was in the pay of Florence, but stated that, when Florence paid her debt of one hundred and fifty thousand ducats and complied with Venetian trading laws, she would be admitted under the same regulations as the others. Next the vizirs inquired about Santa Maura, and Gritti responded that his government, to please Bayezid, had agreed to surrender the island but could not pay the money, because it had not fallen into Venetian hands. In speaking of the boundaries of Napoli di Romania,

¹³¹ Marco Antonio Contarini to Venetian Government, Ruigno, n.d., summarized in *ibid.*, V, 22. Hersekoglu was liberally bribed by the Venetians, while Daud Pasha, who disliked Christians, had, nevertheless, been bought by the other Italians (Gritti, pp. 40-41).

¹³² Gritti, p. 10; Sanuto, V, 29, 42.

¹³³ Andrea Gritti to Venetian Government, Istanbul, Oct. 6, 1503, summarized in Sanuto, V, 272; Albèri, series 3, III, 30. To represent the merchants and their losses in Turkey, Bernardo Zustignam and Alberto Bavarin were deputed to accompany Gritti (Sanuto, V, 36-37).

¹³⁴ At Paros, the governor of the island gave Ali Bey such fine presents that the envoy wished to visit all the islands of the Archipelago before returning to the Porte, but Gritti dissuaded him from this (Gritti, p. 15).

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 27-29; Relation of Andrea Gritti, Venice, Dec. 2, 1503, summarized in Sanuto, V, 449-451.

¹³⁶ Sanuto, V, 449-451; Gritti, pp. 29-35.

Mustafa Pasha argued that the surrender of lands to Venice had been accomplished through bribery, and since Turkey had retaken everything up to the walls of the city, it was enough that Venice retained the city. Mustafa Pasha then added that perhaps an adjustment might be made if Venice ceded Cefalonia and Alessio. This angered Gritti, but he answered that these places had not been mentioned in his instructions. Upon this Gritti raised the subject of the boundaries of Cattaro and the salt mines, at which Mustafa warned Venice not to fortify these places as it had fortified Zante, and when Gritti argued that the defenses were a protection against pirates and were built during the war, Mustafa stated that they had been begun before the war. Gritti sought a counterclaim and mentioned the damages suffered by Venetians since the truce and from the pirate Karadromis, who was protected and harbored in Turkish ports.¹³⁷ The vizirs rose and were ready to terminate the conference, but Gritti pacified them and said Venice wished the friendship of the Ottomans and he had been ordered to use every courtesy to please them.

Following this discussion, Gritti visited each vizir separately. He complained to Hersekoglu that all had not gone as he had supposed, but Hersekoglu stated that already his own life was in danger for supporting Venice, and then he told Gritti what to say to the other vizirs. To both Daud and Mustafa, Gritti berated Hersekoglu and said that things of small value should not be denied to Venice. Mustafa replied that Bayezid made peace with whom he wished, and that inferiors should welcome any favors. Finally, the general treaty was concluded on July 30, 1503, and formally signed and celebrated on August 10, 1503. In the presence of Gritti, Bayezid swore to uphold the treaty and to punish all infringements of it.¹³⁸

Not all of the articles of the treaty had been prepared, and Gritti remained in Istanbul two months longer to settle many details. During this time, he had the residence of the *bailo* and merchants prolonged from one to three years, secured the restoration of goods taken from merchants, and raised the official valuation of the ducat from fifty to fifty-four aspers.¹³⁹ With most of the questions settled, Gritti left Istanbul and reached Venice in December, when he gave his report to the Senate. Santa Maura was consigned to Turkey on August 31, 1503,¹⁴⁰ a Turkish ambassador was sent to Venice to receive Turks whom Venetians held as

¹³⁷ Later five letters from Hersekoglu Ahmed Pasha were found in Karadromis' house warning him to put to sea, for Bayezid was sending for him, and Hersekoglu, himself, had ordered the aga of the janissaries to bring his head (Sanuto, V, 973-974).

¹³⁸ Gritti, pp. 36-38; Andrea Gritti to Venetian Government, Istanbul, Aug. 15, 1503, summarized in Sanuto, V, 77.

¹³⁹ Andrea Gritti to Venetian Government, Istanbul, Oct. 6, 1503, summarized in Sanuto, V, 272-273; Andrea Gritti to Venetian Government, Corfu, Nov. 2, 1503, summarized in *ibid.*, V, 431; Relation of Andrea Gritti, Venice, Dec. 2, 1503, summarized in *ibid.*, V, 449-454; Bayezid to Leonardo Laurendano, Istanbul, Oct. 6, 1503, summarized in *ibid.*, V, 454.

¹⁴⁰ Hironimo Contarini to Venetian Government, Corfu, Sept. 5, 1503, summarized in *ibid.*, V, 84.

slaves,¹⁴¹ Bayezid wrote to all his sanjakbeys to observe peace, and Leonardo Bembo was appointed as the Venetian *vice-bailo* in Turkey.¹⁴²

The boundaries of Napoli di Romania and Cattaro had not been defined in the treaty, but provisions for the discussion and settlement had been included. Alvise Sagudino came to the former city to confer with Ali Pasha. Upon reaching Napoli di Romania, he met Ali Pasha and stated that the small villages of Damala, El Castri, and Termisi were by treaty a part of the city. Ali Pasha objected to this because he had orders from the Porte that nothing outside the city should go to Venice and perhaps because he, himself, received the income from Damala. Sagudino was forced to acquiesce,¹⁴³ and then they went to Monemvasia, where Sagudino requested a small plain so that the inhabitants could plant grain and vegetables. Ali Pasha consented to this, though he stipulated that no Albanians were to possess any of the land and that those who worked the land must pay the regular taxes to Turkey.¹⁴⁴ The Venetians, to gain their point at Napoli di Romania, tried to bribe Ali Pasha with a pension for life, but he would not accept it,¹⁴⁵ and Venice had to remain unsatisfied.¹⁴⁶

Before the treaty was signed, the governors of Cattaro and Castelnuovo had arranged trade agreements between themselves, to allow the people of Risano and Castelnuovo to buy salt in Cattaro.¹⁴⁷ To settle the boundaries Firuz Bey met Zaccaria di Freschi, the Venetian representative, near Cattaro. Each claimed the Cernovitch lands. Di Freschi argued that by the treaty with Mehmed II these belonged to Venice and that they should be returned just as Santa Maura was being returned to Turkey, but Firuz Bey informed him that Bayezid had held these lands before the outbreak of the war, that the inhabitants had twice brought tribute to him, and that consequently they belonged to Turkey.¹⁴⁸ At Antivari and Budua, a number of fields were deeded to Turkey, but the Venetians retained everything at Pastrovichi. After much discussion, the Venetians ceded the Cernovitch lands to Turkey in the spring of 1504.¹⁴⁹

While Gritti had been in Istanbul, the vizirs had demanded Alessio,

¹⁴¹ Leonardo Bembo to Venetian Government, Pera, Nov. 7, 1503, summarized in *ibid.*, V, 761-762.

¹⁴² Andrea Gritti to Venetian Government, Istanbul, Aug. 15, 1503, summarized in *ibid.*, V, 77.

¹⁴³ Zaccaria di Freschi to Venetian Government, Zara, Sept. 26, 1503, summarized in *ibid.*, V, 125; Alvise Sagudino to Venetian Government, Argos, Sept. 24-25, 1503, summarized in *ibid.*, V, 242-243; Alvise Sagudino to Venetian Government, Napoli di Romania, Oct. 5, 15, 1503, summarized in *ibid.*, V, 255, 337; V, 852-853.

¹⁴⁴ Sanuto, V, 852-853; Alvise Sagudino to Venetian Government, Napoli di Romania, Nov. 21, 1503, summarized in *ibid.*, V, 727-728.

¹⁴⁵ Alvise Sagudino to Venetian Government, Napoli di Romania, Oct. 5, 1503, summarized in *ibid.*, V, 255. ¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, V, 1001.

¹⁴⁷ Mehmed Bey to Sebastiano Contarini, Castelnuovo, Jan. 11, 1503, summarized in *ibid.*, IV, 656-657; Sebastiano Contarini to Venetian Government, Cattaro, Feb. 1-9, 1503, summarized in *ibid.*, IV, 790; Ahmed to Sebastiano Contarini, Risano, n.d., summarized in *ibid.*, IV, 799.

¹⁴⁸ Zaccaria di Freschi to Venetian Government, Cattaro, Antivari, Dulzigno, Oct. 15-26, 1503, summarized in *ibid.*, V, 273-275.

¹⁴⁹ Zaccaria di Freschi to Venetian Government, Corfu, Nov. 12, 1503, summarized in *ibid.*, V, 432; Hironimo Foscari to Venetian Government, Cattaro, Feb. 7, 1504, summarized in *ibid.*, V, 956; VI, 29.

but he had not been able to give it because it was not mentioned in his instructions.¹⁵⁰ Consequently, its ownership was not transferred by the treaty, but Turkey still desired it. Firuz Bey continued to press the matter, and finally in 1506, Alessio was assigned to Turkey.¹⁵¹

In Istanbul, there were about twenty-five Venetians who had been captured during the war. Gritti had attempted to have them freed, but the Porte demanded two hundred forty thousand ducats ransom.¹⁵² As this was an impossible sum, the men remained in prison until 1508, when they were freed on payment of fifteen thousand ducats, only after the threat that they would be executed if the money was not paid.¹⁵³

Venice had wished to include Hungary in her peace treaty, but Bayezid preferred to make peace with the Christians separately.¹⁵⁴ The Hungarian ambassador, Zober Martin, arrived in Istanbul, March 25, 1503, the day after Zaccaria di Freschi left.¹⁵⁵ The treaty proposed by Hungary¹⁵⁶ was to endure for seven years unless Bayezid should die during that time. All brigandage and raids along the frontiers were to be suppressed and the offenders punished. The articles concerned with commerce were similar to those incorporated in the treaties which Turkey had with Venice and Naples. Included in the treaty on the side of Hungary were the Pope, the Holy Roman Emperor, the kings of France, Spain, Portugal, England, Poland, Naples, all Italy, the grand master of Rhodes, and the princes of Wallachia and Moldavia, each of whom might come under its provisions by ratifying the treaty. In general, Bayezid agreed to the articles except the term of seven years and the inclusion of Wallachia and Moldavia. In the final settlement these two provinces were omitted, but Bayezid allowed the provision of seven years to stand, on the agreement that Hungary would support Turkey if war came between Venice and Turkey.¹⁵⁷ On August 20, 1503, Vladislav on the Bible and Hersekoglu Ahmed Pasha on the Koran swore to maintain the treaty.¹⁵⁸

These two treaties with Hungary and Venice once again established peace between Bayezid and the Christian nations. Against Hungary, Turkey had accomplished almost nothing, no material gain had been won, and the war had not been pressed very effectively or energetically, perhaps because Bayezid had not desired the war with Hungary but had

¹⁵⁰ Relation of Andrea Gritti, Venice, Dec. 2, 1503, summarized in *ibid.*, V, 450.

¹⁵¹ Soon after news reached Alessio that it had been given to the Turks, a fire destroyed all of the city except the church (Relation of Giacomo Contarini, Venice, Mar. 1, 1507, summarized in *ibid.*, VII, 20).

¹⁵² Relation of Andrea Gritti, Venice, Dec. 2, 1503, summarized in *ibid.*, V, 452; Marco Orio to Venetian Government, Castel di Mar Mazor, n.d., summarized in *ibid.*, VI, 292.

¹⁵³ Leonardo Bembo to Venetian Government, Istanbul, Nov. 24-Dec. 4, 1507, summarized in *ibid.*, VII, 259; Andrea Foscolo to Venetian Government, Istanbul, Sept. 12-13, 24, 1508, summarized in *ibid.*, VII, 649, 663.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, V, 27. ¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, V, 26. ¹⁵⁶ Articles of Treaty between Vladislav and Bayezid, Buda, Feb. 22, 1503, summarized in *ibid.*, IV, 879-883. ¹⁵⁷ Gritti, p. 29. ¹⁵⁸ Halil Edhem, V, 285; Albèri, series 3, III, 29.

entered into the war when Hungary gave assistance to Venice. For Venice, however, the war had been disastrous. Turkey now possessed the valuable ports of Durazzo, Lepanto, Modon, and Coron, and had retained dominance over the Ionian Islands. Turkish control of all of Greece and Albania was nearly complete, and Venice never regained her prestige in the Levantine trade. With the loss of Modon and the expense of the war, coming at the same time as the rounding of Africa by the Portuguese, Venice was not able to make a successful bid to recover the spice trade of the Orient.

The Ottoman empire, on the other hand, not only was the dominant power in the Balkan peninsula, but also had now risen to the position of a great sea power. In the first engagements of the war, the Ottoman sea captains were afraid of the Venetian galleys, but after they had repeatedly proved their superiority in armaments, ability, and courage, they gained in confidence and were ready at any time to meet the Christian fleets. The numbers and the power of the Turkish ships gave to the Ottoman empire the strength to rule the Greek Archipelago, and from this war until the nineteenth century most of the islands in the Aegean were tributaries of the Ottoman sultans.

This victory over Venice was one of the most significant victories in the annals of Ottoman history for it sealed the fate of the eastern third of the Mediterranean for the following three hundred years. The conquest of Syria and Egypt by Selim I in the next decade was, undoubtedly, less difficult because of the resulting weakness of Venetian sea power and the lack of ports-of-call between Venice and the Levant. Too, had Venice remained a sea power in the eastern Mediterranean, Suleiman's long siege of Rhodes might not have ended in a Turkish victory. Furthermore, the outcome of this war with Venice played a distinct role in Suleiman's many successful campaigns in Europe. Control of Greece and the lower Adriatic as well as the defeat of Venice gave to his armies in Hungary, Croatia, Slovenia, and the provinces to the north a valuable protection from rear-guard and flanking movements.

Even more important, however, is the effect this victory had on the economy of Turkey. More of the trade between east and west came under the control of the Porte. The income of the state and that of the leading officials was increased considerably. The defeat of Venice and the Turkish acquisition of Modon and the other trading posts in the Balkans rounded out the Ottoman empire and gave to it a certain economic unity lacking before this time. Without this economic strength and the resulting prosperity the campaigns and the glories of Bayezid's son and grandson might not have been. Though not particularly heroic or dramatic in itself, the victory had a profound influence on the growth and development of the Ottoman empire.

WAR WITH PERSIA AND THE SUPPRESSION OF HERESY, 1500-1511

THE WAR with Venice and Hungary was concluded in 1503 because a new star had risen in the east. The Ottoman sultans always found it difficult to prosecute successfully a war in Europe when they were being attacked in Asia, or vice versa. The new power in Asia was Shah Ismail of Persia, who not only was upsetting the political balance in the Near and Middle East but also was spreading among the Moslems a heterodox faith which was particularly disturbing to the Sunnite leaders of the Ottoman empire.

Uzun Hasan of Persia had died in 1478, and for the remainder of that century no one appeared with enough ability and strength to settle the resulting chaos. There were many rulers in Persia, one of whom was Ahmed Mirza, a grandson of Uzun Hasan and a son-in-law of Bayezid, but after a reign of six months, he, like many of the others, fell at the hand of an assassin.¹ In 1499 Ismail came out of hiding, and within a year he had made himself shah of Persia.

Such a rapid rise to power can not be explained by his personal qualities alone. His varied family connections were, undoubtedly, a great boon. On the paternal side he claimed to be descended from the Prophet through Fatima and Ali and the seventh Imam. Ismail's father was Haydar, a prominent sheikh, who had preached and fostered the Shi'ite creed in Anatolia as well as in Persia. From the maternal side, Ismail had in his veins the blood of the kings of Persia and the Christian emperors of Constantinople. His mother was the daughter of Uzun Hasan and Despina, who was the daughter of Kalo Ioannes, Greek emperor of Trebizond.² The exact year of Ismail's birth remains uncertain,³ but all evidence indicates that he was in his teens when he entered upon a political career. Undoubtedly, there were many elderly men⁴ surrounding, aiding, and advising him in the unifying of Persia.

The events of his rise to power can not be detailed here, but some of his experiences and ideas are relevant in explaining the great speed of his elevation and the eagerness of the people to flock to his support. His mother may have been a Christian, and as a youth he had lived for several years in an Armenian monastery on an island in Lake Van.⁵ Accord-

ingly, he was tolerant toward Christians, and this may have been the reason why he avowed that the Prophet of God was in heaven and not dead.⁶ Ismail never professed to be a saint, but his followers explained that he had the true religion and therefore that God had wrought a miracle in placing him on the throne so quickly.⁷

The booty and treasure of the first rich city to fall to Ismail were divided wholly among his followers and soldiers, whereupon the liberality of the new Persian leader was recognized far and wide to such an extent that men from distant lands assembled under his standard.⁸ Besides being generous and having a genial disposition, Ismail identified himself with various Turkish tribes, several of which inhabited Asia Minor.⁹ Members of these resided in the Ottoman empire, and it was this item in Ismail's rise which threw the border tribes into confusion.¹⁰

Nationalism played little or no part in the affairs of that time.¹¹ Men rushed to Ismail's support for personal and religious reasons. Ismail belonged to the Bektashi order of dervishes, and in 1502 he made the Shi'ite faith the official religion of Persia, either exiling or executing most of those who did not conform. His followers wore a large pointed red hat and from this emblem the Turks named his disciples the *kizil-bashis*, or red-heads. Another epithet for the party was *Sofi* or *Sufi*, which may be a derivative of the Persian word for wool but more probably should be translated as "mystic," and Ismail was often referred to as the Grand *Sofi*.

Simultaneously with the rise of Ismail in Persia, the Karamanian tribes, many of whom were *kizil-bashis*, rebelled against Ottoman overlordship. In 1490 at the cessation of war between Egypt and the Porte, Karamania had been subdued, but not thoroughly integrated as a part of the empire, for in 1500 the nephew of the last Karamanian prince gathered an army and marched against the Ottomans. Bayezid's main forces were in Europe, and consequently the Karamanians met with little opposition. They burned Larenda and defeated two pashas and Bayezid's son Shehin, who came from Konya to repulse them.¹² The Venetians urged the Kara-

¹ Sanuto, IV, 313.

² R. Knolles, *The Turkish history*, I, 319.

³ Angiolello, p. 104.

⁴ Browne, *History of Persian literature*, pp. 51-52. His father and grandfather had traveled and preached in Konya, Karaman, Sivas, and Amasya, and thus the Turkish tribes were greatly attached to the family (J. K. Birge, *The Bektashi order of dervishes*, pp. 63-64).

⁵ It was among these border tribes that the ghazi spirit and traditions had had their origin, as has been pointed out in the introductory chapter of this study. Since the ghazis were never noted for their interest in fine theological distinctions or orthodoxy in their religious beliefs and practices, it was not difficult for them to accept the beliefs advanced by Ismail. In fact, in these regions certain vestiges of early Christian heresies have remained throughout the centuries to the effect that other heresies have always found a certain degree of acceptance and tolerance there.

⁶ In addition to being the cradle land of the ghazis, Asia Minor was the home of the Bektashi order of dervishes to which Ismail belonged. Under the pen name of Hatayi, Ismail wrote many mystic poems which were very popular among the Bektashis. These poems were in the Turkish language of the common Turkish people, vastly different from the language used at the Porte (Birge, pp. 64-69). Likewise, in the correspondence between Bayezid and Ismail, the former usually wrote in Persian, whereas the latter used Turkish.

⁷ DeLazze, p. 264; Hironimo Zorzi to Constantino Zorzi, Ragusa, Oct. 17, 1500, Jan. 20, 1501, summarized in Sanuto, III, 1060, 1404; Troylo Malpiero to Venetian Government, Famagosta, Sept. 13, 14, Oct. 20, 1500, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 1119, 1121, 1150.

⁸ Ross, "The early years of Shāh Isma'il, founder of the Safavi dynasty," in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, n.s., XXVIII, 297-300.

⁹ G. Le Strange (trans. and ed.), *Don Juan of Persia, A Shi'ah Catholic, 1560-1604*, p. 107.

¹⁰ Browne gives the date 1487 (*A history of Persian literature in modern times, A.D., 1500-1924*, p. 49), but it seems impossible that he was only thirteen when his rise began. Contemporary accounts placed his birth from 1480 to 1486 (Sanuto, IV, 313; Deposition about the new prophet, Venice, Dec. 1501, quoted in *ibid.*, IV, 192).

¹¹ An early report coming to Venice mentioned forty governors (Sanuto, IV, 191), but undoubtedly this referred to the forty saints and the Turkish name of the assembly, or gathering in fellowship, of the Bektashi order, of which Ismail was a member.

¹² Browne, *History of Persian literature*, p. 49.

manians to persevere,¹³ but in the spring of 1501, Mesih Pasha with thirty thousand soldiers met and routed the Karamanians, putting many to the sword and selling the rest of the rebels into slavery.¹⁴

The Ottomans realized that the rise of Ismail was a danger for Turkey, not only because of his power and religion but because of the ease with which he might stir the janissaries, by tradition members of the Bektashi order, as well as the border tribes to revolt. Bayezid, therefore, sent out an edict in the autumn of 1501, saying that Ismail was dead.¹⁵ This, of course, convinced few, and was a rather nonsensical bit of psychological diplomacy on the part of the Porte. The leaders of the border tribes of Karman, Turgud, Warsak, and Sulqadr fled from the Ottomans and went to Ismail, who presumably promised to aid them. Venice sent Constantino Laschari from Cyprus also to promise aid and artillery.¹⁶ The Egyptian sultan, however, sided quite readily with Bayezid, and when Ismail requested the governor of Aleppo to free the Karamanian leader, the sultan of Egypt was displeased and sent three thousand mamluks to Aleppo to prevent his release and to guard the frontier.¹⁷

The Shiite beliefs, already rooted in Turkey, spread rapidly. In the previous century when Ismail's father had been killed, Hasan Kalifa and Karabiik, two of his adherents, entered Turkey and for a time lived as hermits in the wild mountainous region of the south. These two were the most prominent leaders, but there were many others scattered throughout the empire. When these two came from Persia they were considered pious men, and it has been asserted that Bayezid gave them six or seven thousand aspers annually,¹⁸ but their heretical beliefs soon became apparent and all who were suspected of Shiite convictions began to be persecuted. Early in 1502 it was rumored in Istanbul that five hundred *kizil-bashis* were in the city, and for five days all gates were closed to prevent their escape and to facilitate their capture.¹⁹ Karabiik, or Shah Kuli as he was called, was particularly active in the province of Tekke, and in the city of Attalya. From there and from the whole of Anatolia, groups of the heretics were deported to Greece and Albania to refill the recently captured cities of Lepanto, Modon, and Coron.²⁰

In the Taurus Mountains, Murad and Alvand, two of Ismail's cousins, were defying his power. To reach their chief city, Diarbekir, the *Sofi*

set out from Erzincan toward Karahisar. In addition to being within the Ottoman frontier, this route led to Albistan and Marash, the seat of Ala-eddevlet. He and the Ottoman sanjakbeys began to protest forcibly, and the fiery Selim prepared an army to resist the Persians from Trebizond.²¹ To protect the frontier, Bayezid gathered an army under the beylerbey of Anatolia and advised the Rumelian troops to be ready to cross to Asia. During the summer the beylerbey marched to Ankara, and minor skirmishes ensued between the advance guards of the two armies, but no engagements occurred.²² Ismail wrote protesting that his followers were prohibited from going to Persia, but Bayezid replied that their desire had no pious foundation and was based on the hope of escaping military service and financial tribute.²³ Events might easily have led to war, but Ismail was forced to retire to crush an uprising in Persia.

Ambassadors came to Istanbul to propose peace. At first it was thought they had been sent to spy out the land and to spread their heresy. Some of the mission lingered along the way, and the Porte ordered an inquisition set up to find and execute them. Bayezid, however, after the news of the loss of Santa Maura preferred to make peace with Ismail.²⁴

During the years of 1503 and 1504, Ismail was occupied with troubles in his own land, but Bayezid was not assured that the *Sofi* would not return. The sultan of Egypt was also worried lest the Persians invade Syria, and in a letter to Bayezid he spoke of "the victory of the misguided Qizil-bashi faction in the Eastern countries" as a "public calamity."²⁵ Since 1491, Egypt and Turkey had been relatively friendly.²⁶ It was not the usual custom in Turkey to give daughters of the sultan to foreign princes, but Bayezid disregarded this usage and married two daughters outside the empire. One he had given to Ahmed Mirza of Persia, and now he cemented the friendship between Turkey and Egypt by sending a daughter to Cairo.²⁷ This was in 1501, and the next year ambassadors were exchanged to discuss the affairs of Persia and the Syrian frontier. The *Sofi* had sent envoys to Egypt to persuade the sultan to join in an attack upon Turkey and to free the Karamanian prince.

¹³ Relation of Constantino Laschari, Venice, Oct. 14, 1502, summarized in Sanuto, IV, 354.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, IV, 319; Giovanni di Tabia to Beneto Pesaro, Chios, Sept. 5, 1502, summarized in *ibid.*, IV, 390; Domenego Dolfin to Venetian Government, Rhodes, Aug. 29, 1502, summarized in *ibid.*, IV, 404; Leonardo Bembo to Venetian Government, Pera, Sept. 9, 1502, summarized in *ibid.*, IV, 434.

¹⁵ Nicolo di Prioli to Venetian Government, Leucosia, Sept. 7, 1502, quoted in *ibid.*, IV, 488; Browne, *History of Persian literature*, pp. 67-68.

¹⁶ Sebastiano Zustignam to Venetian Government, Buda, Oct. 8-11, 1502, summarized in Sanuto, IV, 373; Domenego Dolfin to Venetian Government, Rhodes, Aug. 29, Sept. 14, 1502, summarized in *ibid.*, IV, 405, 407; Nicolo Gondola to Venetian Government, Ragusa, Oct. 28, 1502, summarized in *ibid.*, IV, 474; Giovanni di Tabia to Venetian Government, Nov. 25, 1502, summarized in *ibid.*, IV, 636; Leonardo Bembo to Andrea Gritti, Istanbul, Oct. 3, 1502, summarized in *ibid.*, IV, 511; Giovanni di Tabia to Domenego Dolfin, Chios, Oct. 7, 1502, summarized in *ibid.*, IV, 480.

¹⁷ Browne, *History of Persian literature*, p. 69.

¹⁸ A report from Alexandria in 1502 stated that a Turkish ship set out from Egypt every day either for Istanbul or Attalya (Sanuto, IV, 247).

¹⁹ Cristofal Malaverti to Beneto Pesaro, Candia, Jan. 7, 1501, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 1523.

¹³ Sanuto, III, 853.

¹⁴ Giovanni di Tabia to Venetian Government, Chios, June 20, 1501, summarized in *ibid.*, IV, 105; DaLezze, p. 264. ¹⁵ Sanuto, IV, 248.

¹⁶ Relation of Constantino Laschari, Venice, Oct. 14, 1502, summarized in *ibid.*, IV, 353.

¹⁷ Nicolo di Prioli to Beneto Pesaro, Cyprus, Sept. 24, 1502, summarized in *ibid.*, IV, 481; Lorenzo Contarini to Venetian Government, Famagosta, Sept. 5, 1502, summarized in *ibid.*, IV, 486.

¹⁸ Knolles, *The Turkish history*, I, 317.

¹⁹ Letter, Istanbul, Mar. 7, 1502, summarized in Sanuto, IV, 255.

²⁰ Spandugino, p. 257; Sanuto, IV, 313; Giovanni di Tabia to Venetian Government, Chios, July 27, 1502, summarized in *ibid.*, IV, 309. Karabiik was not captured. His followers called him Shah Kuli, or the Shah's slave, but in Turkey he was dubbed Shaytan Kuli, or the Devil's slave.

Evidently the Egyptian sultan did not know which way to turn, for he refused the former request and complied with the latter.²⁸ The Turkish ambassador, however, was honored, and his demands for the return of Jem's daughter and for a better patrolling of the routes to Mecca were granted, but Egypt would not surrender the Karamanian.²⁹ The important result of the visits was the agreement that Shah Ismail menaced the sultans of both Turkey and Egypt.

In 1504, Ismail captured Baghdad and then moved north toward Mardin and Diarbekir. Some of his enemies in Persia sent costly presents to Bayezid, and Alaedddevlet sought Ottoman support,³⁰ but the Porte was not willing to antagonize the *Sofi* and dispatched an ambassador to congratulate Ismail on the conquest of Fars and Iraq.³¹ It was asserted, however, that the Turkish envoy was forced to eat pork and to witness the execution of several Sunnite theologians. This visit was returned in the summer of 1505, when a Persian ambassador came to Istanbul, to assure Bayezid of Ismail's peaceful intentions toward the Ottoman empire and to protest against the warlike action of Selim on the frontier of Trebizond.³² Ismail was planning a campaign against Alaedddevlet, who sometimes professed allegiance to the Porte, and the *Sofi* wished to inform Bayezid that the Persian soldiers had been ordered to respect Ottoman lands and troops.³³ Bayezid accepted these assurances but did not trust the ambassador, who was guarded closely. Even the money which he spent in Istanbul was afterwards collected and the holders of it were reimbursed,³⁴ in order that the heresy inscribed upon it could not circulate in Turkey.

In spite of the ambassador's mission, Ismail was planning to attack the Ottomans if the opportunity should be presented. He defeated Alaedddevlet and then sought the aid of Egypt and Venice against Turkey.³⁵ Venice sent a friendly reply to the *Sofi*, but the sultan of Egypt

prepared an army in Syria and conferred with Bayezid, who was moving artillery and war implements from the Morea to Anatolia.³⁶ Alaedddevlet, after his defeat, promised to send his daughter to Ismail, but then a substitution was made on the excuse that Bayezid had forbidden the original transaction.³⁷ This infuriated the *Sofi*, who thereupon decided to subdue Alaedddevlet and the entire country of Sulqadr.

To reach Harput, Marash, and Diarbekir easily, Ismail was forced to march through Ottoman territory. He sent an ambassador to Bayezid to secure permission for the transit of his army, and another to Cairo to inform the sultan of Egypt that the Persian troops would not enter Syria.³⁸ Each of the sultans, however, wished to be prepared for any event, and therefore each mobilized his army. When the Ottoman ambassador was told that Egypt had few guns, Bayezid sent Kemal to Alexandria with great quantities of copper and many skilled workmen to cast pieces of artillery.³⁹

In the summer of 1507, Ismail entered Ottoman territory near Karahisar, and purchasing supplies on the way, he proceeded to take Harput and Diarbekir, where several of Alaedddevlet's children were captured and roasted alive.⁴⁰ Bayezid, to protect the frontier, sent Yahya Pasha to Ankara with many janissaries, *azabs*, and *timarijs*, and all the sanjakbeys of Anatolia. In addition he established camps at Akseray, Kaysari, and Amasya, but all were ordered not to come to blows with the Persians.⁴¹ Bayezid greatly feared the *Sofi* because of the nearness of his army and even more because of the great number of Ottomans, both soldiers and civilians, who were deserting the Porte and joining the *Sofis*. In fact, one of Bayezid's sons wrote to Istanbul that it would be impossible to form an army against the *Sofi* if the sultan did not come in person.⁴² It appears that, without the presence of the sultan, the power of Ismail's attraction in the way of Bektashi ideology, generosity, and common Turkish customs, was more than Ottoman *timarijs*, janissaries, and Anatolian Turkish feudatories could withstand. With the approach of winter, however, Ismail

²⁸ Nicolo di Prioli to Beneto Pesaro, Cyprus, Sept. 21, 1502, summarized in *ibid.*, IV, 481; Lorenzo Contarini to Venetian Government, Famagosta, Sept. 5, 1502, summarized in *ibid.*, IV, 486; Browne, *History of Persian Literature*, p. 69. The Sultan of Egypt said he was not able to aid Ismail because all his men and ships were in India (Alvise Arimondo to Sebastiano Moro, Alexandria, Mar. 26, 1503, summarized in Sanuto, V, 34-35).

²⁹ Andrea Moresini to Nicolo di Priolo, Aleppo, Nov. 20, 1502, summarized in Sanuto, IV, 717; Thuasne, p. 389.

³⁰ Leonardo Bembo to Venetian Government, Istanbul, n.d., summarized in Sanuto, VI, 37, 90.

³¹ Browne, *History of Persian Literature*, p. 57.

³² Leonardo Bembo to Venetian Government, Istanbul, June 25, 1505, summarized in Sanuto, VI, 212; Letter, Damascus, May 28, 1505, summarized in *ibid.*, VI, 220-221; Letter, Gaza, June 11, 1505, summarized in *ibid.*, VI, 221; Deposition of Antonio Marzello, Venice, Sept. 25, 1505, summarized in *ibid.*, VI, 240; VI, 221-222.

³³ Browne, *History of Persian Literature*, p. 68.

³⁴ Giovanni di Tabia to Venetian Government, Chios, Aug., 1505, summarized in Sanuto, VI, 247-248; Deposition of Giovanni Donado, Venice, Nov. 29, 1505, summarized in *ibid.*, VI, 261. The words were, "There is only one God, Mohammed is his Prophet, and Ali is Mohammed's successor" (*ibid.*, VI, 270). Perhaps this action and that of a close guard were to prevent any contact with the janissaries who, of course, were called "Sons of Haji Bektash."

³⁵ Bartolo Contarini to Venetian Government, Damascus, Aug., 1505, summarized in *ibid.*, VI, 261; Ismail to Leonardo Lauredano, n.p., received Jan., 1506, summarized in *ibid.*, VI, 302-303. The Persians, besides wishing for allies against Turkey, needed artillery which could be purchased from Venice (Relation of Giacomo Contarini, Venice, Mar. 1, 1506, summarized in *ibid.*, VII, 15).

³⁶ Fantin Contarini to Venetian Government, Alexandria, n.d., summarized in *ibid.*, VI, 283; Bartolo Contarini to Venetian Government, Damascus, Sept. 28, 1505, summarized in *ibid.*, VI, 284-285; Dona da Lezze to Venetian Government, Zante, n.d., summarized in *ibid.*, VI, 277.

³⁷ Relation of Giacomo Contarini, Venice, Mar. 1, 1506, summarized in *ibid.*, VII, 15-16.

³⁸ Angiolello, p. 108.

³⁹ Sanuto, VII, 164; Francesco Arimondo to Venetian Government, Alexandria, Oct. 31, 1507, summarized in *ibid.*, VII, 181-182; Giovanni Moresini to Ambrogio Moresini, Damascus, Mar. 5, 1508, quoted in *ibid.*, VII, 535.

⁴⁰ Bernardini Zippello to Venetian Government, n.p., Dec. 20, 1507, summarized in *ibid.*, VII, 267-269.

⁴¹ At Ankara under Yahya Pasha, who was one of the vizirs, there were about 70,000 men; at Akseray under Prince Shehin there were about 10,000; at Kaysari under Karagöz Pasha there were 23,000; and at Amasya under Prince Ahmed there were 12,000 (Letter, Cyprus, n.d., summarized in *ibid.*, VII, 266-267).

⁴² Deposition of Priamo Malipiero, Cyprus, Aug. 24, 1507, summarized in *ibid.*, VII, 166; Deposition of Hironimo de Matio, Cyprus, Aug. 29, 1507, summarized in *ibid.*, VII, 168; Letter to Alvise Zen, Cattaro, Oct., 1507, summarized in *ibid.*, VII, 171; Letter, Nicosia, Sept. 19, 1507, summarized in *ibid.*, VII, 182; Giovanni di Tabia to Venetian Government, Chios, Oct. 21-24, 1507, summarized in *ibid.*, VII, 265.

retired from Diarbekir and the Ottoman forces were disbanded, but the Porte did not feel assured that Ismail would not return. If he should, Bayezid wished Venice to remain neutral, and therefore wrote to the doge that Ismail had been defeated and had fled.⁴³

In Turkey preparations were laid during the winter and spring of 1508 to defend the empire against an invasion by Ismail. Camps remained at Bursa and various places in Anatolia, and all the sanjakbeys of Rumelia were ordered to be in readiness to cross to Asia if the need warranted it. Guards were posted along the southern and eastern frontiers to keep a vigilant eye on the movements of the *Sofis* and to report and punish any defection of the border tribes.⁴⁴ Within the empire the heterodox *Sofis* were ferreted out and either executed or deported to Europe.⁴⁵ The caution, however, proved to be partially unnecessary, for the Tartars, wearing the green hat, invaded Persia from the east, and Ismail went to meet them.⁴⁶

Because of the new enemy a Persian ambassador came to Istanbul in July, 1508, and his visit coincided with the arrival of an envoy from Shahabey Khan, the Tartar leader.⁴⁷ Obviously their objects were identical, and though the Tartars were more distant, Bayezid recalled the fate of his ancestor at the hands of Tamerlane and therefore accorded honor to both embassies, hoping that neither Ismail nor Shahabey Khan would be successful. The *Sofi* complained at the Porte that Prince Selim had attacked him and robbed him of artillery. He stated that Persia had been fighting Alaedddevlet, not Turkey, and therefore asked for the restitution of the stolen armaments.⁴⁸ Apparently the request was tactfully ignored, but the ambassador was laden with gifts and departed with peace and friendship expressed between Ismail and Bayezid.⁴⁹

In the next few years, the affairs between Ismail and Bayezid were relatively quiet. In 1509, envoys of the *Sofi* went to Venice to secure artillery and probably to obtain an alliance against Turkey,⁵⁰ but Venice

⁴³ *Ibid.*, VII, 270; Leonardo Bembo to Venetian Government, Istanbul, Oct. 21, Nov. 27-Dec. 4, 1507, summarized in *ibid.*, VII, 231, 259; Bayezid to Leonardo Laurendano, Istanbul, n.d., summarized in *ibid.*, VII, 233; Giovanni Moresini to Ambrogio Moresini, Damascus, Mar. 5, 1508, summarized in *ibid.*, VII, 535. Contrary reports came to Venice from Rhodes, Chios, and Zante that the *Sofi* had defeated the Turks and overrun Turkey, but these were soon recognized as false (Antonio da Mulla to Venetian Government, Zante, n.d., summarized in *ibid.*, VII, 161; VII, 178, 179; DaLezze, p. 268).

⁴⁴ Leonardo Bembo to Venetian Government, Istanbul, Dec. 29, 1507-Jan. 10, 1508, summarized in Sanuto, VII, 286-287; Almore Pisani to Venetian Government, n.p., Jan., 1508, summarized in *ibid.*, VII, 300; Antonio da Mulla to Venetian Government, Zante, Apr. 7, 1508, summarized in *ibid.*, VII, 440; Letter, Corfu, Apr. 30, 1508, summarized in *ibid.*, VII, 468; Giovanni Moresini to Ambrogio Moresini, Damascus, Mar. 5, 1508, summarized in *ibid.*, VII, 529.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, VII, 531; Spandugino, p. 257.

⁴⁶ Angiolello, p. 110; Zeno, "Travels in Persia," in *A narrative of Italian travels in Persia in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries*, The Hakluyt Society Works, XLIX, 55-56; Andrea Foscolo to Venetian Government, Istanbul, Aug. 6, 13, 1508, summarized in Sanuto, VII, 631.

⁴⁷ Hammer, IV, 94.

⁴⁸ Andrea Foscolo to Venetian Government, Istanbul, Aug. 6, 13, 1508, summarized in Sanuto, VII, 631.

⁴⁹ Andrea Foscolo to Venetian Government, Istanbul, Aug. 1, 1508, summarized in *ibid.*, VII, 636-637.

⁵⁰ Letter, Napoli di Romania, Sept. 27, 1508, summarized in *ibid.*, VII, 659; VIII, 14.

was occupied with Italian wars and was in no position to offend the Porte. These envoys passed through Egypt on their way and thereby almost brought Turkey and Egypt to blows; however, the sultan of Egypt arrested all the Venetians in Aleppo, and Bayezid was satisfied.⁵¹ Again in 1510, Ismail gathered an army, because Prince Selim had taken the region of Erzincan, but Bayezid sent an envoy to Persia with many presents and the difficulty was settled.⁵²

In 1511, however, there occurred in Anatolia a great rebellion, led and supported by the *Sofi* heretics. Also many of the Karamanian leaders participated, but probably more for political reasons than for religious beliefs. Upon the death of Prince Shehin in Konya the previous year, they had risen in revolt but accomplished nothing.⁵³ In 1511 a remarkable leader appeared. During all the years of persecution, Shah Kuli had escaped the inquisition, and now he gathered his forces from Attalya and Tekke to ravage the Ottoman empire. When Prince Korkud moved his seat from Attalya to Manisa, Shah Kuli robbed him of many of his effects⁵⁴ which may have given the heretics the means to commence their revolt. Once the movement was under way, it grew in size and weight like a giant snowball.

Late in February, 1511, Shah Kuli and his followers endeavored to take Konya, which was successfully defended by Princes Orhan and Mehmed, grandsons of Bayezid and sons of Princes Alem and Shehin, respectively.⁵⁵ Foiled, Shah Kuli circled to the west and north toward Afyon Karahisar, where he was met by Karagöz Pasha, beylerbey of Anatolia. The Ottomans suffered a serious defeat, and Karagöz Pasha, narrowly escaping capture, fled to Kutahya,⁵⁶ which was his headquarters. Princes Korkud and Ahmed were ordered to gather troops at Manisa and Amasya, respectively, and to march to succor Karagöz.⁵⁷ As there were some janissaries and many *azabs* at Kutahya, the Ottomans felt that the city was impregnable. Undaunted, Shah Kuli and his poorly armed men approached Kutahya, because they knew that within was the treasury of the beylerbey,⁵⁸ who held the money for paying and provisioning his troops. In May, before Korkud or Ahmed had arrived with their armies, Shah Kuli and his *kizil-bashis* assaulted and took Kutahya, capturing Karagöz and a number of sanjakbeys. For a few days they reveled in acquiring booty and slaughtering the troops and inhabitants, and then pro-

⁵¹ Hahli Edhem, V, 275; "De fatti illustri di Selim Imperator de Turchi," in *Dell'istoria universale dell'origine et imperio de Turchi* (Sansovino, ed.), p. 403r.

⁵² Andrea de Civald to Nicolo Venier, Damascus, July 15, 1510, summarized in Sanuto, XI, 477; Nicolo Zustinam to Venetian Government, Istanbul, Dec. 5, 1510, summarized in *ibid.*, XI, 809-810.

⁵³ DaLezze, p. 269.

⁵⁴ Hammer, IV, 108.

⁵⁵ "De fatti illustri," p. 403r; Knolles, *The Turkish history*, I, 321.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ Also because the city was considered safe, many merchants of Anatolia had deposited their valuables there.

ceeded to the Sakaria River with Bursa as their objective.⁵⁹ The news of their success almost paralyzed Istanbul, but the Porte rose to the occasion and set the crack troops in motion to rout the heretics.⁶⁰

Ali Pasha, the grand vizir, crossed to Asia with four thousand janissaries and sipahis to oppose Shah Kuli.⁶¹ Princes Ahmed, Korkud, and Mehmed⁶² were called to support Ali Pasha, but Korkud did not appear, either because of fright or because of a false rumor of Bayezid's death.⁶³ Having impaled Karagöz Pasha, Shah Kuli began to retreat before the formidable army of Ali Pasha. Between the Sakaria and Ankara, Shah Kuli halted and retired upon a mountain to defy Ali Pasha, who immediately endeavored to surround the rebels. But Shah Kuli was resourceful and escaped during the night by the ruse of leaving his camp fires burning.⁶⁴ The janissaries were angry with Ali Pasha for this lost opportunity since he had counseled delaying the attack until the arrival of Prince Ahmed. Joined by Ahmed at Ankara, Ali crossed the Kizil Irmak and proceeded toward Kaysari but only caught stragglers from Shah Kuli's troops.⁶⁵ Ali grew impatient, and leaving the foot soldiers to advance more slowly under Ahmed, he took the Rumelian cavalry and caught up with Shah Kuli at Sarmusaklu near Kaysari.⁶⁶ The heretics were encamped in the hills, but Ali was bold and attacked, though his men were weary from the hot sun and hard riding. Like Sultan Selim I, several years later, he may not have wished to give the Bektashis among his men time to consider fully the beliefs of those whom they were attacking. The Ottoman horsemen were winning the battle until Ali Pasha fell, whereupon they retired from the field.⁶⁷ But Shah Kuli had also been killed in the engagement.⁶⁸ When Ahmed appeared on the scene several days later, he found that the *Sofis* had scattered and that the rebellion had subsided. After remaining in the region for some weeks to clear away the heretics, the Ottoman soldiers then turned and began to pillage in Anatolia, robbing

⁵⁹ Knolles, *The Turkish history*, I, 322; "De fatti illustri," pp. 404r-404v; Nicolò Zustignam to Venetian Government, Edirne, May 2-5, 1511, summarized in Sanuto, XII, 199; Andrea Foscolo to Piero Foscolo, Pera, June 18, 24, Aug. 27, 1511, summarized in *ibid.*, XII, 507-512, XIII, 114-117.

⁶⁰ Since many of the government officials and almost all of the janissaries belonged to the Bektashi order, it probably was not an easy task to urge them on against the *kizil-bashis*. Similarly, Selim I several years later experienced difficulty and exercised considerable diplomacy in obtaining the full efforts of the janissaries against Shah Ismail, a fellow Bektashi (Birge, *The Bektashi order of dervishes*, pp. 66-67).

⁶¹ Andrea Foscolo to Piero Foscolo, Pera, June 18, 1511, summarized in Sanuto, XII, 507-510; Spandugino, p. 257. ⁶² Mehmed was a son of Prince Shehin.

⁶³ "De fatti illustri," p. 403r; Andrea Foscolo to Piero Foscolo, Pera, June 24, July 12, 1511, summarized in Sanuto, XII, 510-513.

⁶⁴ Sanuto, XII, 510-513; Le Strange, *Don Juan of Persia*, p. 114.

⁶⁵ Knolles, *The Turkish history*, I, 323; Andrea Foscolo to Piero Foscolo, Pera, June 24, July 12, Aug. 27, 1511, summarized in Sanuto, XII, 510-513, XIII, 114-117.

⁶⁶ Presumably the foot soldiers, or at least the janissaries among them, were all Bektashis. This would be one good reason for leaving them behind.

⁶⁷ Andrea Foscolo to Piero Foscolo, Pera, June 24, July 12, Aug. 27, 1511, summarized in Sanuto, XII, 510-513, XIII, 114-117; Nicolò Zustignam to Venetian Government, Edirne, July 15-17, 1511, summarized in *ibid.*, XII, 343; "De fatti illustri," p. 405v; Spandugino, pp. 177, 257; Knolles, *The Turkish history*, I, 323.

⁶⁸ Browne, *History of Persian literature*, p. 71; Spandugino, p. 257.

and taking many of the inhabitants as slaves, saying that they were of the *Sofi* sect.⁶⁹ The extent of the ravaging by the soldiers is uncertain but undoubtedly it was not so great a vengeance as that wrought on the *Sofis* by Selim I several years later.⁷⁰

To escape the wrath of the Ottoman soldiers, some of the *Sofis* fled to Persia, seeking the shelter of Shah Ismail. On their way they robbed a caravan richly laden with silk for Bursa, which act may have been the cause for Ismail's condemnation and execution of some of the fugitives.⁷¹ More probably, Ismail's reason was based on his wish to show that this rebellion had not been directly sponsored by him and to avoid any complicity or doubt in the matter.⁷² Evidence for the latter assumption is not wanting. During the spring and summer of 1511, when the rebellion was at its height, an ambassador from Ismail arrived at the Porte. As a present he brought in a silver casket the head of Shahabey Khan, whom Ismail had slain the previous autumn.⁷³ The Persian envoy arrived May 30, 1511, and while at the Porte he was closely guarded, because of the fear that he might learn of the dissension that had arisen among Bayezid's sons and their respective adherents at the court. Bayezid was afraid that if Ismail learned the true proportions of this controversy he might actively aid the Turkish *Sofis*.⁷⁴ After many gifts and avowals of friendship had been exchanged, Ismail's ambassador returned to Persia.

The departure of the envoy and the curtailment of the *Sofi* heresy terminated the events in the relations of Bayezid with Ismail. For the remaining year of Bayezid's life, harmony reigned between the two governments. Unofficially there was much tension, because in the spring of 1512, when it became obvious that Selim would succeed his father, Prince Ahmed allied with Persia and the *kizil-bashis* in an attempt to defeat his brother. The incidents of this alliance, however, will be discussed later. Before describing the fratricidal quarrels of Ahmed, Korkud, and Selim and their foreign implications, Bayezid's relations with the Christian powers during the years when his principal interests were directed toward Persia and the *Sofi* heresy should be considered.

From the signing of the treaties in 1503 with Venice and Hungary until Bayezid's death in 1512, Turkey was at peace with the western

⁶⁹ Andrea Foscolo to Piero Foscolo, Pera, Aug. 27, 1511, summarized in Sanuto, XIII, 114-117.

⁷⁰ Birge, *The Bektashi order of dervishes*, p. 66. This massacre by Selim has been placed in Bayezid's reign by Knolles (*The Turkish history*, I, 324), but he is confused in his chronology. He dates the whole rebellion in 1509, and states that it occurred a few months before the great earthquake of September, 1509.

⁷¹ Knolles, *The Turkish history*, I, 324; Letter, Ragusa, Oct. 15, 1511, summarized in Sanuto, XIII, 187; Andrea Foscolo to Venetian Government, Istanbul, Nov. 15, 1511, summarized in *ibid.*, XIII, 358. ⁷² Browne, *History of Persian literature*, p. 71.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 65; Spandugino, "La Vita di Sach Ismail," pp. 101v-102r. ⁷⁴ Per the *Sofis* and *Sofis* nella quale si vede la cagione della controversia ch'è tra il Shah Ismail e il Sultan Bayezid, *versale*, p. 101v; Thoma Contarini to Zorzi Venier, Cairo, Apr. 3, 1511, summarized in Sanuto, XII, 236; Nicolò Zustignam to Venetian Government, Edirne, May 15, 1511, summarized in *ibid.*, XII, 273; Andrea Foscolo to Piero Foscolo, Pera, June 18, 24, July 12, 1511, summarized in *ibid.*, XII, 507-513.

⁷⁵ Andrea Foscolo to Piero Foscolo, Pera, June 24, 1511, summarized in Sanuto, XII, 510-512.

nations, and it might be termed an "era of good feelings." The Turco-Hungarian treaty was to endure for seven years, and the peace was not broken in spite of the death of Stepan Karabogdan of Moldavia and the subsequent rivalry between his two sons, one of whom was supported by Hungary and the other by Turkey.⁷⁵ When the Moldavian prince died in 1504, a Turkish envoy was dispatched to Hungary to secure the non-intervention of the king.⁷⁶ No understanding was reached for several years, but the Turkish candidate was successful and was recognized by Hungary in 1508.⁷⁷ Besides the Moldavian difficulty, there were the usual Balkan frontier quarrels and raids, which were, however, settled peaceably. In 1510 at the expiration of the treaty of 1503, Bayezid was eager to renew it for seven years more. Hungary, nevertheless, delayed because Maximilian, Louis XII, and Julius II were urging her to join the League of Cambrai and break with Turkey. In 1508, when they had formed a ring around Venice, Hungary had remained aloof because she feared that Venice might call upon Bayezid to cross the Hungarian frontier and because she was receiving a subsidy from Venice. Now the members of the League, to prevent Hungary from aiding Venice, sought to open a breach between Hungary and the Porte by offering the Dalmatian coast as an inducement to the former.⁷⁸ These negotiations, however, proved futile, for in July, 1510, the Turco-Hungarian treaty was extended for one year,⁷⁹ and then in the winter of 1511-1512, peace was renewed for five years more.⁸⁰

One of the minor causes of the Turco-Venetian war in 1499 had been piracy, and in an age when the distinction between merchant and pirate was not finely drawn, a peace treaty could hardly convince the sailors and the sea captains that piracy was outlawed. Numerous clashes, therefore, between the Turks and the Venetians occurred on the sea. All were settled peacefully, even an incident in 1506 near Otranto where two Turkish ships were sunk and a Venetian galley was taken to Istanbul.⁸¹ The reason for this amity was the *Sofis*'s rise and the attack on Venice by the European powers. In 1509 when the members of the League of Cambrai routed the Venetians, the vizirs professed sympathy with the Venetian *bailo* and

⁷⁵ Leonardi di Massari to Giovanni Badoer, Buda, July 26, 1504, summarized in *ibid.*, VI, 49-51; Letter, Istanbul, July 28, 1504, summarized in *ibid.*, VI, 66.

⁷⁶ Letter, Buda, Sept. 7-8, 1504, summarized in *ibid.*, VI, 67.

⁷⁷ Vicenzo Guidoto to Venetian Government, Buda, n.d., summarized in *ibid.*, VII, 591, 640.

⁷⁸ Nicolo Zustignam to Venetian Government, Edirne, June 9, 1510, summarized in *ibid.*, X, 716; Piero Pasqualigo to Venetian Government, Tatha, June 18, 23, July 2, 10-11, 1510, summarized in *ibid.*, X, 757, 759, 824, 850.

⁷⁹ Lodovico Valdrim to Venetian Government, Edirne, Aug. 3, 1510, summarized in *ibid.*, XI, 294.

⁸⁰ Piero Pasqualigo to Venetian Government, Buda, Oct. 22, 1511, summarized in *ibid.*, XIII, 197; Andrea Foscolo to Venetian Government, Istanbul, Jan. 29, 1512, summarized in *ibid.*, XIII, 521.

⁸¹ Piero Balbi to Venetian Government, Otranto, July 9, 1506, summarized in *ibid.*, VI, 378; Leonardo Bembo to Venetian Government, Istanbul, Sept. 7, 1506, summarized in *ibid.*, VI, 469.

asked him why the Porte had not been called upon for aid.⁸² This idea, moreover, was not novel, for the subject was seriously debated in the Venetian Senate, and finally Hironimo Zorzi was sent to Serajevo to secure aid from Firuz Bey.⁸³ The Porte, however, had not been frank with the *bailo* and excused its delay by the uncertainty of the Hungarian affairs and the question of Venetian sincerity.⁸⁴

At Sarajevo, Zorzi discovered that Firuz Bey had been forbidden to send aid to Venice, but some Turks were employed as mercenary soldiers.⁸⁵ Finally, to secure a formal league with Turkey, Venice decided on December 17, 1510, to send Alvise Arimondo as an ambassador to Turkey.⁸⁶ He arrived at Edirne in March, 1511, and after vainly trying to persuade the vizirs to aid Venice he departed in May with kind words and presents, but no alliance.⁸⁷ The reason was not unfriendliness toward Venice but only an unwillingness on the part of Turkey to engage in the conflict at a time when the *Sofis* and the *kizil-bashis* were threatening so menacingly in Asia Minor.

With the other Moslem nations, Bayezid was friendly. Spain was attacking the Moors of North Africa, who sought aid from the Porte. Turkey, however, was interested only to the extent of sending Kemal with some ships to Tunis.⁸⁸ On the other hand, Egypt was occupied in a contest with Portugal over the Indian trade.⁸⁹ In 1510, an Egyptian ambassador came to Edirne to secure iron, artillery, and ships for the fleet of his sultan, who swore to defeat the Portuguese.⁹⁰ Kemal was sent from Istanbul with a small fleet heavily laden with naval supplies and experts, but near Samos it was wrecked by a storm and consequently never reached Alexandria.⁹¹ But other expeditions,⁹² sent from Istanbul, arrived in Egypt, and during the remainder of Bayezid's life, Turkey furnished many war supplies, timber, copper, guns, oars, masts, and sails to the

⁸² Andrea Foscolo to Venetian Government, Istanbul, June 12, 1509, summarized in *ibid.*, VIII, 509. ⁸³ *Ibid.*, IX, 424.

⁸⁴ The vizirs asked the *bailo*: "Quando vessemo ajutar la Signoria e darli zente e passar exercito in Italia, che cauzion haria il Signor da vuy cristiano non vi acordesce insieme e tajarne tutti a pezzi li in Italia" (Nicolo Zustignam to Venetian Government, Edirne, Dec. 26, 1509, summarized in *ibid.*, IX, 527).

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, X, 704; Nicolo Zustignam to Venetian Government, Edirne, Mar. 20, 1510, summarized in *ibid.*, X, 198-199; Hironimo Zorzi to Venetian Government, Sarajevo, Apr. 28, 1510, summarized in *ibid.*, X, 343; Nicolo Zustignam to Venetian Government, Edirne, June 21, 1510, summarized in *ibid.*, X, 801. ⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, XI, 683.

⁸⁷ Augustin Bernardo to Giovanni Badoer, Edirne, Mar. 26, 1511, summarized in *ibid.*, XII, 144; Nicolo Zustignam to Venetian Government, Edirne, May 5, 1511, summarized in *ibid.*, XII, 199. Arimondo died the evening he reached Venice and unfortunately gave no report to the Senate.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, VI, 26; Donado DaLesse to Venetian Government, Zante, n.d., summarized in *ibid.*, VI, 300. ⁸⁹ Stripling, *The Ottoman Turks and the Arabs, 1511-1574*, pp. 29-36.

⁹⁰ Piero Zen to Venetian Government, Apr. 5, 1510, summarized in Sanuto, X, 637; Lodovico Valdrim to Venetian Government, Edirne, July 5, 1510, summarized in *ibid.*, XI, 55.

⁹¹ Lodovico Valdrim to Venetian Government, Edirne, Nov. 8, 1510, summarized in *ibid.*, XI, 663.

⁹² In all, Bayezid sent timber for thirty ships, three hundred iron guns, one hundred fifty masts, three thousand oars, sails, and much other apparatus and material, such as copper (Stripling, *The Ottoman Turks and the Arabs, 1511-1574*, pp. 32-33).

sultan of Egypt for his attempt to oust the Portuguese from their position in India.⁹⁸

At the close of the year 1511, Bayezid, to the casual observer, appeared at peace with the world. A five-year peace which included Hungary, Poland, and Venice had just been signed, and Venice instead of being opposed to the Porte was moving heaven and earth in an attempt to secure Ottoman aid against the League of Cambrai. In the Moslem world of the west, Bayezid was looked upon as the chief defender of the faith, and each ruler came to the Porte with his difficulties. With Persia, Bayezid was at peace, not so much because of good feeling toward the *Sofi*, as because of Bayezid's and Ismail's engagements in domestic affairs. The *Sofi's* followers within the Ottoman empire had been temporarily subdued and the heresy was being crushed.

But there was no peace within the Ottoman government. Bayezid was becoming feeble, and his sons were gathering forces and strengthening themselves for the inevitable conflict that would follow his death. Since this was expected and rumored almost daily, the three remaining sons, Ahmed, Korkud, and Selim, pursued every kind of intrigue, both domestic and foreign, to further their ends.

⁹⁸ Pelegrim Venier to Venetian Government, Palermo, Dec. 24, 1510, summarized in Sanuto, XI, 736; Piero Loredano to Nicolo Bernardo, Cairo, Dec. 6, 1510, summarized in *ibid.*, XI, 829; Andrea Foscolo to Venetian Government, Istanbul, Sept. 25, 1511, summarized in *ibid.*, XIII, 220; Marcantonio Mora to Donado Marzello, Alexandria, May 9, 1512, summarized in *ibid.*, XIV, 500.

CHAPTER VIII

BAYEZID'S DEPOSITION AND DEATH, 1511-1512

WHEN the Persian ambassador was at the Porte in the summer of 1511, he was guarded closely and held incommunicado in order that the great rivalry among Bayezid's sons might not be too apparent to him.¹ At that time Prince Selim, the youngest son, was in open revolt against his father, and each of the other sons, Princes Ahmed and Korkud, was using every possible force to advance his position as successor to Bayezid, who had been in poor health for several years.

It has been asserted² that Mehmed II planned to kill Bayezid in the spring of 1481 because Bayezid had eight sons and because Mehmed II, perceiving the forces of true unity which were developing rapidly within the Ottoman state, realized that if Bayezid became sultan he would have difficulty in controlling so many sons. If these assumptions are correct, Mehmed II was a discerning ruler, for during the last twelve years of Bayezid's reign his sons were a severe trial to him and created much confusion and weakness within the Ottoman empire.

The eight sons in the probable order of their births were: Abdullah, Shehin, Alem, Ahmed, Mehmed, Korkud, Mahmud, and Selim.³ When a prince reached an age of from ten to fourteen, the custom was to assign a province to him in order that he might become skillful in the art of ruling. Pashas and clerks were delegated by the Porte to wait upon him and to advise and aid him in the administration of his provincial government. It was also the custom that the sons remain in Asiatic Turkey, probably because this was considered the true homeland of the Turks and because Istanbul and Edirne were easier of access from European Turkey. In Asia Minor, Konya, Manisa, Amasya, Kastamuni, Attalya, Kaffa (more exactly in eastern Europe), and Trebizond were some of the cities where the sons held their courts.

Upon the flight of Jem in 1481, Prince Abdullah, who had been assigned to Manisa, was given Konya to rule. However he died in 1483⁴ and was thus removed from the picture so early that Venetians later reported that Bayezid had had seven sons.⁵ The first sign that Bayezid still had too many sons came in 1499 during the campaign against Lepanto. Selim refused to send six hundred men for the fleet,⁶ and at the end of the campaign Bayezid hurried back to Edirne because some of his sons were in arms.⁷ He had been afraid of such an occurrence from the beginning

¹ See above, page 99. ² See above, page 16, note 22.

³ This order is based on the importance of the provinces assigned to them by Bayezid, and the subsequent shifts that were made following the deaths of certain sons.

⁴ Hammer, IV, 11.

⁵ Relation of Leonardo Bembo, Venice, July 3, 1508, summarized in Sanuto, VII, 569.

⁶ Relation of Andrea Zanchani, Venice, May 10, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, II, 696.

⁷ Deposition, Modon, Sept. 26, 1499, summarized in *ibid.*, III, 28.

of the expedition, but had gone to please the janissaries. From that time until the end of Bayezid's reign he was continually vexed and hampered by the bickering and jealousy among his sons. As Bayezid grew older and more feeble and the number of sons diminished, the intensity of the suspicions and rivalry of the surviving sons increased.

In 1503, Alem died a natural death. He had been a favorite of Bayezid, who, upon learning the news, ordered all shops in Istanbul to be closed for three days, and for several weeks gave alms to the poor for Alem's spirit.⁸ Later in that year the remaining six sons were invited to Istanbul to attend a great circumcision fête but, fearing that Bayezid would execute all but one, they corresponded among themselves and then declined the invitation.⁹ Already each son was intriguing to have his friends and adherents advanced to important governmental positions, and in 1504, when the beylerbey of Rumelia died and there was considerable shifting of officials, Mehmed succeeded in having his friend, Hasan, appointed beylerbey of Anatolia.¹⁰

The sons were trying to strengthen their positions, but Mahmud was too eager. In 1505 when there was a shortage of grain in Istanbul and the pirates were preying upon the ships outside of the Straits, Mahmud, who resided at Kaffa and had married a Tartar princess, closed all the Crimean ports and forbade ships to leave with grain. This act so angered Bayezid that he sent some poisoned gifts to his son.¹¹ After Mahmud's death, Bayezid declared he would send a sanjakbey there and not a son, but this statement was evidently withdrawn, for Selim's son, Suleiman, later became governor of Kaffa.

Each of Bayezid's sons possessed striking qualities, which often led to strange results. Perhaps the most unusual character was Mehmed, who enjoyed traveling about the empire like a troubadour. After Alem died, Mehmed was transferred from Kastamuni to Manisa, and upon one occasion he visited the court of his brother Ahmed in the disguise of a singing dervish. Ahmed, who was noted for his parsimony, gave him the small sum of five aspers, whereupon Mehmed, when he had returned home, sent the coin to Ahmed and berated him for his closeness.¹² Bayezid was not pleased with this incident, because a son was not allowed to leave his province without permission from the Porte, but Mehmed did not

reform, for shortly afterwards he decided to visit Istanbul. In 1507, departing from Manisa dressed like a sea captain, he came and wandered about the city for several days. The temptation to see the court was too great, and though he was not recognized until leaving, word reached his father's ears that Mehmed had been at the Porte. Bayezid was angry and ordered that Mehmed should be poisoned. When the deed had been accomplished, Bayezid felt or feigned grief and increased his charitable donations.¹³

Of the four remaining sons, Shehin, though the eldest, was not considered as a candidate for sultan because he had a withered leg.¹⁴ This defect might have saved him from execution had he outlived his father, but Shehin drank himself to death in 1510.¹⁵ Though Shehin had an able son, Prince Mehmed, who succeeded him at Konya,¹⁶ the rivalry had now virtually narrowed down to three, Princes Ahmed, Korkud, and Selim.

Greater differences in characters could hardly be found in any three brothers.¹⁷ Ahmed was a pleasure-loving politician, amiable and regal, but not noted for his largess, the lack of which together with an ineptitude in war brought him the disfavor of the janissaries. These qualities, however, did not deter the patronage and the obvious preference given him by Bayezid and the high officials at the Porte. Korkud, a poet and a scholar, was so steeped in theology and philosophy that the officials at the Porte and the janissaries deemed him unfit to rule. Selim, later called "the Grim," showed by his acts that he was cunning, ruthless, energetic, and generous. Because of these qualities, and perhaps because he was a member of the Bektashi order,¹⁸ the janissaries loved him, and felt that he would maintain and increase the empire and pay them liberally. Bayezid and the vizirs preferred Ahmed, the poets and the theologians supported Korkud, but the soldiers chose Selim.

In 1481 when the janissaries became unruly after the death of Mehmed II, the vizirs placed Korkud upon the throne until the arrival of Bayezid, who tacitly agreed that Korkud should be his successor. During the years of 1508 and 1509 when Bayezid was dangerously ill and the French doctor in attendance was saying that the sultan would not be able to live long,¹⁹ Korkud became uneasy because Selim was extending his province to include Kaffa and the friends of Ahmed were being appointed to high

⁸ Beneto Pesaro to Venetian Government, Corfu, Mar. 29, 1503, summarized in *ibid.*, V, 16; Caroldo to Venetian Government, n.d., n.p., summarized in *ibid.*, V, 462; Menavino, "Della vita et legge Turchesca," in *Dell'istoria universale*, p. 49v.

⁹ Zaccaria di Freschi to Venetian Government, Cattaro, Dec. 17, 1503, summarized in Sanuto, V, 670. Gritti, who reported to Venice in 1503, mentioned only three sons, Princes Ahmed, Korkud, and Selim, and stated that Selim had come into Europe (*Relazione*, pp. 23-24), and therefore it is probable that his account, as published by Alberi, was edited later.

¹⁰ Leonardo Bembo to Venetian Government, Istanbul, Jan. 18, 1504, summarized in Sanuto, V, 1035.

¹¹ Relation of Jacomo Contarini, Venice, Mar. 1, 1507, summarized in *ibid.*, VII, 13-14; VI, 141-142.

¹² Menavino, "Della vita et legge Turchesca," in *Dell'istoria universale*, pp. 49v-50r.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 50r-50v; Leonardo Bembo to Venetian Government, Istanbul, Oct. 21, 1507, summarized in Sanuto, VII, 231.

¹⁴ Andrea Foscolo to Venetian Government, Istanbul, Jan. 6, June 18, 1511, summarized in Sanuto, XII, 170, 507. No one with a physical defect could become sultan.

¹⁵ DaLezze, p. 269; Nicolo Zustignam to Venetian Government, Edirne, July 15-17, 1511, summarized in Sanuto, XII, 343.

¹⁶ Andrea Foscolo to Venetian Government, Istanbul, June 18, 1511, summarized in Sanuto, XII, 507; Menavino, "Della vita et legge Turchesca," in *Dell'istoria universale*, p. 50v. This was Prince Mehmed (see above, page 97).

¹⁷ Gritti, pp. 23-24. ¹⁸ Birge, *The Bektashi order of dervishes*, p. 67, n. 2.

¹⁹ Zorzi Pisani to Venetian Government, Rome, Nov. 5, 1508, summarized in Sanuto, VII, 664.

office.²⁰ Ali Pasha appropriated some lands that by law belonged to him as grand vizir. However since these had not been held previously, Korkud, in whose province they were situated, protested, but in vain.²¹ Feeling that he was an outcast in his own land, he gathered a few men and ships and sailed from Attalya in May, 1509, to seek aid from the sultan of Egypt.²² In Alexandria and Cairo, Korkud was received royally, but Bayezid sent word to the sultan of Egypt that any support given to Korkud would be considered as an attack on the Ottoman empire.²³ Since Egypt in this year was in the midst of a disastrous war with the Portuguese and the Mamluk fleet had just been destroyed, Egypt was forced, upon such a threat from the Porte, to desist from furnishing any arms to Korkud. Realizing that he could not fight both his father and Ali Pasha, Korkud wrote to the Porte asking to be reinstated and saying that he had only intended to go on a pilgrimage to Mecca.²⁴ In July, 1510, an Egyptian ambassador came to Edirne to negotiate Korkud's return. This was arranged,²⁵ and Korkud set out with his fleet for Attalya, but, being attacked by the Knights of Rhodes,²⁶ he was forced to land at Alexandretta. A few months later Bayezid transferred Korkud from Attalya to Manisa, which move perturbed Selim, who, though he was Korkud's full brother, was hoping to be appointed to this province,²⁷ because it was closer to Istanbul than was Trebizond.

In the same year that Korkud returned from Egypt, Prince Selim began a more active strategy in his campaign for the throne. He obtained two valuable appointments; his relative, Iskender Bey, who had been *bostanji-bashi* (chief gardener), became sanjakbey of Gallipoli and *kapudan* of the fleet;²⁸ and Prince Suleiman, Selim's only son, was given Kaffa to govern.²⁹ The latter assignment created considerable friction, because Ahmed had hoped to secure this for one of his sons and because

²⁰ DaLezze, p. 269. Hersekoglu, who was Ahmed's brother-in-law, had been appointed vizir, and Ali Pasha, the grand vizir, also favored Ahmed (Andrea Foscolo to Venetian Government, Istanbul, June 18, 1509, summarized in Sanuto, IX, 12; Hammer, IV, 95).

²¹ Hammer, IV, 95-96.

²² *Ibid.*, IV, 96-97; Andrea Foscolo to Venetian Government, Istanbul, June 18, 1509, summarized in Sanuto, IX, 12.

²³ Marin da Molin to Venetian Government, Alexandria, n.d., and Jan. 5, 1510, summarized in Sanuto, IX, 27; X, 432.

²⁴ Letter, Candia, n.d., summarized in *ibid.*, IX, 126; Relation of Marin da Molin, Venice, Aug. 10, 1510, summarized in *ibid.*, X, 76; Hammer, IV, 97-98.

²⁵ Lodovico Valdrim to Venetian Government, Edirne, Aug. 3, 1510, summarized in Sanuto, XI, 294.

²⁶ Nicolo Pisani to Venetian Government, Nicsia, Aug. 15, 1510, summarized in *ibid.*, XI, 469; Pelegrin Venier to Venetian Government, Palermo, Oct. 22, 1510, summarized in *ibid.*, XI, 639; Piero Liom to Venetian Government, Famagosta, Oct. 17, 1510, summarized in *ibid.*, XI, 645.

²⁷ Nicolo Zustignam to Venetian Government, Edirne, Aug. 28, 1510, summarized in *ibid.*, XI, 418; Ivan Coresi to Venetian Government, Chios, July 20, 1511, summarized in *ibid.*, XII, 433; Andrea Foscolo to Venetian Government, Istanbul, June 18, 1511, summarized in *ibid.*, XII, 508.

²⁸ Iskender Bey was rapidly promoted from the sanjakbey of Negroponte to *bostanji-bashi* to *kapudan* of the fleet (Lodovico Valdrim to Venetian Government, Edirne, Mar. 27, May 31, 1510, summarized in *ibid.*, X, 202, 669).

²⁹ Andrea Foscolo to Venetian Government, Istanbul, May 21, 1510, summarized in *ibid.*, X, 667.

Selim immediately moved many of his troops to Kaffa, from which point he could easily march into European Turkey. About the same time Selim, against his father's wishes, married Prince Mahmud's widow, who was the daughter of a Tartar khan.³⁰ This alliance greatly increased Selim's strength in man power, and after his move to Kaffa, Bayezid was forced to order the sanjakbeys of Kilis and Akerman to watch all roads and prevent men from going to Selim's court.³¹

In the spring of 1511, Bayezid's health improved, though he was still confined to his bed.³² The sons, however, were not assured that the reports of his condition were correct and began to move toward the center of the empire. With the real excuse of the *Sofi* rebellion, Prince Ahmed left Amasya and came to Bolu, four days distance from Istanbul.³³ Simultaneously Prince Selim gathered his men, the majority of whom were Tartars, and advanced to Kilis, on the plea that he wished to kiss the hand of his father whom he had not seen for twenty-six years.³⁴ With all these manoeuvres, the cares of the empire became too great for Bayezid, and he suggested to his vizirs that he abdicate in favor of Ahmed, but they, feeling that Selim would in all probability be victorious over Ahmed, advised Bayezid to delay.³⁵ The vizirs knew that if Bayezid were counseled by them to raise Ahmed to the throne, Selim would execute them after he had defeated Ahmed.

In June, Selim drew near to Edirne, and to placate him, Bayezid assigned Bosnia and Semendra to him, but these did not satisfy Selim for he demanded Silistra as well.³⁶ Then came the news that Shah Kuli had been successful in Anatolia, whereupon Selim declined to go to his new post,³⁷ because Ali Pasha, who favored Ahmed, had been sent with a considerable force to Anatolia. Selim was afraid that should Ali Pasha and Prince Ahmed be victorious they might then unite and cross to Europe against him. With this in mind, Selim camped near Edirne, continually increasing his army at the expense of his father's by offering double pay.³⁸

³⁰ Nicolo Zustignam to Venetian Government, Istanbul, Dec. 5, 1510, summarized in *ibid.*, XI, 810; "De fatti illustri," p. 407r.

³¹ Lodovico Valdrim to Venetian Government, Edirne, May 31, 1510, summarized in Sanuto, X, 669.

³² Nicolo Zustignam to Venetian Government, Edirne, Mar. 9, 1511, summarized in *ibid.*, XII, 113.

³³ Andrea Foscolo to Venetian Government, Istanbul, Jan. 6, 1511, summarized in *ibid.*, XII, 170.

³⁴ Andrea Foscolo to Venetian Government, Istanbul, May 13, 1511, summarized in *ibid.*, XII, 244-245; Lodovico Valdrim to Venetian Government, Edirne, May 27-June 3, 1511, summarized in *ibid.*, XII, 273; DaLezze, p. 269.

³⁵ Halil Edhem, V, 286-287; Andrea Foscolo to Piero Foscolo, Pera, June 18, 1511, summarized in Sanuto, XII, 508-509.

³⁶ Nicolo Zustignam to Venetian Government, Edirne, June 18, 1511, summarized in Sanuto, XII, 299; Andrea Foscolo to Piero Foscolo, Pera, June 24, 1511, summarized in *ibid.*, XII, 511; DaLezze, p. 271; Spandugino, *De la origine*, p. 178.

³⁷ Nicolo Zustignam to Venetian Government, Edirne, July 15-17, 1511, summarized in Sanuto, XII, 343; Ivan Coresi to Venetian Government, Chios, July 20, 1511, summarized in *ibid.*, XII, 433.

³⁸ Andrea Foscolo to Piero Foscolo, Pera, June 24, 1511, summarized in *ibid.*, XII, 511-512.

Probably Selim did not intend to fight his father, but if Bayezid should die or abdicate in favor of Ahmed, Selim wished to be ready to march on Istanbul.

Bayezid could find no pasha to attack and drive Selim to his new province, because each officer, feeling that Selim would be the next sultan, did not dare to incur his wrath.³⁹ Through some channel, Bayezid heard a rumor that Selim was planning to circle Edirne and go to Istanbul to seize the imperial treasury.⁴⁰ Without waiting to ascertain the verity of this information, Bayezid departed for Istanbul and Prince Selim entered Edirne.⁴¹ Because Prince Ahmed was in Bursa, Selim then proceeded to follow his father, fearing that he was going to Istanbul to abdicate in favor of Ahmed. Early in August, 1511, Selim caught up with Bayezid near Tchörü, where a battle occurred. At first the imperial troops refused to draw their swords, but Bayezid raised himself from his litter and spoke to his men, cursing Selim and imploring them to fight for their sultan. Later, Selim maintained that he had been informed that Bayezid was dead and that he had deserted the field when he had learned otherwise.⁴²

Bayezid then proceeded to Istanbul, which he entered on August 14, 1511.⁴³ Prince Ahmed was still encamped close to the Bosphorus in Anatolia, and the forces of Bayezid were ordered to remain a short distance outside Istanbul.⁴⁴ Selim knew of his father's desire to leave the empire to Ahmed, and to prevent this Selim went to Varna and thence to Kaffa to prepare a stronger force for the coming year.⁴⁵ Two things stood in the way of Ahmed's crossing from Uskudar to Istanbul and becoming sultan. One was that the janissaries would not accept him, and the other was that Selim with the aid of the *kapudan* had a fleet in the Bosphorus to prevent such an occurrence.⁴⁶

Bayezid preferred Prince Ahmed and wished to abdicate in his favor, but the soldiers could not be won over to the idea. Bayezid argued with

them and offered them many gifts and increases in pay if they would accept Ahmed,⁴⁷ but they stated that Ahmed was fat and could not lead them in war⁴⁸ and therefore they preferred Selim. On the night of September 20, 1511, the rumor spread among the soldiers that Bayezid and the vizirs planned to bring Ahmed secretly into the city and then declare him sultan. To prevent this, some of the janissaries rose in arms and went to the palace of Mustafa Pasha, one of Ahmed's staunch supporters. Not finding him there, they looted his home and then went to display their wrath to Hersekoglu, who was Ahmed's brother-in-law. Mustafa Pasha had fled when the soldiers approached, but Hersekoglu was courageous and knew how to deal with a frenzied mob. He coolly appeared at his door, asked why they had come, and told them to present their dissatisfaction to Bayezid.⁴⁹ This action probably saved the day, and Bayezid pacified them with gifts and by dismissing Mustafa Pasha, a *kaziasker* (army judge), and the *nishanji-bashi* (chief scribe), all adherents of Prince Ahmed.⁵⁰

Being unable to place Ahmed on the throne, Bayezid gave his favorite son a sum of money from the treasury and ordered him back to Amasya.⁵¹ Ahmed, realizing that his hopes could not be fulfilled in this manner at the present, returned to his province, where he and his sons gathered an army to win control of Anatolia as Selim had in Rumelia. Ahmed's first move was toward Konya, which had been given to Prince Mehmed, a son of Prince Shehin. Mehmed could not stand against Ahmed and surrendered the city to him, begging leniency.⁵² In taking the city, Ahmed captured several of Bayezid's officers, whose heads he sent to the Porte. This affront angered all so much⁵³ that not only Bayezid but also the janissaries sent messengers to Ahmed that he must return Konya to Mehmed and retire to Amasya.⁵⁴ But Ahmed knew that this was a life or death matter, and after rebuffing the messengers, he set out to make himself master of Anatolia.

³⁹ Andrea Foscolo to Piero Foscolo, Pera, June 24-July 21, 1511, summarized in *ibid.*, XII, 511, 515.

⁴⁰ Menavino, "Della vita et legge Turchesca," in *Dell'istoria universale*, p. 51v. Had Selim acquired control over the imperial treasury, it would have been virtually impossible to keep him from taking possession of the throne and the empire.

⁴¹ Andrea Foscolo to Piero Foscolo, Pera, Aug. 24, 1511, summarized in Sanuto, XIII, 46.

⁴² Menavino, "Della vita et legge Turchesca," in *Dell'istoria universale*, p. 52r; Piero Pasqualigo to Venetian Government, Buda, Aug. 20, 1511, summarized in Sanuto, XII, 459; Andrea Foscolo to Piero Foscolo, Pera, Aug. 27, 1511, summarized in *ibid.*, XIII, 115-117; Spandugino, *De la origine*, pp. 178-179.

⁴³ Andrea Foscolo to Piero Foscolo, Pera, Aug. 27, 1511, summarized in Sanuto, XIII, 115-117.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ Andrea Foscolo to Piero Foscolo, Pera, Sept. 26, Nov. 15, 1511, summarized in *ibid.*, XIII, 220-221, 357-358; Nicolo Zustignam to Venetian Government, Istanbul, Oct. 30-Nov. 13, 1511, summarized in *ibid.*, XIII, 342.

⁴⁶ Andrea Foscolo to Piero Foscolo, Pera, June 18, 24, 1511, summarized in *ibid.*, XII, 509, 511. The *kapudan* was a friend of Selim, who had intrigued to secure this post for a supporter (see above, page 106). Selim was a member of the Bektashi order, which was the traditional janissary order; evidence is lacking in regard to Ahmed in this respect. Statements to the effect that one of his sons took the red hat might indicate that previous to that period Ahmed and his family had not been adherents of the order.

⁴⁷ Andrea Foscolo to Piero Foscolo, Pera, Aug. 24, Nov. 15, 1511, summarized in Sanuto, XIII, 47, 358.

⁴⁸ Andrea Foscolo to Piero Foscolo, Pera, Sept. 26, 1511, summarized in *ibid.*, XIII, 222.

⁴⁹ DaLezze, p. 270; Nicolo Zustignam to Venetian Government, Istanbul, Sept. 23, 1511, summarized in Sanuto, XIII, 185; XIII, 221-222.

⁵⁰ Letter, Ragusa, Oct. 10-15, 1511, summarized in *ibid.*, XIII, 186-187; Andrea Foscolo to Piero Foscolo, Pera, Sept. 26, 1511, summarized in *ibid.*, XIII, 222. Mustafa Pasha was dismissed and another Mustafa who had been sanjakbey of the Morea was put in his place.

⁵¹ DaLezze, p. 270; Andrea Foscolo to Piero Foscolo, Pera, Oct. 4, 1511, summarized in Sanuto, XIII, 258.

⁵² Menavino, "Della vita et legge Turchesca," in *Dell'istoria universale*, p. 52v; DaLezze, p. 271; Andrea Foscolo to Piero Foscolo, Pera, Jan. 29, 1512, summarized in Sanuto, XIII, 521; Nicolo Zustignam to Venetian Government, Istanbul, Feb. 23, March 17-23, 1512, summarized in *ibid.*, XIV, 50, 162; Andrea Foscolo to Piero Foscolo, Pera, Mar. 28, 1512, summarized in *ibid.*, XIV, 291-292.

⁵³ It should be remembered that by this time a great majority of the officers of the court were graduates from the palace school, and that among the "alumni" of this school there was a strong "esprit de corps," which would almost certainly have turned any uncertain officers at the Porte against Ahmed (Miller, *The palace school, passim*).

⁵⁴ Andrea Foscolo to Piero Foscolo, Pera, Mar. 28, 1512, summarized in Sanuto, XIV, 291-292; DaLezze, p. 271; Hammer, IV, 117.

During the winter of 1511-1512, Selim remained at Kaffa, building ships and gathering men to return to Edirne in the spring and to bring all of Rumelia under his control.⁵⁵ Ahmed was proving to be successful in unifying Anatolia, and to strengthen his hold still more he married one of his daughters to Shah Ismail of Persia, while one of his sons donned the red hat of the *Sofî* heretics.⁵⁶ In this struggle, therefore, Selim controlled Europe and had the support of the Tartar khan, whereas Ahmed possessed Asia and was aided by the Persian shah.

Finally in March, 1512, after Ahmed had allied with the heretics, had disgraced his father's messengers, and had brought turmoil to Anatolia, Bayezid, partly on his own initiative, partly on the advice of the court, and partly from pressure from the janissaries, called Selim to lead an army against Ahmed.⁵⁷ Messengers with the good news hurried to Selim, who arrived at the outskirts of the city on April 19, 1512.⁵⁸

Before Selim's appearance, however, Korkud with a few companions secretly entered Istanbul and went to the barracks of the janissaries. He had made an attempt to gather an army near Bursa,⁵⁹ but with the power of Ahmed in Anatolia, Korkud had judged that his only hope was to come to Istanbul and make a personal appeal to his father and the soldiers. Korkud was well received, and the aga of the janissaries notified Bayezid of his son's presence. At the Porte Korkud was honored and informed of Selim's coming to lead the army against Ahmed. Korkud emphasized the fact that he had once been sultan, but Bayezid knew that this son was impractical, and would promise him nothing.⁶⁰

When Selim approached Istanbul, conferences with his father were held through intermediaries. Bayezid designated three conditions to Selim before bestowing the army upon him: Bayezid was to die as sultan and then Selim was to succeed him; the imperial treasury was to remain in Bayezid's hands; and Selim was to be lenient with Ahmed.⁶¹ Selim accepted all except the last condition, but he stipulated that Korkud must

⁵⁵ Andrea Foscolo to Piero Foscolo, Pera, Sept. 26, Nov. 15, 1511, Jan. 29, 1512, summarized in Sanuto, XIII, 220, 357, 521; Nicolo Zustinham to Venetian Government, Istanbul, Oct. 30, Nov. 13, 1511, summarized in *ibid.*, XIII, 342.

⁵⁶ Nicolo Zustinham to Venetian Government, Istanbul, Apr. 24, 1512, summarized in *ibid.*, XIV, 246; Letter, Istanbul, n.d., summarized in *ibid.*, XIV, 289; Andrea Foscolo to Piero Foscolo, Pera, Mar. 28, 1512, summarized in *ibid.*, XIV, 292; Bernardo Gondola to Antonio Grimani, Ragusa, June 18, 1512, summarized in *ibid.*, XIV, 464. Without doubt Selim's concern over the spread of the Shiite heresy in Anatolia after he became Sultan was not so much the religious aspects of the situation (Birge, *The Bektashi order of dervishes*, p. 66) as it was the connection which this group had with his brother and rival for the throne.

⁵⁷ Menavino, "Della vita et legge Turchesca," in *Dell'istoria universale*, pp. 52v-53r; Nicolo Zustinham to Venetian Government, Istanbul, Apr. 24, 1512, summarized in Sanuto, XIV, 246.

⁵⁸ Sanuto, XIV, 246.

⁵⁹ Andrea Foscolo to Venetian Government, Pera, Jan. 29, 1512, summarized in *ibid.*, XIII, 521.

⁶⁰ DaLezze, pp. 271-272; Nicolo Zustinham to Venetian Government, Istanbul, Apr. 2, 1512, summarized in Sanuto, XIV, 216; Menavino, "Della vita et legge Turchesca," in *Dell'istoria universale*, pp. 53r-53v.

⁶¹ Nicolo Zustinham to Venetian Government, Istanbul, Apr. 24, 1512, summarized in Sanuto, XIV, 246; Menavino, "Della vita et legge Turchesca," in *Dell'istoria universale*, p. 53v.

leave Istanbul before the army departed.⁶² On the twenty-second of April, Korkud was sent to Manisa and on the following day Selim entered Istanbul.⁶³ Then his demands changed and he declared that he must be made sultan before he set out for Anatolia, saying that while he was gone Bayezid might confer the honor on Korkud. With the troops and most of the officials now paying court to Selim, Bayezid was helpless and was forced to abdicate in favor of Selim.⁶⁴

On April 24, 1512, an agreement was reached between Bayezid and Selim whereby, for the consideration of the empire, Bayezid was granted permission to live out his days in peace at his birthplace, Demotika, to take from the palace what he wished, and to have an income of two hundred thousand aspers annually for the rest of his life. Selim was then girded with the sword of Osman and declared the ninth Ottoman sultan.⁶⁵

Bayezid remained in the palace in Istanbul for twenty days, after which with a train of great length he set out for Demotika. Selim accompanied him outside the walls, where Bayezid with tears in his eyes blessed his son and wished him and his successors a wide and peaceful empire.⁶⁶ Thirteen days later, on May 26, 1512, Bayezid died before reaching Demotika.⁶⁷ It has been asserted by some who were accompanying Bayezid that he was poisoned on Selim's orders. Later in Selim's reign it was publicly said that Selim had killed his father.⁶⁸ The reasons given were that Selim did not dare cross to Asia against Ahmed with Bayezid still living in Europe. Another reason may have been that Selim, not finding enough money in the treasury to fulfil his pledges to the janissaries, suspected that Bayezid had taken a large amount with him.⁶⁹ Upon Bayezid's death, Selim, against his father's wishes, brought the body back to Istanbul and interred it in a turbeh near the mosque which Bayezid had built.⁷⁰

⁶² Menavino, "Della vita et legge Turchesca," in *Dell'istoria universale*, p. 53v; Letter, Istanbul, n.d., summarized in Sanuto, XIV, 289.

⁶³ Nicolo Zustinham to Venetian Government, Istanbul, Apr. 24, 1512, summarized in Sanuto, XIV, 246; Menavino, "Della vita et legge Turchesca," in *Dell'istoria universale*, p. 53v.

⁶⁴ Menavino, "Della vita et legge Turchesca," in *Dell'istoria universale*, p. 53v; Nicolo Zustinham to Venetian Government, Istanbul, Apr. 24, 1512, summarized in Sanuto, XIV, 245.

⁶⁵ Menavino, "Della vita et legge Turchesca," in *Dell'istoria universale*, pp. 53v-54r; Spandugino, *De la origine*, p. 179; DaLezze, p. 272; Letter to Venetian Government, Ragusa, May 10, 1512, summarized in Sanuto, XIV, 222; Nicolo Zustinham to Venetian Government, Istanbul, Apr. 24, 1512, summarized in *ibid.*, XIV, 246.

⁶⁶ Sanuto, XIV, 246; Andrea Foscolo to Venetian Government, Pera, May, 1512, summarized in *ibid.*, XIV, 303-304; Bernardo Gondola to Antonio Grimani, Ragusa, June 18, 1512, summarized in *ibid.*, XIV, 463-464; Menavino, "Della vita et legge Turchesca," in *Dell'istoria universale*, p. 54r.

⁶⁷ Hammer, IV, 123.

⁶⁸ DaLezze, p. 272; Spandugino, *De la origine*, p. 179; Menavino, "Della vita et legge Turchesca," in *Dell'istoria universale*, pp. 54r-54v; Nicolo Zustinham to Venetian Government, Istanbul, June 11, 1512, summarized in Sanuto, XIV, 483; Letter, Cyprus, Mar. 10, 1519, summarized in *ibid.*, XXVII, 41.

⁶⁹ Letter, Istanbul, n.d., summarized in Sanuto, XIV, 289; Andrea Foscolo to Piero Foscolo, Pera, May, 1512, summarized in *ibid.*, XIV, 304; Menavino, "Della vita et legge Turchesca," in *Dell'istoria universale*, p. 54r; Spandugino, *De la origine*, p. 179; DaLezze, p. 272.

⁷⁰ Leonardo Zustinham to Venetian Government, Istanbul, July 12, 1512, summarized in Sanuto, XIV, 578; Menavino, "Della vita et legge Turchesca," in *Dell'istoria universale*, p. 54v; DaLezze, p. 272.

Bayezid was sixty-five years old when he died, and he had ruled the Ottoman empire for nearly thirty-one years. Although the empire had been extended slightly during his reign, these few additions were extremely valuable. Possession of the coastal cities of Greece and Albania placed Turkey in a position to dominate not only the entire Balkan peninsula but also the eastern Mediterranean and its rich trade. Peace had been established with Egypt, and the struggle with Persia had been postponed. Because Bayezid was at heart a man of peace, the conquests of his reign were few and small, but this very peace furthered commercial relations with nearly all the known world to such an extent that Bayezid, in his position on the Bosphorus, was undoubtedly the wealthiest monarch of his age.

Preceded by the Conqueror of Constantinople, and followed first by the conqueror of Syria, the Holy Land, and Egypt, and then by the conqueror of Rhodes and Belgrade and the besieger of Vienna, a sultan called "The Magnificent" or "The Lawgiver," Bayezid II has remained somewhat obscure on the pages of history. Nevertheless, during the years of his reign (1481-1512), the empire which his father so brilliantly created became firmly established as one of the great powers of the world. Weathering civil war, heresy, numerous rebellions against the empire, earthquakes, and plagues, Bayezid erected on the foundations set by Murad II and Mehmed II the solid framework of an edifice, completed and so magnificently embellished by Selim I and Suleiman. To what extent the building was designed by the vizirs and the officers of the Porte instead of Bayezid is difficult to determine, for all was done in his name. Bayezid was weak in handling men, and under his rule the soldiers and the officials at the Porte, who had begun to show their spirit and their influence in the reign of Mehmed II, became in reality all-powerful. Bayezid was raised to the throne by them and in turn deposed by them. At the time, it was said, "They are the ones who dominate and lord it over the country."⁷¹

⁷¹ "... loro son quelli che domina e signorizano el paexe" (Andrea Foscolo to Piero Foscolo, Pera, Mar. 28, 1512, summarized in Sanuto, XIV, 293).

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IN VIEW OF the extensive and rather complete bibliography for this general period of Ottoman history compiled by Dr. Stripling in his monograph, *The Ottoman Turks and the Arabs, 1511-1574*, the following bibliography is limited to titles cited in this study and to a few works concerning the general background of the subject.

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III. BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

For the early portions of this study, the *Historia Turchesca* by Donado DaLezze proved to be of considerable value. The work is a compilation of three authors. The first part, up to the year 1499, was taken, evidently almost verbatim, from Angiolello, with only here and there a phrase inserted by DaLezze. Following this is an account of the siege and fall of Modon by Andrea Balastro, who was captured at Modon by the Turks. The remainder of the book is the work of DaLezze, who at that time resided in Cyprus. DaLezze was not a chronicler but had a sense of history and included many items of importance frequently omitted by ordinary chroniclers.

Spanduguino, a Greco-Italian, spent much of his life in Turkey and had relatives who had become Turks and who, during Spanduguino's life, reached high office at the Porte. Thus, much of the information embodied in his work was probably received from his relatives, Mesih and Hersekoglu Ahmed Pashas, both grand vizirs under Bayezid.

Menavino, like Angiolello, was a slave in Bayezid's court and asserts that he was a member of the suite that started for Demotika with Bayezid in 1512. He was younger than Angiolello and came to the palace about 1505. In describing Bayezid's family he does not mention Abdullah, who had died some twenty years before. It may

be, therefore, that Menavino was not thoroughly familiar with the inside of the palace, or perhaps he did not consider Abdullah important.

The Ottoman chronicle of 'Āsiqpaşāzāde and that translated by Professor Giese end with the year 1490, but they are of great value, especially in narrating the diplomacy and campaigns of the Turco-Egyptian war of 1485-1491. From Neşrî's language and style, it can be assumed that he was an eyewitness of many of the stirring events of 1481 and 1482.

The accounts of Angiolello and Zeno in the Works of The Hakluyt Society, though their titles denote relationship with Uzun Hasan, relate the rise of Shah Ismail of Persia. Zeno was Venetian ambassador at the Persian court and Angiolello served in Ismail's army.

For the latter part of this study the diary of Marino Sanuto has been extremely valuable. Born in 1466, Sanuto began his diary in 1495 and continued it until his death in 1535. He included more than his personal observations on the incidents of his day. A member of a prominent Venetian family, Sanuto was a senator and had access to most of the reports coming in to the government from consuls and ambassadors scattered over Europe, Asia, and Africa. A great many of these letters and reports were summarized in his diary, which thus almost becomes a collection of Venetian state papers.

Of the secondary accounts, the two drawn upon most heavily are the work of von Hammer and the biography of Jem by Thuasne. The former was familiar with all the Near Eastern languages, and, though often he was not a very critical author, his volumes contain the gist of the histories written by Ottomans and Persians. Some modern scholars greatly prefer von Hammer's original German text to the French translation by Hellert. However, an examination of the two with respect to the period covered in this study does not reveal any significant or considerable difference between the two. On this basis, volume and page references are given for the French edition since that edition is more commonly found in American libraries. Thuasne not only has made a detailed study of Jem's life but also has shown its relationship to the politics and diplomacy of the age.

Halil Edhem, in his articles on Hersekoglu Ahmed Pasha, has made use of the Turkish and Arabic sources, and he shows the important role that Hersekoglu played in the government and in diplomacy under Bayezid.

In conclusion, it is almost impossible to understand correctly the full import of many trends in Ottoman history throughout the period under consideration here without referring to Dr. Wittek's numerous publications in regard to the origins and the development of the Ottoman state.

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